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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of 
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues 
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to 
judicial decisions from the previous year.  The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC v. State, Department of Fish & Game 
In Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC v. State, Department of Fish & Game,1 the 
supreme court held that statements made by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, or 
its personnel, were insufficient to allow Alaska Trademark Shellfish (ATS) to harvest 
geoducks by promissory estoppel.2 ATS applied for state permits to allow it to engage in 
geoduck farming, believing that the permits would allow ATS to harvest wild geoducks 
on its farm sites.3 However, the Department denied the permits because ATS refused to 
agree not to harvest the protected wild geoducks.4 In a previous proceeding, the supreme 
court held that the Department lacked the statutory authority to grant any aquatic farmer 
the exclusive right to harvest wild stocks.5 Here, the supreme court concluded that the 
record contained no evidence that would permit an inference that the Department actually 
promised ATS that it could harvest the wild geoducks.6 The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s judgment for the State, holding that statements made by the Department 
or its personnel were insufficient to allow ATS to harvest geoducks by promissory 
estoppel.7 
 
Bickford v. State, Department of Education & Early Development  
In Bickford v. State, Department of Education & Early Development,8 the 
supreme court held that the Alaska Department of Education had not violated the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) when it rejected an ambiguous 
complaint and required the resubmission of a clarified version.9 The mother of a learning-
disabled child sent a complaint to the Department naming eight plaintiffs and listing 
twenty counts accusing the Anchorage School District of violating IDEA student-
evaluation procedures.10 The document appeared to be drafted as a civil court document 
and did not specify where it was meant to be filed.11 The Department forwarded the 
complaint to the attorney general, and the assistant attorney general told the mother that 
she would have to clarify her complaint in order to resolve the procedural problems it 
presented.12 The supreme court determined that the Department’s dismissal of the 
original complaint was found to be proper because the complaint raised issues beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Department and was otherwise vague in its intended purpose.13 The 
                                                
1 172 P.3d 764 (Alaska 2007). 
2 Id. at 765. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 766. 
7 Id. at 765. 
8 155 P.3d 302 (Alaska 2007). 
9 Id. at 304. 
10 Id. at 305. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 306. 
13 Id. at 304. 
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supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that the Department had not violated 
IDEA when it rejected an ambiguous complaint and required the resubmission of a 
clarified version.14 
 
City of Kotzebue v. State, Department of Corrections 
In City of Kotzebue v. State, Department of Corrections,15 the supreme court held 
that: (1) the city was entitled to partial reimbursement for the cost of housing prisoners, 
(2) the city’s claim for more expansive reimbursement of transportation costs was not 
ripe, and (3) the city must pay the state’s attorneys’ fees.16  Believing that its contract 
with the state to operate a jail caused unreasonable financial burdens, the city did not 
renew its contract with the state to operate the jail.17 Alaska state troopers failed to take 
custody of prisoners for a time after the contract had expired and the city was forced to 
open the prison, subsequently bringing suit to recover housing and transportation costs 
from the state for the time after which the contract expired.18 On appeal, the city argued 
that the state was liable to the city for prisoner housing costs and was also responsible for 
all transportation of prisoners, and that because Kotzebue was a public-interest litigant, it 
was not required to pay the state’s attorney’s fees.19 The supreme court held that (1) 
because the contract power of the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of 
Corrections was not coextensive with the Commissioner’s power to designate a jail a 
“correctional facility” for purposes of the statute, the city was entitled to the housing 
costs it incurred between the time the contract lapsed and the time the jail was no longer 
an authorized “correctional facility;” (2) because the state lost on the issue of 
transportation costs and did not appeal the issue, and because the city’s argument sought 
to regulate the department’s conduct outside of the city, the claim for broader 
transportation costs was not ripe; and (3) because the city was seeking significant 
compensation from the state, it had an economic interest in the litigation that made it 
ineligible for public-interest litigant status.20 The supreme court vacated and remanded 
the judgment of the superior court regarding housing costs but affirmed on all other 
grounds, holding that: (1) the city was entitled to partial reimbursement for the cost of 
housing prisoners; (2) the city’s claim for more expansive reimbursement of 
transportation costs was not ripe; and (3) the city must pay the state’s attorneys’ fees.21 
 
Copeland v. State. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
In Copeland v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,22 the supreme 
court held that, under Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission’s (CFEC) 
regulations, the “unavoidable circumstance” exception is limited to circumstances where 
fishermen are prevented from fishing due to circumstances beyond their control.23 The 
                                                
14 Id. at 313. 
15 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007). 
16 Id. at 45–47. 
17 Id. at 38–39. 
18 Id. at 39. 
19 Id. at 40, 45–46.   
20 Id. at 45–47.   
21 Id. 
22 167 P.3d 682 (Alaska 2007). 
23 Id. at 684. 
 4 
CFEC denied Copeland’s application for a limited entry fishing permit.24 On appeal, inter 
alia, Copeland claimed he qualified for the CFEC’s “unavoidable circumstances” 
exception in 1970 because domestic issues kept him from fishing that year.25 After 
reviewing the record, the supreme court found that Copeland simply made a business 
decision not to fish that year based on fishing forecasts, and that nothing about his 
decision met the unavoidable circumstance clause’s requirements of uniqueness and 
unavoidability.26 The supreme court upheld all other aspects of the superior court’s 
decision.27 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that under CFEC 
regulations, the “unavoidable circumstance” exception is limited to circumstances where 
fishermen are prevented from fishing due to circumstances beyond their control.28 
 
Eagle v. State, Department of Revenue 
 In Eagle v. State, Department of Revenue,29 the supreme court held that the 
narrow scope of federal preemption of state law did not extend past the explicit intent of 
the federal law in question.30 Eagle, a member of the United States Navy from 1986 to 
2002, grew up in Alaska and made his last trip to Alaska in 1999.31 The state awarded 
Eagle a Permanent Fund Division (“PFD”) from 1986 to 1994, but refused to award 
Eagle a PFD in 1995 because he was no longer a resident, and he did not reapply until 
2003.32 The court reasoned that the Federal Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 
explicitly protected servicemembers’ residency for tax and voting purposes, but did not 
establish residence for all purposes, and that Congress did not intend for the Act to do 
so.33 The supreme court affirmed, holding that the narrow scope of federal preemption of 
state law did not extend past the explicit intent of the federal law in question.34 
 
Griffiths v. Andy’s Body & Frame, Inc. 
In Griffiths v. Andy’s Body & Frame, Inc.,35 the supreme court held that the 
Workers’ Compensation Board abused its discretion in dismissing as incomplete a 
claimant’s petition for modification where the claimant followed all instructions set out 
by the Board in its previous decision.36 Griffiths, an auto body repairman, developed 
carpal tunnel syndrome after working at Andy’s Body & Frame, Inc. for five years but 
was denied reemployment benefits because his employer’s medical examiner diagnosed 
no permanent partial impairment (PPI).37 The Board determined that the employee can 
seek modification of the decision if the employee is diagnosed with PPI.38 Griffiths 
                                                
24 Id. at 683. 
25 Id. at 683–84. 
26 Id. at 684. 
27 Id. at 683. 
28 Id. at 684. 
29 153 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2007). 
30 Id. at 982. 
31 Id. at 977. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 978–79. 
34 Id. at 982. 
35 165 P.3d 619 (Alaska 2007). 
36 Id. at 624. 
37 Id. at 620–21. 
38 Id. at 621. 
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obtained a diagnosis of PPI and filed a petition for modification.39 The Board then 
determined that the petition violated modification procedures by failing to include a 
statement of due diligence as to why the diagnosis could not have been produced for the 
previous hearing, and dismissed the petition.40 Griffiths appealed, arguing that the 
Board’s first decision did not indicate that a statement of due diligence was required.41  
Noting that Griffiths was representing himself at the time of the first order and that his 
interpretation of the order was reasonable under the circumstances, the supreme court 
held that the Board “violated Griffiths’s reasonable procedural expectations” by 
dismissing his petition.42 The supreme court vacated the Board’s decision, holding that 
the board abused its discretion in dismissing as incomplete a claimant’s petition for 
modification where the claimant followed all instructions set out by the board in its 
previous decision.43 
 
May v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
In May v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,44 the supreme court 
held that a commercial fisherman was ineligible to apply for a limited entry permit to the 
Southeast Alaska herring purse seine fishery.45 In 1977, May applied to the Commercial 
Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) for a permit to enter the fishery, arguing that his 
prior fishing activity in the Annette Island Reserve (AIR) qualified him.46 The CFEC 
denied his permit because prior fishing activity within AIR was not a basis for 
eligibility.47 May’s appeals and long periods of “delay and dormancy” kept his 
application open until December 2004, when May exhausted his appeals within the 
CFEC, and his application was denied.48 May appealed to the superior court, alleging 
equal protection and due process violations and that the CFEC was collaterally estopped 
from finding him ineligible because of a prior decision.49 The superior court affirmed the 
CFEC’s final decision on all points.50 May appealed to the supreme court, which held 
that, to the extent the CFEC’s decision to deny May’s application was inconsistent with a 
prior decision, the CFEC was not estopped because it explained its reasons for 
abandoning the prior decision and the prior decision was plainly erroneous.51 The court 
also held that May’s equal protection claim failed because he did not show intentional 
discrimination and that his due process claim was entirely without merit.52 The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court, holding that a commercial fisherman was ineligible to 
apply for a limited entry permit to the Southeast Alaska herring purse seine fishery.53 
                                                
39 Id. at 621–22. 
40 Id. at 623. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 624 
43 Id.  
44 168 P.3d 873 (Alaska 2007). 
45 Id. at 887. 
46 Id. at 877. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 879. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 882–83. 
52 Id. at 884–85. 
53 Id. at 887. 
 6 
 
May v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
 In May v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission54 the supreme court 
held that substantial evidence did not support the Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission’s (CFEC) finding that May was ineligible for an entry permit for longline 
fishing, but that substantial evidence did support the CFEC’s decision that he was 
ineligible for a pot fishery permit.55 May’s applications for entry permits in the longline 
and pot fisheries were denied, and, after appeals, the CFEC issued its final ruling which 
denied his applications and found that he lacked standing to challenge the number of 
permits that were issued.56 May appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the 
CFEC’s decision.57 The supreme court held May’s eligibility for a longline fishing permit 
was supported by substantial evidence, and he therefore also had standing to challenge 
the maximum number of longline fishing permits issued.58 The supreme court further 
held that substantial evidence supported the CFEC’s determination that he was ineligible 
for a pot fishing permit and therefore lacked standing to challenge the number of pot 
fishing permits issued.59 The supreme court revered the superior court and remanded the 
case, holding that substantial evidence did not support the CFEC’s finding that MAY was 
ineligible for an entry permit for longline fishing, but that substantial evidence did 
support the CFEC’s decision that he was ineligible for a pot fishery permit.60 
 
Pasternak v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
 In Pasternak v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,61 the supreme 
court held that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) properly set the 
maximum and optimum number of fishery permits at seventy-three,62 and advice that 
Pasternak’s equipment was inappropriate for the fishery did not constitute extraordinary 
circumstances.63 Pasternak applied for a permit to a sablefish fishery from the CFEC and 
was denied because his point total was insufficient.64 Pasternak then appealed to the 
district court, arguing that the CFEC set the number of available permits too low and that 
he should have been awarded points for extraordinary circumstances, but the district 
court upheld CFEC’s decision.65 The supreme court explained that Pasternak’s first 
argument was foreclosed because seventy-three was an appropriate maximum and 
optimal number of entry permits.66 Next, the court rejected Pasternak’s argument that 
advice he received from other people that his equipment was not strong enough for 
sablefish in 1983 constituted extraordinary circumstances because Pasternak made no 
                                                
54 175 P.3d 1211 (Alaska 2007). 
55 Id. at 1222. 
56 Id. at 1213–15. 
57 Id. at 1215. 
58 Id. At 1216–21. 
59 Id. at 1221–22. 
60 Id. at 1222. 
61 166 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2007). 
62 Id. at 908, 909. 
63 Id. at 910. 
64 Id. at 906. 
65 Id. at 906–07. 
66 Id. at 907–09. 
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attempt to fish that year and did not make all reasonably possible efforts to participate.67 
The supreme court of Alaska affirmed the district court, holding that the CFEC properly 
set the maximum and optimum number of fishery permits at seventy-three,68 and advice 
that Pasternak’s equipment was inappropriate for the fishery did not constitute 
extraordinary circumstances.69 
 
Powercorp Alaska, LLC v. State, Alaska Industrial Development & Export Authority 
 In Powercorp Alaska, LLC v. State, Alaska Industrial Development & Export 
Authority,70 the supreme court held that the Alaska Energy Authority did not violate its 
authority by requiring bidders to use a specific operating system.71 The Alaska Energy 
Authority (Authority) had a program to provide electricity to rural communities.72 The 
program included upgrading the switchgear system, and the Authority preferred the PLC 
operating system for the switchgear system.73 Powercorp was unable to bid for upgrading 
the switchgear system because the Authority required all bidders to use the PLC system, 
whereas Powercorp used a different operating system.74 Powercorp protested the 
invitation to bid because of the Authority’s demand of the PLC system, and asked that the 
bidding be delayed until the PC operating system that it used could be evaluated and 
compared.75 Powercorp’s request was denied, and Powercorp appealed to an independent 
hearing officer, who ultimately found that the Authority did not abuse its discretion.76 
Powercorp then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the decision.77 On 
subsequent appeal, the supreme court held that the rational basis standard should be used 
in deferring to the agency’s decision-making.78 The supreme court found that the hearing 
officer carefully investigated the law and evidence when deciding both that the agency 
was allowed to prefer one operating system over another and that the Authority had a 
rational basis for its preference.79 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
decision, holding that the Alaska Energy Authority did not violate its authority by 
requiring bidders to use a specific operating system.80   
 
Pruitt v. City of Seward 
In Pruitt v. City of Seward,81 the supreme court held that the doctrines of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies and collateral estoppel did not bar a building 
owner from appealing the zoning commission’s denial of a permit to build a canopy.82 
                                                
67 Id. at 909–10. 
68 Id. at 908, 909. 
69 Id. at 910. 
70 171 P.3d 159 (Alaska 2007). 
71 Id. at 161. 
72 Id. at 161–62. 
73 Id. at 162. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 162–63. 
77 Id. at 163. 
78 Id. at 164. 
79 Id. at 165. 
80 Id. at 161. 
81 152 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2007). 
82 Id. at 1132–33. 
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After Pruitt built a canopy in violation of the city's decision denying him a variance, the 
city brought a successful enforcement action against Pruitt in superior court.83 On appeal, 
Pruitt argued that the city's interpretation of section 15.10.140 of the Seward City Code is 
not supported by the text of the ordinance.84 The city argued that Pruitt was barred from 
defending against the enforcement action by the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies85 and collateral estoppel.86 The supreme court held that neither doctrine applied 
because the city did not give Pruitt notice that its decision was final87 and because the 
city’s decision denying the variance did not require it to resolve whether or not the 
canopy violated the zoning restrictions.88 The supreme court further held that, because the 
city denied Pruitt an appeal and the zoning code is ambiguous, the superior court should 
have given Pruitt the opportunity to appeal the zoning commission's interpretation of 
§15.10.140 directly to the commission.89 The supreme court vacated and remanded, 
holding that the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and collateral 
estoppel did not bar a building owner from appealing the zoning commission’s denial of a 
permit to build a canopy.90 
 
Pyramid Printing Co. v. State, Commission for Human Rights 
 In Pyramid Printing Co. v. State, Commission for Human Rights,91 the supreme 
court held that the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights’ award of backpay and 
vacation pay and order of sexual harassment training was appropriate in a sexual 
harassment case, but that the interest awarded was excessive.92 Tiernan, a former 
employee at Pyramid Printing Company, quit her job with the company after repeated 
incidents of inappropriate behavior directed towards her by Pintar, the owner’s son.93 
After leaving the company, Tiernan filed a claim for sexual harassment with the Alaska 
Department of Labor. During the hearing with the Department of Labor, the Pintars 
offered Tiernan her job back, but she rejected the offer of re-employment.94 After the 
Department of Labor denied Tiernan’s benefit claims because she left the job voluntarily 
and without good cause, she filed a claim with the Human RightS Commission.95 The 
Commission awarded Tiernan damages with interest at 10.5% and also required Pyramid 
to adopt written policies on discrimination and provide annual training.96 Pyramid 
appealed the decision.97 Despite the fact that Tiernan was offered reemployment with the 
company, she was reasonable to believe that the intolerable conditions had not changed, 
                                                
83 Id. at 1132. 
84 Id. at 1139. 
85 Id. at 1135. 
86 Id. at 1138. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1138–39. 
89 Id. at 1139–41. 
90 Id. at 1141. 
91 153 P.3d 994 (Alaska 2007). 
92 Id. at 996. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 997.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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and she was therefore not obligated to mitigate damages.98 The supreme court affirmed in 
part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the Alaska State Commission for 
Human Rights’ award of backpay and vacation pay and order of sexual harassment 
training was appropriate in a sexual harassment case, but that the interest awarded was 
excessive.99 
 
South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage Board of 
Adjustment 
In South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage 
Board of Adjustment,100 the supreme court held that the filing deadline set by section 
21.30.050 of the Anchorage Municipal Code is discretionary and not mandatory.101 
Neighboring landowners, organized as the South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. 
(Coalition), challenged a residential development.102 The plat was initially approved, and 
the Coalition’s subsequent appeal was filed past the deadline set by section 21.30.050(B) 
of the Anchorage Municipal Code and thus automatically denied.103 The record showed 
that both the Board of Adjustment and the clerk of court believed they had no discretion 
in hearing untimely appeals.104 The supreme court held that the language of section 
21.30.050(B) of the Anchorage Municipal Code was directory, as opposed to mandatory, 
and therefore substantial compliance is acceptable absent significant prejudice to the 
other party.105 The court considered the serious, practical consequences of a mandatory 
time limit and the intention of the provision—to act as a guideline for the efficient 
conduct of public business.106 The Board of Adjustment thus has discretion to relax the 
filing deadline when it hears matter on appeal.107 The supreme court remanded the case to 
the Board of Adjustment and allowed the appeal to proceed, holding that the filing 
deadline set by section 21.30.050 of the Anchorage Municipal Code is discretionary and 
not mandatory.108 
 
Smith v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks 
 In Smith v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks,109 the supreme court held that in 
situations where causation is a medical issue, the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board 
(Board) must explain its decision adequately enough to permit review of its application of 
legal rules and consideration of relevant evidence.110 Smith had a history of back 
problems when he injured himself working at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks power 
plant in 1999.111 A month later, he aggravated his back to the point that he needed 
                                                
98 Id. at 999. 
99 Id. at 1002–03. 
100 172 P.3d 768 (Alaska 2007). 
101 Id. at 773. 
102 Id. at 770. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 770–71. 
105 Id. at 771–72. 
106 Id. at 772–73. 
107 Id. at 773. 
108 Id. 
109 172 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2007). 
110 Id. at 793. 
111 Id. at 784. 
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emergency surgery, and later claimed his injury resulted from his work and filed for 
worker’s compensation.112 When the Board met, it heard evidence from lay people and 
physicians regarding the potential causes of Smith’s injury.113 Smith appealed after a 
number of Board and superior court decisions ultimately resulted in denying him 
worker’s compensation.114 The supreme court found that it was unable to determine (1) 
the extent to which the Board relied on the lay testimony115 and (2) whether the Board 
relied on an incorrect legal rule regarding causation.116 Without adequate findings from 
the Board, the supreme court was unable to render judicial review.117 The supreme court 
remanded the case to the Board to clarify its findings, holding that in situations where 
causation is a medical issue, the Board must explain its decision adequately enough to 
permit review of its application of legal rules and consideration of relevant evidence.118 
 
State, Department of Administration v. Bachner Co.  
 In State, Department of Administration v. Bachner Co.,119 the supreme court held 
that none of the factors in section 36.30.585(b) of the Alaska Statutes should be given 
determinative weight in deciding a proper remedy.120 Bachner and Bowers Investment 
Co. both protested their unsuccessful bids on a leasing contract with the Department, and, 
after losing there, appealed to the commissioner.121 The hearing officer decided that there 
had been serious deficiencies in the bidding process and that the proper remedy would be 
for the state to reimburse the companies for their proposal preparation costs.122 The 
companies appealed, arguing that the proper remedy should have been either a 
cancellation of the contract or rescoring.123 The supreme court rejected these arguments 
and stressed the difficulty in deciding the proper remedy in such situations as well as the 
hearing officer’s thorough analysis.124 The court also explained that no factor in section 
36.30.585(b) of the Alaska Statutes should be determinative and that it was proper for the 
hearing officer to consider the state’s costs to the winning bidder if the bid was 
cancelled.125 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, holding that 
none of the factors in section 36.30.585(b) of the Alaska Statutes should be given 
determinative weight in deciding a proper remedy.126 
 
State, Division of Corps., Business & Professional Licensing v. Platt 
                                                
112 Id. at 785. 
113 Id. at 785–86. 
114 Id. at 787. 
115 Id. at 789–90. 
116 Id. at 791–92. 
117 Id. at 793. 
118 Id.  
119 167 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2007). 
120 Id. at 61–62. 
121 Id. at 59–60. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 61–62. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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 In State, Division of Corps., Business & Professional Licensing v. Platt,127 the 
supreme court held that the Board of Nursing may consider an applicant’s set-aside 
conviction when weighing her application for certification as a nurse aide.128 Platt was 
convicted of forgery, theft, and shoplifting between 1998 and 1999, for which she was 
given suspended sentencing.129 In 2002, Platt applied to be a nurse aide.130 Despite Platt’s 
argument that she expected her convictions to be set aside, the Board considered the 
convictions, and relying heavily on the fact that Platt’s victims were older persons, 
denied her application on the grounds that her forgery conviction was “substantially 
related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a certified nurse aide.”131 Platt 
appealed, arguing that she should not be treated as if she remained convicted after her 
conviction had been set aside.132 The supreme court held that an individual whose 
conviction has been set aside is a person who has been “convicted of a crime” under 
section 08.68.334(2) of the Alaska Statutes, and therefore it was proper to consider the 
convictions.133 The supreme court reversed the decision of the superior court and 
affirmed the board’s denial of Platt’s application, holding that the Board of Nursing may 
consider an applicant’s set-side conviction when weighing her application for 
certification as a nurse aide.134 
 
State v. Jeffery  
In State v. Jeffery,135 the supreme court held that two appellate judges seeking 
retention in office had failed to file proper declarations of candidacy for retention by the 
August 1 deadline set in section 15.35.070 of the Alaska Statutes and that the penalty for 
such failure was mandatory vacation from office.136 Both Judge Jeffery and Judge Nolan 
had completed the Alaska Judicial Council’s questionnaires, sent in June and July, and 
had each emailed the council stating their intention to stand for retention in those same 
months.137 Because they failed to submit declarations of candidacy by the filing date, the 
Alaska Division of Elections refused to place their names on the ballots.138 The superior 
court reversed on the grounds of “substantial compliance” with the statute.139 The 
supreme court held that the Judges’ actions did not constitute a “declaration of 
candidacy” as required under the statute, and that such a declaration would require a 
personal, affirmative declaration of the judge to be a candidate.140 The supreme court 
further held that, absent statutory ambiguity—of which the court found none—strict 
compliance with election filing deadlines was required.141 In response to this holding, the 
                                                
127 169 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2007). 
128 Id. at 597. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 597, 601. 
132 Id. at 598. 
133 Id. at 599. 
134 Id. at 597. 
135 170 P.3d 226 (Alaska 2007). 
136 Id. at 237. 
137 Id. at 230–31. 
138 Id. at 229 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 232. 
141 Id. at 237. 
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court ordered the statutorily mandated vacation of office for both judges.142 The supreme 
court reversed the superior court, holding that two appellate judges seeking retention in 
office had failed to file proper declarations of candidacy for retention by the August 1 
deadline set in section 15.35.070 of the Alaska Statutes and that the penalty for such 
failure was mandatory vacation from office.143 
 
Thoeni v. Consumer Electronic Services 
In Thoeni v. Consumer Electronic Services,144 the supreme court held that 
substantial evidence did not support the conclusions of the Workers' Compensation Board 
that a claimant's refusal to attend an employer's independent medical examination 
(EIME) was unreasonable and that claimant's knee was medically stable.145  Thoeni 
sought workers' compensation benefits for a knee injury, costochondritis, depression, and 
insomnia.146  In part, the Workers' Compensation Board  concluded that Thoeni forfeited 
some benefits due to her refusal to attend an EIME in Utah; and that Thoeni's knee was 
medically stable.147  Thoeni appealed. The supreme court held that the Board abused its 
discretion in determining that Thoeni forfeited her benefits when she refused to travel a 
manifestly unreasonable distance to attend an EIME,148 and that the Board’s finding that 
Thoeni’s knee was medically stable was not supported by substantial evidence because it 
was based on predictive testimony that proved to be inaccurate.149  The supreme court 
reversed and remanded, holding that substantial evidence did not support the conclusions 
of the Workers' Compensation Board that a claimant's refusal to attend an EIME was 
unreasonable and that claimant's knee was medically stable.150 
 
West v. Anchorage 
In West v. Anchorage,151 the supreme court held that classifying a dog that bit or 
pawed a baby as a “level three” animal was appropriate.152 The dog in question either bit 
or pawed a baby who was in a carrier while in a store belonging to the dog’s owner.153 A 
doctor who later examined the baby reported several superficial red whelp-like scratch 
marks on the baby’s face, but no puncture wounds or deep bruises.154 An Animal Control 
Enforcement Supervisor classified the dog as “level three,” defined by Anchorage 
Municipal Code as an animal that inflicts an aggressive bite or causes any physical injury 
to a human while under restraint.155 An Administrative Hearing Officer affirmed, using a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard.156 The supreme court held that applying the 
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“preponderance of the evidence” test was appropriate: the hearing officer merely 
conducted an administrative hearing, rather than a criminal hearing, since animal control 
laws are remedial and not criminal in nature.157 The supreme court further held that the 
hearing officer properly found that the dog inflicted a “physical injury” to a human under 
section 17.40.020(A)(3) of the Anchorage Municipal Code, because both the statute’s 
plain meaning and statutory definition of “physical injury” support this interpretation.158 
Finally, the supreme court held that the Hearing Officer relied on sufficient evidence, 
since there was contested evidence that the baby felt pain and it is up to the hearing 
officer to make findings of fact.159 The supreme court affirmed the hearing officer’s 
decision, holding that classifying a dog who bit or pawed a baby as a “level three” animal 
was appropriate.160 
 
 
 
BUSINESS LAW  
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Afognak Joint Venture v. Old Harbor Native Corp. 
In Afognak Joint Venture v. Old Harbor Native Corp.,161 the supreme court held 
that the withdrawing members of a joint venture and the remaining joint venture both had 
ownership of an oil spill claim at the time of partition and that mutual mistake warranted 
dividing the claims.162 Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, two corporations withdrew 
from a joint venture that owned land eligible to receive oil spill damages.163 The partition 
agreement appointed the joint venture trustee with respect to the assets at issue and 
purported to allocate all the rights between the withdrawing corporations and the joint 
venture, but the oil spill claim was not addressed.164 After the partition agreement was 
finalized, the joint venture received settlement funds from the oil spill claim and the two 
corporations sued for their share.165 The supreme court held that the withdrawing 
corporations owned a portion of the oil spill claims: either the claims accrued before the 
partition and were part of the partition agreement or the claims accrued while the joint 
venture held them in trust and also owed the withdrawing corporations a fiduciary 
duty.166 The court further held that since both parties were aware that oil spill claims 
existed and intended to divide up all their rights, their failure to explicitly address the 
claims in the partition agreement constituted a mistake of fact.167 Therefore, dividing the 
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claims was appropriate because courts may imply contract terms in order to conform a 
contract to the evident intent of the parties.168 The supreme court affirmed the decision of 
the superior court, that the oil spill claims should be divided and remanded the case to 
determine the appropriate division, holding that the withdrawing members of a joint 
venture and the remaining joint venture both had ownership of an oil spill claim at the 
time of partition and that mutual mistake warranted dividing the claims.169 
 
Alaska National Insurance Co. v. Northwest Cedar Structures 
 In Alaska National Insurance Co. v. Northwest Cedar Structures,170 the supreme 
court held that in order to collect on a surety bond for a breached construction contract, 
the breached contract must be of the type contemplated by the relevant statute.171 
Northwest Cedar Structures breached its contract with Alaska National Insurance Co. by 
failing to pay premiums for workers’ compensation.172 The superior court found that 
Alaska National could not collect from the surety bond because the legislature did not 
intend such bonds to cover expenses like workers’ compensation.173 Alaska National 
appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by going against the plain meaning of 
section 08.18.071(a)(3) of the Alaska Statutes and relying instead on its own assumptions 
of legislative intent.174 Section 08.18.071(a)(3) states that surety bonds must cover 
“breach of contract in the conduct of the contracting business,” and Alaska National 
argued that the statute’s language was “clear and unambiguous,” so the surety bond ought 
to cover the failure to pay the workers’ compensation premiums.175 The supreme court 
found that the intent of the legislature was to restrict the coverage of surety bonds to 
contract breaches that were more intimately tied to the nature of construction contracts 
specifically,176 and that workers’ compensation qualified more as a generic “overhead 
expense” instead of a unique aspect of construction contracts.177 The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court, holding that in order to collect on a surety bond for a 
breached construction contract, the breached contract must be of the type contemplated 
by the relevant statute.178 
 
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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In re Exxon Valdez 
In In re Exxon Valdez,179 the Ninth Circuit held that state law applied in 
determining the prejudgment interest relating to tort claims arising under state law.180 A 
seafood processing business brought suit against Exxon/Mobil Corp. for business losses 
sustained as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.181 With respect to the claims governed 
by Alaska state law, the parties had settled all their claims except whether state or federal 
law applied to determining the prejudgment interest, and the district court ruled that 
federal law applied.182 Reasoning that prejudgment interest was substantively related to 
the business’s claim and that federal law did not preempt state law in a case, as here, 
where the claims were for economic loss, the court invoked the Erie doctrine in holding 
that state law applied when assessing the amount of prejudgment interest related to the 
business’s state law tort claims.183 Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case for a determination of the interest owed, holding that state law applied 
in determining the prejudgment interest relating to tort claims arising under state law.184   
 
In re Exxon Valdez 
In In re Exxon Valdez,185 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an award of 
punitive damages representing a ratio of punitives to harm of five to one, or $2.5 billion, 
was appropriate under current due process jurisprudence.186 The Exxon Valdez oil tanker 
ran aground in Prince William Sound in 1989.187 Exxon was found liable in tort for the 
reckless misconduct of placing a known, relapsed alcoholic in control of a massive oil 
tanker.188 At issue in this litigation are the punitive damages awarded as compared with 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding substantive due process limits on punitive 
damages.189 The court analyzed the reprehensibility of Exxon’s misconduct, which is the 
most important guidepost for punitive damages under State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell,190 and found several mitigating facts, such as Exxon’s prompt efforts to 
both clean up the spill and compensate victims for their economic harm.191 The court also 
noted that Exxon’s actions were reckless but not intentional.192 The court thus declared 
that the district court’s award of $4.5 billion in punitive damages was unwarranted 
because it fell in the highest range of damages allowable under due process analysis.193 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and 
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instructed the court to further lower the damages award to the amount of $2.5 billion, 
holding that an award of punitive damages representing a ratio of punitives to harm of 
five to one was appropriate in the instant case.194 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Anchorage Baptist Temple v. Coonrod 
In Anchorage Baptist Temple v. Coonrod,195 the supreme court held that three 
churches had the right to intervene in a lawsuit challenging a state statute that exempts 
teachers’ residences owned by religious institutions from property tax.196 After the 
Alaska Legislature passed an amendment to create a property tax exemption for 
educators’ residences owned by religious schools, two groups of citizen-taxpayers filed a 
lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment as violating the Establishment 
Clause.197 The superior court denied three churches the right to intervene, instead 
allowing them to participate only as amicus curiae.198 On appeal, the supreme court 
applied a four-part test to determine if the churches could intervene. The four parts were 
that the motion was timely, that the applicant showed an interest in the subject matter of 
the action, that the applicant showed that the interest may be impaired because of the 
action, and that the applicant showed that the existing party did not adequately represent 
the interest.199 The court found that the church’s satisfied this test because their interest is 
direct and substantial, because they may raise an argument that no other party is likely to 
raise, and because the state’s interests are adverse to the churches’ interests.200 The 
supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that three churches had the right to 
intervene in a lawsuit challenging a state statute that exempts teachers’ residences owned 
by religious institutions from property tax.201 
 
Bethel Family Clinic v. Bethel Wellness Associates  
In Bethel Family Clinic v. Bethel Wellness Associates,202 the supreme court held 
that real party in interest objections under Alaska Civil Rule 17(a) must be brought with 
reasonable promptness.203 In April 2000, Bethel Wellness Associates (BWA) sued the 
Bethel Family Clinic for breach of contract.204 Four years after filing the complaint, the 
Clinic filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to state a claim, arguing that the 
BWA was not a contracting party and, therefore, could not recover.205 Based on 
widespread support in state case law, the superior court concluded that Civil Rule 17(a) 
objections should be raised with reasonable promptness, unless the original error was 
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made by honest mistake.206 The supreme court reasoned that allowing such delays would 
unfairly prejudice the opposing party, because the Clinic would have had four additional 
years to prepare a defense.207 The supreme court affirmed, holding that real party in 
interest objections under Alaska Civil Rule 17(a) must be brought with reasonable 
promptness.208 
 
Carr v. Carr 
In Carr v. Carr,209 the supreme court held that remarks made by a superior court 
judge during criminal sentencing did not establish judicial bias in divorce proceedings 
involving the same party where the record showed no clear error or abuse of discretion.210 
With Kelly Carr’s approval, both his criminal trial for possession of child pornography 
and his divorce proceedings were assigned to the same judge.211 After the criminal trial 
but before sentencing, the divorce proceedings resumed, with the court ultimately 
rejecting Kelly’s position.212 At Kelly’s criminal sentencing, the judge described his own 
visceral reaction to the images of child pornography presented at trial.213 On appeal, 
Kelly asserted that these remarks demonstrated the judge’s bias against him during the 
divorce proceedings.214 The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court judge’s refusal to 
recuse himself, holding that the judge’s remarks during criminal sentencing did not 
establish judicial bias in divorce proceedings involving the same party where the record 
showed no clear error or abuse of discretion.215 
 
Denardo v. Cutler 
In Denardo v. Cutler,216  the supreme court of Alaska held a number of plaintiff’s 
claims were meritless,217 and in addition, signaled willingness to restrain the future filings 
of a vexatious litigant.218 Denardo initially filed a lawsuit against his employer, Alaska 
Cleaners, alleging unlawful termination due to age discrimination.219 On appeal, Denardo 
filed numerous additional claims against Alaska Cleaners, their attorneys, and the judges 
involved.220 Cutler’s briefs revealed that Denard had filed 37 cases, mostly meritless, 
since 1990.221 The court quickly dismissed Denardo’s meritless claims of abuse of 
process and violation of due process rights.222 Turning to a suggestion by the superior 
court judge, the court looked favorably upon an injunction against Denardo’s future 
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filings against judges, noting the serious harm caused to the judicial system and finding 
support from both case law and commentators.223 However, because the request for 
injunctive relief was brought up on appeal, the court declined to reach the issue.224 The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that a 
number of claims were meritless and, in addition, signaled willingness to restrain the 
future filings of a vexatious litigant.225 
 
Dickerson v. Goodman 
 In Dickerson v. Goodman,226 the supreme court held that Dickerson’s lack of 
understanding of English did not interfere with her right to file a counterclaim and that 
because she did not file a counterclaim in her original answer, she was barred from suing 
on this claim in a second suit.227  The parties were involved in a car accident and 
Goodman filed suit for her injuries.228  Dickerson answered the claim without asserting a 
counterclaim.229  After Dickerson’s motion for summary judgment was granted, 
Dickerson tried to intervene in the case in order to assert a counterclaim, but her motion 
to intervene was denied because she had always been a party and the deadline to file a 
counterclaim had expired.230  In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that, in reviewing 
the denial of a relief from judgment, the moving party was required to have a good reason 
for not litigating the issue at the appropriate time.231  Here, Dickerson had no valid reason 
since she was at all times represented by counsel, never indicated she did not understand 
English, and presented no evidence that she attempted to assert the claim at the 
appropriate time.232  The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that 
Dickerson’s lack of understanding of English did not interfere with her right to file a 
counterclaim and that because she did not file a counterclaim in her original answer, she 
was barred from suing on this claim in a second suit.233 
 
Dobrova v. State, Department of Revenue 
In Dobrova v. State, Department of Revenue,234  the supreme court held that the 
superior court’s denial of a motion to appeal an order by Child Support Services Division 
(“CSSD”) was warranted given the information the superior court had at the time, but 
because of information now available the case should be remanded to determine whether 
the late appeal should be granted.235 CSSD ordered Dobrova to pay child support after an 
original finding to pay was appealed and remanded.236 Dobrova’s counsel failed to file 
timely appeal from this order, instead filing a motion related to the original appeal to 
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prevent CSSD from enforcing the original order, and the motion was denied.237 Dobrova 
obtained new counsel and sought appeal of CSSD’s order on remand, arguing good faith 
error in not filing an appeal before the deadline238. The superior court rejected the late 
appeal.239 After this rejection, another superior court judge granted a motion to supplant 
the appellate record with information pertaining to the erroneous order filed by 
Dobrova’s previous counsel.240 The supreme court held that, because the superior court 
did not have evidence outside of the pleadings regarding the erroneously filed motion by 
Dobrova’s previous counsel, and because the state had evidence that Dobrova’s previous 
counsel was on notice of the CSSD’s order on remand, the superior court did not abuse 
its discretion in rejecting the late appeal.241 Furthermore, because the appeal was not 
properly commenced in the first place, the superior court was not required to state its 
reasoning for denying the late appeal.242 However, given the information now contained 
in the record, the supreme court held that the merits of permitting the late appeal should 
be re-evaluated.243 The supreme court remanded the case to the superior court, the 
supreme court held that the superior court’s denial of a motion to appeal an order by 
CSSD was warranted given the information the superior court had at the time, but 
because of information now available the case should be remanded to determine whether 
the late appeal should be granted.244 
 
Gilbert v. State Farm Insurance Co. 
In Gilbert v. State Farm Insurance Co.,245 the supreme court held that findings of 
fact made by an arbitrator are unreviewable, even in the case of gross error, and that an 
arbitrator’s award shall only be vacated if it was procured by fraud or other undue 
means.246 Gilbert had been involved in an automobile accident and disagreed with State 
Farm, her insurance carrier, over the extent of her injuries.247 In 2000, an arbitrator issued 
a memorandum and an award finding that Gilbert could not prove the accident caused her 
injuries and ruled State Farm the prevailing party.248 Gilbert alleged fraud on the part of 
the arbitrator—essentially amounting to an allegation that his findings were made in 
gross error and were inconsistent with the evidence.249 The court found that there was no 
evidence to support Gilbert’s claims of fraud, or that she was treated unfairly by the 
arbitrator.250 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court to uphold the 
arbitrator’s award, holding that findings of fact made by an arbitrator are unreviewable, 
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even in the case of gross error, and that an arbitrator’s award shall only be vacated if it 
was procured by fraud or other undue means.251 
 
Greywolf v. Carroll 
In Greywolf v. Carroll,252 the supreme court held that all acts falling squarely 
within discretionary jurisdiction granted by a court are protected by absolute quasi-
judicial immunity.253 Greywolf was involuntarily committed to a mental health unit by 
Carroll, her psychiatrist, who filed an ex parte order for detention with the superior 
court.254 The court issued the order, specifying that Greywolf be evaluated by the “locum 
tenens” doctor at the hospital that housed the unit255 Greywolf filed suit against Carroll 
claiming medical malpractice, citing his failure to provide her with an aftercare plan for 
follow-up treatment.256 The superior court dismissed this claim, ruling that Carroll was 
protected by the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity because he had evaluated 
Greywolf pursuant to a court order.257 Greywolf appealed, arguing that Carroll could not 
enjoy such immunity because his actions were not integral to the judicial process.258 The 
supreme court noted that, at the time of his failure to provide an aftercare plan, Carroll 
was a locum tenens at the hospital and the ex parte order calling for evaluation was in 
effect.259 The supreme court held that Greywolf’s evaluation and discharge fell under 
Carroll’s discretionary jurisdiction as a court-appointed psychiatrist.260 The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that all acts falling squarely within 
discretionary jurisdiction granted by a court are protected by absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity.261 
 
Hicks v. Pleasants 
 In Hicks v. Pleasants,262 the supreme court held that a trial court had the right to 
adjudicate the property rights of the parties following the entry of a default divorce, and, 
in doing so, it must properly apply the Syndoulos standard.263 After Hicks failed to file an 
answer or appear in court in response to Pleasants’ summons and complaint for divorce, 
the clerk of court entered a default against Hicks.264 During a hearing, where both parties 
were unrepresented by counsel, Hicks and Pleasants disagreed about the value of various 
assets.265 Following this hearing, Hicks, now represented by counsel, objected to the 
master’s findings of fact and proposed property division and requested that the 
recommendation be set aside because the division was more than what Pleasant asked for 
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in her prayer for relief, making the division void under Alaska Civil Rule 54.266 However, 
the court held that, although Pleasants’ prayer for relief did not list each piece of marital 
property and debt, a general claim is enough to allow a court to adjudicate property 
rights.267 The property division was consistent with Rule 54 because the basic language 
of Pleasants’ prayer for relief was enough to put Hicks on notice and Hicks nevertheless 
decided to default.268 However, the lower court erred in applying the Syndoulos standard 
of weighing conflicting evidence in favor of the non-defaulting party and, therefore, the 
property division order was vacated and remanded.269 Thus, the supreme court held that a 
trial court had the right to adjudicate the property rights of the parties following the entry 
of a default divorce and must properly apply the Syndoulos standard. 270 
 
Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One 
In Jackman v. Jewel Lake Villa One,271 the supreme court held that for the 
purposes of Alaska Civil Rule 68, advance payments must be deducted from the total 
award of damages to determine a judgment’s final value unless it can be shown that the 
payments were compensation based on the defendant’s degree of fault and that, given this 
test, the jury award exceeded the offer of judgement.272 Jackman injured herself in a fall 
at her apartment complex, the Jewel Lake Villa Apartments.273 Jewel Lake’s insurer paid 
$3,474 to cover Jackman’s medical expenses.274 However, Jackman nonetheless sued to 
recover additional damages.275 Prior to trial, Jewel Lake sent Jackman a $1,400 offer of 
judgment, which she failed to accept.276 At trial, the jury found Jackman’s damages to 
total $7,147.23 and found that Jewel Lake was 51% responsible for these damages.277 
Jewel Lake moved for payment of their attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68, 
which allows for payment of such fees by the offeree rejecting a pretrial offer of 
judgment if “the judgment finally rendered is at least five percent less favorable” to the 
rejector than the offer was.278 The superior court granted this motion, reasoning that 51% 
of $7,147.23, less $3,474 (and then calculating in all relevant interest) was at least five 
percent less favorable than the offer of $1,400.279 On appeal, the supreme court noted that 
the deduction of payments not made on the basis of a defendant’s potential fault lowers 
both the defendant’s and plaintiff’s share of the award.280 The supreme court further 
noted that there was no ground to assume that payments by Jewel Lake’s insurer reflected 
only Jewel Lake’s share of the fault.281 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s 
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award of attorneys’ fees, holding that, for the purposes of Alaska Civil Rule 68, advance 
payments must be deducted from the total award of damages to determine a judgment’s 
final value unless it can be shown that the payments were compensation based on the 
defendant’s degree of fault and that, given this test, the jury award exceeded the offer of 
judgment.282 
 
Kuk v. Nalley  
In Kuk v. Nalley,283 the supreme court held that when a person is out of state and 
is at all times amenable to service of process, any extension of a statute of limitations 
otherwise provided under section 09.10.130 of the Alaska statutes does not apply.284 
More than two years after an auto accident, Kuk and his family sued for damages arising 
out of their injuries from the accident.285 When Nalley moved for summary judgment on 
the basis that the two-year statute of limitations had passed, the Kuks filed a cross-motion 
arguing that, under section 09.10.130, the statute of limitations should be extended for the 
time that Nalley was out of the state for health and surgery reasons.286 The court held that 
section 09.10.130 does not apply where substituted service is available during the 
absence.287 Here, the court found that Nally had been amenable to service of process 
based on the means of service available under Alaska’s Civil Rules and long-arm statute 
section 09.05.015 of the Alaska statutes.288 The supreme court affirmed the decision of 
the superior court holding that when a person is out of state and is at all times amenable 
to service of process, any extension of a statute of limitations otherwise provided under 
section 09.10.130 does not apply.289 
 
Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska 
In Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska,290 the supreme court held that an 
unsuccessful bidder had standing as an interested party to challenge a bid awarded by a 
government agency, and that the unsuccessful bidder was entitled to a hearing on the 
merits.291 After Lakloey submitted a bid to the University of Alaska, the University 
awarded the bid to a bidder who had not acknowledged an amendment to the bid 
request.292 The University denied Lakloey’s protest to the bid award on the grounds that 
Lakloey was not the next-lowest bidder and therefore was not an interested party eligible 
to protest.293 The University also argued that the amendment in question was not a 
material change to the bid request.294 The supreme court held that Lakloey had a 
sufficient economic interest in ensuring that the University considered its bid honestly 
and fairly because Lakloey might have been the lowest bidder had the University applied 
                                                
282 Id. at 179–80. 
283 166 P.3d 47 (Alaska 2007). 
284 Id. at 54–55. 
285 Id. at 48. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 49. 
288 Id. at 50. 
289 Id. at 54–55. 
290 157 P.3d 1041 (Alaska 2007). 
291 Id. at 1049. 
292 Id. at 1042–43. 
293 Id. at 1043. 
294 Id. at 1044. 
 23 
the appropriate criteria.295 The supreme court further held that whether the changes in the 
amendment were material was a factual question based on (1) whether the amendment’s 
specifications exceeded those in the original request and (2) whether those changes gave 
the winning bidder an advantage over those bidders who conformed with the 
amendment.296 The supreme court reversed the decision of the superior court and 
remanded to the University for further proceedings, holding that an unsuccessful bidder 
had standing as an interested party to challenge a bid awarded by a government agency, 
and that the unsuccessful bidder was entitled to a hearing on the merits.297   
 
Larson v. Benediktsson 
In Larson v. Benediktsson,298 the supreme court held that an order denying 
summary judgment on the ground that material factual issues may not be reviewed after 
the court has conducted a trial.299 About a year after agreeing to build two houses for 
Benediktsson, Larson sued for unpaid wages.300 Benediktsson moved for summary 
judgment, alleging Larson was an unlicensed contractor and thus, under Alaska law, 
unable to claim wages for contract work.301 Larson claimed he was hired as an 
employee.302 Finding Larson’s employment status to be a factual dispute, the court denied 
summary judgment and proceeded to trial.303 The supreme court declined to review the 
denial of summary judgment because the denial was made on factual grounds.304 Thus, 
the supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that an order denying summary 
judgment on the ground that material factual issues may not be reviewed after the court 
has conducted a trial.305 
 
Lexington Marketing Group, Inc. v. Goldbelt Eagle, LLC 
In Lexington Marketing Group, Inc. v. Goldbelt Eagle, LLC,306 the supreme court 
held that federal and state arbitration law prohibits courts from determining the validity 
of a contract when determining arbitrability.307 Goldbelt contracted with Lexington for 
marketing services in October 2002, and in 2004 Lexington referred a business 
opportunity to Goldbelt but did not receive the commission as provided for in their 
contract.308 The trial court denied Lexington’s request that the court compel arbitration 
because the court found the contract unenforceable on public policy grounds and found 
no duty to arbitrate the claims related to an unenforceable contract.309 Lexington argued 
on appeal that the trial court violated federal and state law by refusing to compel 
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arbitration.310 The supreme court reasoned that the superior court had jurisdiction to 
decide arbitrability under federal and state law, but erred in adjudicating the validity of 
the underlying contract because federal and state law does not permit a court deciding 
arbitrability to decide validity.311 Additionally, the court concluded that this dispute fell 
within the terms of the contract’s arbitration clause.312 In reversing the trial court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that federal and state law prohibits courts from 
determining the validity of a contract when determining arbitrability.313  
 
MacDonald v. Riggs 
In MacDonald v. Riggs,314 the supreme court held that the superior court correctly 
denied a party’s motion for JNOV on a defamation counterclaim where there was 
sufficient evidence of defamation for a reasonable jury to find for the aggrieved party, 
where the defamatory statements were not time-barred because the counterclaim is 
related back to the date of the original complaint, and where the defamatory statements 
were slander per se, thus proof of actual damages was not required.315 MacDonald 
brought charges of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against Wilson and Riggs.316 Although Wilson was ordered to pay 
damages, the jury found in favor of Riggs on the claims against him and awarded him 
damages for his defamation counterclaim.317 MacDonald made motions for directed 
verdict and JNOV on the defamation counterclaim, both of which were denied.318 
MacDonald appealed.319  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the 
motion for JNOV because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 
MacDonald made defamatory statements, because statements were not time-barred by the 
statute of limitation, and because the statements were slander per se and thus did not 
require proof of damages.320.  
 
Maines v. Kenworth Alaska, Inc. 
In Maines v. Kenworth Alaska, Inc.,321 the supreme court held that excluding an 
affidavit from a late-disclosed automotive expert without first considering alternative 
sanctions was error.322 Maines, a truck driver, alleged that a leak in the vehicle’s air 
conditioning system caused him to develop respiratory problems, and he sued both the 
truck manufacturer and truck distributor for negligent manufacture and maintenance of 
the truck he drove.323 In response to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Maines 
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submitted two affidavits, one by an automotive expert.324 Excluding both affidavits and 
granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court held that the 
automotive expert’s affidavit was untimely filed and not based on sufficient facts.325 The 
supreme court found that summary judgment was improper because the affidavit raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to negligent manufacture of the truck.326 The supreme 
court reversed and remanded, holding that excluding an affidavit from a late-disclosed 
automotive expert without first considering alternative sanctions was error.327   
 
Martin v. Coastal Villages Region Fund  
In Martin v. Coastal Villages Region Fund (“CVRF”),328 the supreme court held 
that neither party had a superior equitable claim over the other, as such claims had not 
been adjudicated by a trial court.329 The Martins brought suit in Juneau against a lessee 
fisherman who deserted his fishing vessel in a state of disrepair and won a default 
judgment for damages.330 Concurrent to the desertion of the Martins’ vessel, CVRF also 
sued the lessee in an Anchorage court to recover the profits of his venture and sought a 
preliminary injunction preventing the funds from being delivered to the Martins.331 
CVRF prevailed on its preliminary injunction, eventually settled with the lessee, and 
sought to have the funds released to CVRF.332 The Anchorage court denied the Martins’ 
motion to have the funds released to them based on their judgment, ruling that any claim 
by the Martins would be derivative of CVRF’s claims, and the court ultimately granted 
CVRF’s motion to consolidate the Juneau case.333 The supreme court held that the 
Anchorage court did not err in granting CVRF’s motion for a preliminary injunction, as 
CVRF was attempting to preserve the funds pending a final judgment.334 Second, the 
supreme court reversed the Anchorage court’s decision to award the funds to CVRF, 
whose position was indistinguishable from the Martins’.335 The supreme court reversed 
and remanded to the third trial court, holding that neither party had a superior equitable 
claim over the other, as such claims had not been adjudicated by a third court.336 
 
Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Chugach Electric Ass’n 
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,337 the supreme court held 
that collateral estoppel may apply to rulings by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska 
(“Commission”).338 The supreme court first heard Matanuska’s claim of breach of 
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contract by Chugach in 2004, where the court remanded the issue to the superior court.339 
Matanuska claimed that Chugach had violated its obligation to act in good faith when it 
elected to enter into a rate lock for certain long-term debt, rather than debt 
defeasement.340 In 2004, the supreme court concluded that the Commission waived its 
primary jurisdiction when it declined to resolve issues presented by Matanuska’s 
claim.341 However, the Commission subsequently issued a ruling on the issue presented, 
and the superior court granted summary judgment for Chugach based on the 
Commission’s ruling.342 The superior court then granted Chugach’s motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing Matanuska’s suit against Chugach for failure to conform to prudent 
utility practice under their agreement.343 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
granting of summary judgment in favor of Chugach, holding that collateral estoppel may 
apply to rulings by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska.344 
 
Pagenkopf v. Chatham Electric, Inc. 
 In Pagenkopf v. Chatham Electric, Inc.,345  the supreme court held that: (1) 
attorneys’ fees should not be awarded under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68 if the pre-
trial offer had apportionment problems, (2) prejudgment interest should be paid starting 
at the time when a defendant knows a claim could be filed, and (3) a jury instruction 
dealing with safety regulations did not erroneously shift the third party’s negligence 
standard to negligence per se.346 Pagenkopf was injured at Dilbeck’s shop when a 
Chatham employee opened an overhead garage door, knocking Pagenkopf off a ladder.347  
Pagenkopf sued Chatham, who filed a third-party claim against Dilbeck.348 Pagenkopf 
refused a $525,000 settlement offer from Chatham, with Dilbeck contributing $150,000 
towards that amount, though the offer itself did not mention Dilbeck’s contribution to the 
offer.349 After apportioning twenty-eight percent fault to Chatham and fifty percent fault 
to Dilbeck, a jury awarded a net $545,064 to Pagenkopf.350 The trial court ordered 
Pagenkopf to pay Chatham’s attorneys’ fees because Chatham’s portion of liability was 
much less than its pretrial offer, and it ordered Dilbeck to pay prejudgment interest to 
Pagenkopf, but from the date when Dilbeck actually received service of the third-party 
suit, not when Dilbeck realized that he would be included in the suit.351 The supreme 
court held that the attorneys’ fees were improperly awarded under Rule 68 because 
Chatham’s pretrial offer had apportionment difficulties that would have shifted the 
burden of proving Dilbeck’s third-party liability onto Pagenkopf.352 The supreme court 
further found that Pagenkopf was entitled to receive prejudgment interest from Dilbeck at 
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the earlier date when Dilbeck believed a claim might be filed against him–not the later 
date when notice was served–because a potential defendant only needs to know that a 
claim might be brought to have to pay prejudgment interest, and Dilbeck’s actions reveal 
that he did have reason to believe that a claim could be brought against him.353 The 
supreme court also found that jury instructions that mentioned the violation of safety 
regulations did not lead to a negligence per se standard because the instruction merely 
said that the jury “may” find negligence based on the safety violation, not that the jury 
“shall” find negligence.354 The supreme court reversed the superior court on the 
attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest, and affirmed the superior court on the jury 
instructions,355 holding that: (1) attorneys’ fees should not be awarded under Rule 68 if 
the pre-trial offer had apportionment problems, (2) prejudgment interest should be paid 
starting at the time when a defendant knows a claim could be filed, and (3) a jury 
instruction dealing with safety regulations did not erroneously shift the third party’s 
negligence standard to negligence per se.356 
 
Richard v. Boggs 
 In Richard v. Boggs,357 the supreme court held that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion in vacating a couple’s property division agreement because the 
agreement was inequitable.358 The original property division favored Richard, who 
received between sixty-eight and seventy-five percent, including the marital home, 
because the parties felt that such a division was in the best interest of their children and of 
open communication.359 About one year later, Boggs filed a motion to reopen the 
property division agreement regarding the house because the justifications for the 
agreement had not come to pass.360 The supreme court found that all of the factors that 
could potentially provide cause for reopening the agreement were present: the 
fundamental assumption of the dissolution agreement had been destroyed, the parties’ 
property division was poorly considered and reached without benefit of counsel, and the 
asset in controversy was the parties’ principal asset.361 The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s decision to grant Boggs’ motion, holding that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion in vacating the couple’s property division agreement because the 
agreement was inequitable.362 
 
Roberts v. State, Department of Revenue 
In Roberts v. State, Department of Revenue,363 the supreme court held that (1) 
assignment of a corporation’s claims to its owner was an invalid attempt to circumvent 
the statutory requirement that counsel represent corporate parties in lawsuits, and (2) the 
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Department of Revenue did not err in allowing a nonprofit to use gaming proceeds to 
offer a public bicycle program.364  Roberts owned the corporation Downtown Bicycle 
Rental.365  Earth, a nonprofit organization, received a gaming permit and used the 
proceeds to fund a free bicycle rental program.366  Roberts complained about Earth’s use 
of the gaming proceeds to fund the free bicycle program.367  The superior court dismissed 
without prejudice the complaint filed by Downtown Bicycle Rental because the 
corporation was not represented by counsel.368  Following dismissal, the corporation 
assigned its claims to owner Roberts, and Roberts filed a new complaint naming the same 
defendants.369  The supreme court held that Downtown Bicycle Rental’s assignment of 
claims was invalid as an effort to evade the statutory requirement that counsel represent 
corporations.370  The court found that the legislature did not want courts carving out 
exceptions to the rule.371  The court also held that the Department’s granting of the permit 
to Earth did not violate the gaming statute’s “limitation on use of proceeds” provision372 
nor did it violate the statute’s “satisfactory proof” provision.373  The court found that the 
gaming statute allowed the proceeds to be used for a variety of purposes, and Earth’s use 
of the proceeds was not prohibited.374  The court also found that Earth provided enough 
information to satisfactorily prove that its use of the proceeds would not harm the public 
interest.375  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of claims, holding 
that (1) assignment of a corporation’s claims to its owner was an invalid attempt to 
circumvent the statutory requirement that counsel represent corporations in lawsuits, and 
(2) the Department did not err in allowing a nonprofit to use gaming proceeds to offer a 
public bicycle program.376 
 
South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage Board of 
Adjustment 
In South Anchorage Concerned Coalition, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage 
Board of Adjustment,377 the supreme court held that (1) the superior court was within its 
discretion to deny both de novo review and consideration of additional evidence,378 and 
(2) the Platting Board’s decision meets both standards of substantial evidence and 
rational basis review.379 Neighboring landowners, organized as the South Anchorage 
Concerned Coalition, Inc. (The Coalition), challenged a new real estate development 
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citing potential damage to the area’s water supply.380 The Municipality of Anchorage’s 
Platting Board, after much expert testimony on both sides, approved the subdivision.381 
The Coalition appealed.382 The supreme court found that the superior court correctly 
denied de novo review in recognition of the fact that the Platting Board possessed the 
relevant expertise to determine whether the plat merited approval.383 Because de novo 
review was denied, the superior court was also correct in refusing to admit a 
supplemental expert report which was produced more than a year after the conclusion of 
the administrative proceedings.384 Finally, the supreme court, in an independent review of 
the agency’s decision, found the Platting Board relied on “substantial evidence” and had 
a “rational basis” for its decision.385 The supreme court affirmed the decisions of both the 
superior court and the Platting Board, holding that (1) the superior court was within its 
discretion to deny both de novo review and consideration of additional evidence,386 and 
(2) the Platting Board’s decision meets both standards of substantial evidence and 
rational basis review.387 
 
State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk, Murkowski v. Alaska AFL-CIO 
 In State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk and Murkowski v. Alaska AFL-CIO,388 
the supreme court held that a statute modifying the public interest exception to the loser 
pays rule for attorneys’ fees was constitutional.389 Nunapitchuk first challenged the 
validity of House Bill (HB) 145 and received a favorable judgment from the trial court 
which held that the bill was unconstitutional because it improperly changed procedural 
rules and violated due process and equal protection.390 In Murkowski, the AFL-CIO, in an 
attempt to receive attorneys’ fees, argued that the public interest exception still applied 
because of the ruling in Nunapitchuk 391 that HB 145 limited the reach of the public 
interest exception to the general loser pays rule to rare constitutional issues.392 In 
reaching the decision that the bill was constitutional, even though it was not passed by a 
supermajority, the court first explained that Rule 82 of Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure is 
a rule of practice and procedure as opposed to substance because the rule did not so much 
create a right as it explained how that right was to be enforced.393 However, the court 
held that the public interest exception was substantive because it was created by the 
courts to further the substantive policy of encouraging certain types of lawsuits.394 
Moreover, the court held that HB 145 did not change Rule 82, but that courts should 
consider the policy behind the bill when weighing the equitable factors to determine 
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attorneys’ fees.395 Finally, the court held that HB 145 was not facially invalid because 
attorneys’ fees remained within the discretion of the trial court.396 In Nunapitchuk and 
Murkowski, the supreme court held that a statute modifying the public interest exception 
to the loser pays rule for attorneys’ fees was constitutional.397 
 
Turner v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Turner v. Municipality of Anchorage,398 the supreme court held that: (1) an 
expert did not prejudice the plaintiff where he merely testified about causation of the 
injuries sustained;399 (2) an instruction that the jury could compensate plaintiff for 
damages caused by medical negligence was not warranted;400 (3) a concession that a 
defendant is liable for the accident does not resolve the issue that the injury caused all of 
the asserted damages;401 (4) an offer of judgment is not ambiguous where it merely fails 
to mention the previous satisfaction of another lien;402 and (5) with regards to an offset of 
damages for pre-trial payments, the defendant has the burden of showing that its prior 
payment and the jury award were for the same injury or expense.403 Turner was rear-
ended by a car owned by the Municipality of Anchorage, and  she then underwent 
treatment for the next year, including extensive dental treatment.404 Turner’s insurance 
company received a $4,345.08 payment from the city’s insurance company.405 After 
rejecting a $45,000 settlement offer from the municipality, the case proceeded to trial and 
the jury awarded Turner total damages of $23,395, part of which the court allowed the 
city to offset with the earlier insurance payment.406 The court rejected Turner’s 
contentions that the settlement offer was void due to its failure to disclose the earlier 
payment because the offer released the city from all outstanding liability.407  Moreover, 
regarding offsetting damages, the court held that the burden is on the defendant to prove 
that the prior payment and the jury award were for the same injury, which was satisfied 
here.408 In affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) an 
expert did not prejudice the plaintiff where he merely testified about causation;409 (2) an 
instruction that the jury could compensate plaintiff for damages caused by medical 
negligence was not warranted;410 (3) a concession that a defendant is liable for the 
accident does not resolve the issue that the injury caused all of the asserted damages;411 
(4) an offer of judgment is not ambiguous where it merely fails to mention the previous 
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satisfaction of another lien;412 and (5) with regards to an offset of damages for pre-trial 
payments, the defendant has the burden of showing that its prior payment and the jury 
award were for the same injury or expense.413 
 
Weber v. State  
In Weber v. State,414 the supreme court held that a prisoner who had brought a 
complaint after the two-year statute of limitations was barred by res judicata from 
bringing up the dismissed claim for a fourth time and could not bring up a new claim 
because of judicial immunity and failure to state a claim.415 Three years after claiming to 
have been stabbed in the eye by a fellow inmate, prisoner Weber filed a complaint suing 
for punitive and compensatory damages.416 This complaint was dismissed because it was 
filed after the two-year statute of limitations under section 09.10.070(a)(2) of the Alaska 
Statutes.417 Weber’s second and third complaints, where Weber tried to argue for an 
extension of the statute of limitations due to his schizophrenia, were dismissed for failure 
to state a claim.418 The court dismissed Weber’s fourth complaint under res judicata, and 
dismissed a new claim seeking to add three defendants, including two superior court 
judges and the assistant attorney general, because of judicial immunity and failure to state 
a claim.419 The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint 
holding that a prisoner who had brought a complaint after the two-year statute of 
limitations was barred by res judicata from bringing up the dismissed claim for a fourth 
time and could not bring up a new claim because of judicial immunity and failure to state 
a claim.420 
 
Wilson v. MacDonald 
 In Wilson v. MacDonald,421 the supreme court held that a no contest plea in a 
criminal case precludes relitigation of the same elements in a civil case.422  Wilson 
assaulted MacDonald while attempting to impound her motorized wheelbarrow.423  He 
pled no contest to the assault charge, and the superior court granted summary judgment 
against him in the civil case.424  The supreme court found that he was collaterally 
estopped from denying an element in a subsequent civil action because his no contest 
plea was a serious criminal offense, the defendant had an opportunity for a full and fair 
trial, and the validity of his plea indicates he was aware of the relevant consequences of 
the no contest plea.425  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary 
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judgment, holding that a no contest plea in a criminal case precludes relitigation of the 
same elements in a civil case.426 
 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 
United States Supreme Court 
 
Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse v. Frederick,427 the United States Supreme Court held that a school 
principal did not violate a student’s free speech rights by confiscating a banner which she 
reasonably believed promoted illegal drug use and suspending the student for bringing 
the banner to a school-approved event.428  Frederick was suspended from school after he 
brought a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” to a school-approved event and 
displayed it after the principal requested he take it down.429  Frederick argued that the 
suspension violated his First Amendment rights because the speech did not occur in 
school,430 and because the message displayed was merely nonsense meant only to get him 
on television, not a promotion or celebration of drug use.431  The Supreme Court held that 
bringing a banner to an event that occurred during normal school hours, was sanctioned 
by the principal, and was attended by other students, did constitute school speech.432  The 
Supreme Court further held that schools may restrict student speech which they 
reasonably believe promotes illegal drug use, since deterring drug use among 
schoolchildren is an important, concrete school interest.433  The Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that a school principal did not violate a 
student’s free speech rights by confiscating a banner which she reasonably believed 
promoted illegal drug use and suspending the student for bringing the banner to a school-
approved event.434 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman 
In Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Feldman,435 the Ninth 
Circuit held that a political action committee’s constitutional challenge to three 
provisions of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct were not ripe and that the political 
action committee would not suffer hardship from being denied review under the ripeness 
                                                
426 Id. at 890. 
427 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007). 
428 Id. at 2629. 
429 Id. at 2622–23. 
430 Id. at 2624. 
431 Id. at 2625. 
432 Id. at 2624. 
433 Id. at 2628. 
434 Id. at 2629. 
435 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 33 
doctrine.436 In October 2002, the Alaska Right to Life Political Action Committee (PAC) 
circulated a questionnaire to the twelve Alaska state court judges who were seeking 
retention votes soliciting their views on various political issues including abortion and 
assisted suicide.437 Only four judges responded, and each declined to answer the 
questionnaire, explaining that their participation could require subsequent recusal and 
that the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited judges from “pledging, promising, or 
committing to particular conduct in judicial office.”438 In October 2004, approximately 
one month prior to Alaska’s general election, the PAC brought suit against the Alaska 
Commission on Judicial Conduct and others, challenging the constitutionality of three 
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct concerning a judge’s ability to endorse a 
particular political view.439 The district court ruled that the suit was justiciable, held for 
the PAC with respect to two provisions, but against it with respect to the third.440 Both 
parties appealed.441 The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case with 
instructions to dismiss, holding that the factual record did not include evidence of some 
real threat of enforcement or evidence that withholding federal adjudication would 
impose hardship on the plaintiffs.442 The Ninth Circuit held that a political action 
committee’s constitutional challenge to three provisions of the Alaska Code of Judicial 
Conduct was not ripe and that the political action committee would not suffer hardship 
from being denied review under the ripeness doctrine.443 
 
United States v. Braswell 
 In United States v. Braswell,444 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s claim 
that his indictment violated his constitutional rights was procedurally barred when the 
defendant failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.445 Braswell was convicted of various 
drug felonies.446 After appealing his conviction and filing for various motions and habeas 
relief, Braswell raised a claim that his indictment failed to identify the drug in the crimes, 
so it was constitutionally defective.447 The Ninth Circuit found that the defendant’s claim 
was procedurally barred because he failed to raise the issue on direct appeal, and the 
defendant also was unable to show cause, prejudice, or argue that he was actually 
innocent.448 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that a defendant’s claim 
that his indictment violated his constitutional rights was procedurally barrred when the 
defendant failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.449 
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Winterrowd v. Nelson 
In Winterrowd v. Nelson,450 the Ninth Circuit held that an officer may not use 
excessive force solely because of a suspect’s verbal refusal to comply with a request.451 
Winterrowd was pulled over by state troopers on suspicion that his license plates were 
invalid.452 When Winterrowd was unable to produce valid registration, the troopers 
ordered him out of his vehicle in order to speak with him inside a patrol car.453 Before 
bringing Winterrowd into a patrol car, the troopers attempted to perform a standard-
procedure pat-down.454 Upon being ordered to place his hands behind his back, 
Winterrowd explained that he could not do so because of a pre-existing shoulder 
injury.455 Although other methods existed to search Winterrowd, the troopers insisted on 
patting him down while forcibly holding his arms behind his back, visibly causing 
Winterrowd a substantial amount of pain.456 Winterrowd brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 in federal district court, alleging that the officers injured him through the use of 
excessive force.457 The district court denied the troopers’ motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds of qualified immunity, and they appealed to the Ninth Circuit.458 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that it had previously held that officers are entitled to qualified 
immunity unless their behavior was unreasonable within the context in which it 
occurred.459 The Ninth Circuit held that there were no reasonable grounds on which to 
fear that Winterrowd was dangerous and that, furthermore, a reasonable officer would 
have known the use of force in this situation was excessive.460 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment, holding that an officer 
may not use excessive force solely because of a suspect’s verbal refusal to comply with a 
request.461  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. State  
In Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. State,462 the supreme court held that 
the legislature acted within its constitutional authority in creating the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Commission (“Commission”) and that the Commission did not 
unconstitutionally encroach on the judicial branch.463 As part of the changes to the Alaska 
Workers’ Compensation Act, the state legislature established the Commission in 2005 as 
the final authority in hearing appeals from decisions of the Workers’ Compensation 
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Board.464 The complaint before the court alleged that the Commission was an “executive 
court” in violation of the state’s separation-of-powers doctrine.465 The court agreed with 
the State’s argument that the Commission was only a quasi-judicial agency and was 
properly established,466 but concluded that the Commission’s decisions were only binding 
on the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and the Commission.467 The supreme court 
affirmed the judgment of the superior court and held that the legislature was acting within 
its proper constitutional authority in creating the Commission and that the Commission 
did not unconstitutionally encroach on the judicial branch.468 
 
Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz 
In Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz,469 the supreme court held that a 
successful ballot initiative adopting English as Alaska’s official language and requiring 
English be used in “all government functions and actions” violated the constitutionally 
protected speech of citizens, government officers, and government employees.470 The 
Official English Initiative, a ballot initiative sponsored by the non-profit corporation 
Alaskans for a Common Language and approved by voters in 1998, adopted English as 
the state’s official language and required its use in “all government functions and 
actions.”471 Citizens and public officials, who were either bilingual in English and 
Yup’ik, Inupiaq, or Spanish, or proficient only in their native languages, challenged the 
initiative.472 The supreme court, applying strict scrutiny, held that the initiative violated 
the recipient speech rights of non-English speaking citizens and their right to petition the 
government as well as the speech rights of government officers and employees.473 The 
supreme court further held that unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the 
initiative because, pursuant to the Lynden Transport test, (1) legal effect could be given 
to the severed statute and (2) voters intended for other portions of the initiative to stand if 
some portions were struck down.474 Upholding the portion of the initiative requiring 
English be used in preparing official government documents, the Supreme Court did not 
rule on the constitutionality of the initiative’s other provisions.475 The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court’s finding that the initiative violated constitutional rights, but 
reversed and remanded on the severability question, holding that an initiative adopting 
English as Alaska’s official language and requiring English be used in “all government 
functions and actions” violated the constitutionally protected speech of citizens, 
government officers, and government employees.476 
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Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Gallant 
In Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Gallant,477 the supreme court held that 
requiring Alaska residency in order to receive a cost of living adjustment did not violate 
the state or federal equal protection clause.478 The Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(PERS) and the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) paid a ten percent cost of living 
adjustment (COLA) to retirees who remained in Alaska.479 Former public employees and 
teachers brought a class action against PERS and TRS, arguing that the purpose of the 
COLA was to equalize benefits among retirees who lived in different locations, and 
therefore employees who retired to high cost areas outside of Alaska were entitled to a 
COLA.480 The supreme court held that the COLA did not violate equal protection 
because: (1) the purpose of the COLA was to encourage public employees to remain in 
Alaska, which was at least a legitimate purpose;481 (2) the COLA bore a fair and 
substantial relationship to promoting that purpose, since the high cost of living in Alaska 
created a disincentive to remain in the state;482 and (3) the COLA did not unacceptably 
infringe on retirees’ rights to free migration, since the COLA was reasonably related to 
the cost-of-living differential between Alaska and most other areas of the United States, 
and since the COLA made up no more than ten percent of a retiree’s income.483 The 
supreme court reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded for further 
proceedings, holding that the Alaska residency requirement for the COLA did not violate 
the state or federal equal protection clause.484 
 
Sands v. Green 
In Sands v. Green,485 the supreme court held that section 09.10.140(c) of the 
Alaska Statutes deprives minors of their constitutionally protected due process right to 
access to the courts by limiting the statute of limitations in personal injury actions of 
persons under the age of eight to their tenth birthday.486 Cody Sands was attacked a 
month before his eighth birthday by the Greens’ dog in 1998, and the Sands filed a 
complaint in 2003 when Cody was twelve against the Greens in connection with Cody’s 
injury.487 The superior court dismissed the claim as time-barred because it came well 
after the statute of limitations had run when Cody turned ten; the Sands’ appeal argued 
that Cody’s procedural due process was violated.488 To determine whether or not the 
statute violated due process, the supreme court applied a three-part balancing test and 
determined that (1) a minor’s access to the courts is an important right under the due 
process clause of the Alaska Constitution; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
right is high; and (3) the state’s interest is not weighty enough to surmount the interest.489 
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The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that AS 09.10.140(c) deprives minors 
of their constitutionally protected due process right to access to the courts by limiting the 
statute of limitations in personal injury actions of persons under the age of eight to their 
tenth birthday.490 
 
State, Department of Fish & Game v. Manning  
In State, Department of Fish & Game v. Manning,491 the supreme court held that a 
point system discriminating against urban hunters by using an “access to alternative 
sources of game” criterion was unconstitutional under the state constitution.492  Section 
16.05.258 of the Alaska Statutes, governing the allocation of game in subsistence areas, 
used a point system for ranking Tier II subsistence hunting permit applicants.493  
Manning, a hunter from an urban area within the state, was denied a Tier II subsistence 
permit for a caribou herd hunt.494  Manning challenged three criteria of the point system 
as violating the equal access clauses of the state constitution, including the “access to 
alternative sources of game” criterion.495  In determining whether the statute violated 
equal protection for urban hunters, the court found that it was an “important” interest to 
ensure that Alaskans who rely on hunting and fishing for subsistence can do so.496  
However, the court determined that the game ratio formula used in assessing the “access 
to alternative sources of game” criterion was fundamentally flawed and inaccurate at 
measuring an applicant’s access to alternative food sources.497  Therefore, this criterion 
was not closely related to the state’s interest.498  The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s decision, holding that a point system discriminating against urban hunters by 
using an “access to alternative sources of game” criterion was unconstitutional under the 
state constitution.499 
 
State v. Murtagh 
In State v. Murtagh,500 the supreme court held that portions of the Victims’ Rights 
Act violated the due process rights of the accused.501 The purpose of the act was to 
regulate pretrial interactions between criminal defense representatives and victims or 
witnesses.502 First, the act required defense representatives to state their identity and 
connection to the defendant before interviewing a victim.503 The defense representative 
was further required to advise the victim that he need not speak with the defense 
representative and that he may have a prosecuting attorney present if he chooses to have 
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an interview.504 Second, the act allowed a victim or witness in a sexual offense case to 
require written authorization before being contacted by a defense representative.505 Third, 
the act required defense representatives to tell a victim or witness if they planned to 
electronically record the interview.506 Criminal defense attorneys challenged these 
provisions on behalf of themselves, their present clients, and their future clients.507 The 
court held that requiring defense representatives to give the mandated advice to victims 
and witnesses and to obtain written authorization before conducting an interview implied 
that the victim or witness should not cooperate with the interview, and thus interfered 
with defendants’ right to a fair trial.508 The court further held that, since undisclosed 
recording is lawful and valuable, and since countervailing interests do not outweigh the 
benefits of undisclosed recordings, the act’s prohibition on undisclosed electronic 
recording by defense representatives unduly interfered with the right to prepare and 
present a defense.509 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding 
that portions of the Victims’ Rights Act violated the due process rights of the accused.510 
 
State v. Carpenter 
 In State v. Carpenter,511 the supreme court found that Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress (“IIED”) claims are consistent with the First Amendment, punitive 
damages may be compared to statutory penalties even if the conduct is not the exact same 
as that contemplated in the statute, and plaintiff’s costs, including contingent attorney 
fees, are calculated before the state is awarded its fifty percent share, as provided by 
section 09.17.020(j) of the Alaska statutes.512  Carpenter brought a number of claims, 
including IIED, defamation, and spoliation, against a radio personality and his producer 
based on comments he made about her and directed to her on the radio personality’s 
show.513  The jury found for Carpenter on her spoliation claim and awarded her 
compensatory and punitive damages, half of which was awarded to the state under AS 
09.17.020(j).514  The supreme court reasoned that Carpenter’s IIED claim was not 
appropriately considered by the jury because it was unclear whether or not the jury 
understood that it could consider the statements made by the radio personality regardless 
of their truth and because the First Amendment does not extend protection to speech 
intended to harass or cause others to harass.515  The court found that punitive damages are 
not excessive when the statutory penalties are comparable, even if the events underlying 
the cause of action do not exactly meet the requirements of the statute.516  The court also 
found AS 09.17.020(j) constitutional because it does not violate the separation of powers 
and because the statute’s effect does not amount to an unconstitutional taking when the 
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amount is calculated after pro rata costs to the plaintiff are considered.517  Finally, the 
supreme court found that the statutory language in AS 09.17.020(j), AS 09.60.080, and 
their legislative histories direct a pro rata portion of Carpenter’s attorneys’ fees and costs 
to be deducted from the State’s fifty percent share of the punitive damages award.518  The 
supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that IIED claims are consistent with the 
First Amendment, punitive damages may be compared to statutory penalties even if the 
conduct is not the exact same as that contemplated in the statute, and plaintiff’s costs, 
including contingent attorney fees, are calculated before the state is awarded its fifty 
percent share.519 
 
State v. Planned Parenthood (“Planned Parenthood II”) 
In State v. Planned Parenthood (“Planned Parenthood II”),520 the supreme court 
held the Alaska Parental Consent Act (“PCA”) to be unconstitutional because a less 
restrictive means existed of advancing the interests it protected.521  Planned Parenthood 
of Alaska filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the PCA 
violated state constitutional rights to privacy.522 The PCA prohibited doctors from 
performing abortions on “unmarried, unemancipated wom[e]n under [seventeen] years of 
age”523 absent parental consent or judicial authorization.524 On initial appeal to the Alaska 
Supreme Court, it was held that the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution creates a 
right to reproductive privacy that can be limited “only when necessary to further a 
compelling state interest and only if not less restrictive means exist to advance that 
interest,”525 and the case was remanded for determination of whether the PCA met these 
requirements.526 The superior court found the PCA unconstitutional under the privacy 
clause of the Alaska Constitution and the State appealed to the supreme court.527 In 
analyzing the constitutionality of the PCA, the supreme court acknowledged that the 
goals of the PCA, to shield minors from their own immaturity and to aid parents in 
carrying out parental  responsibilities, were compelling ones.528 However, the court went 
on to recognize that the stripping of the right to reproductive choice from minors was not 
the least restrictive means of advancing those interests, noting that a parental notification 
statute would be less restrictive.529 Two justices dissented, arguing that the PCA is 
appropriately narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means to accomplish the state’s 
compelling interest.530 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, 
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holding the PCA to be unconstitutional because a less restrictive means existed of 
advancing the interests it protected.531  
 
Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute 
 In Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,532 the supreme court held that 
section 47.30.710(b) of the Alaska Statutes, allowing involuntary hospitalization of 
mentally-ill persons found to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious 
harm to themselves or others, is constitutional if construed to require that persons 
involuntarily hospitalized be so incapacitated that they may not “survive safely in 
freedom”533 and that granting a petition for the involuntary administration of 
psychotropic medication in a non-emergency situation prior to a visitor’s report being 
prepared was plain error.534 Wetherhorn was involuntarily committed to the Alaska 
Psychiatric Institute for thirty days based on two doctors’ claim that she was gravely 
disabled and likely to harm herself or others.535 Wetherhorn argued that the definition of 
“gravely disabled” under subsection B of Alaska Statute 47.30.915(7) reflected a 
standard too low to justify the restriction of liberty imposed by involuntary 
commitment.536 The superior court also granted a petition to administer psychotropic 
drugs to Wetherhorn without her consent and in a non-emergency situation, despite no 
visitor’s report being presented as statutorily required.537 The supreme court held that the 
definition of “gravely disabled” under section 47.30.915(7)(B) of the Alaska Statutes is 
constitutional if construed to demand that persons involuntarily hospitalized be so 
incapacitated that they may not survive safely outside of a controlled environment538 and 
that granting a petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs in a non-
emergency situation prior to a visitor’s report being prepared was plain error.539 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Holden v. State 
 In Holden v. State,540 the court of appeals held that an indigent defendant has a 
limited right to a court-appointed attorney when filing for post-conviction relief that 
appears to be untimely in order to investigate whether the defendant may qualify for an 
exception or tolling of the statute of limitations.541 Holden was an indigent prisoner who 
filed for post-conviction relief almost six years after his convictions became final.542 
However, any petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year under 
section 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) of the Alaska Statutes.543 The superior court dismissed the 
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petition and the request for a court-appointed attorney.544 The court held that Holden had 
a crucial need for an attorney to determine whether he applied for an exception to or 
tolling of the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.545 Therefore, Holden had a 
limited due-process right to a court-appointed attorney.546 The court of appeals reversed 
and remanded, holding that an indigent defendant has a limited right to a court-appointed 
attorney when filing for post-conviction relief that appears to be untimely in order to 
investigate whether the defendant may qualify for an exception or tolling of the statute of 
limitations.547 
 
Klemz v. State 
In Klemz v. State,548 the court of appeals held that a probation officer’s 
questioning of a suspected drunk driver was interrogation for Miranda purposes and the 
defendant was entitled to a new trial because administering Miranda warnings midstream 
did not make the statements made after the warning admissible.549 Klemz was on felony 
probation for driving under the influence.550 While waiting to meet with Foster, his 
probation officer, another probation officer smelled alcohol on Klemz and reported this 
discovery to Foster.551 Klemz submitted to a breathalyzer, which indicated a blood 
alcohol level of .221.552 Foster arrested him for violating his probation, but did not advise 
Klemz of his Miranda rights.553 When Foster asked Klemz how he had gotten to the 
probation office, Klemz admitted that he had driven himself.554 Foster then called the 
police.555 A police officer arrived shortly thereafter, advised Klemz of his Miranda rights 
and Klemz once again admitted that he had driven to the office.556 At trial, Klemz moved 
to suppress the incriminating statements, but the superior court held that they were 
admissible because Foster’s questions had a secondary administrative purpose.557 The 
court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that the probation officer’s 
questioning of Klemz as to how he arrived at his appointment was interrogation for 
Miranda purposes because it was reasonably likely to elicit a self-incriminating statement 
and that Klemz was entitled to a new trial because the incriminating statements made 
after he was advised of his Miranda rights stemmed from the earlier Miranda 
violation.558 The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that a probation 
officer’s questioning of an alleged drunk driver was interrogation for Miranda purposes 
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and the defendant was entitled to a new trial because administering Miranda warnings 
midstream did not make the statements made after the warning admissible.559 
 
Malloy v. State 
 In Malloy v. State,560 the court of appeals held that the legislature can deny 
discretionary parole to a defendant convicted of first-degree murder if a judge finds 
evidence of physical torture of the victim.561 Malloy was tried for restraining a woman in 
a motel room for a more than a week, inflicting physical and sexual assaults, keeping the 
victim sedated, and killing the victim.562 A jury convicted Malloy of first-degree murder, 
and the trial judge found that the State had proved substantial physical torture by clear 
and convincing evidence, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of 99 years.563 
Malloy appealed her sentence on constitutional grounds, asserting that she had been 
denied a trial by jury on the torture issue.564 The court held that Apprendi v. New Jersey 
and Blakely v. Washington prohibit an increase in a maximum sentence, but allow for a 
sentence already within the range of discretionary sentences, even without a jury trial on 
aggravating factors.565 However, the appeals court also agreed with the State’s 
concession of error that applying section 33.20.01(a) of the Alaska statutes, which denies 
good time credit to all prisoners convicted of certain first-degree murders, is a violation 
of the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution.566 The court of appeals upheld the 
sentence, holding that the legislature can deny discretionary parole to a defendant 
convicted of first-degree murder if a judge finds evidence of physical torture of the 
victim.567 
 
 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Estate of Polushkin v. Maw 
 In Estate of Polushkin v. Maw,568 the supreme court held that ambiguous contract 
addendums allowing sellers to retain the right to future claims are not enforceable 
without sufficient extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the addendum.569 In 1989, Maw 
sold Polushkin his Upper Cook Inlet salmon drift fishery permit, but added, at the time of 
signing, an ambiguously-worded addendum to the contract, which Maw argued was 
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meant to specify that Maw would retain all rights and ownership to claims resulting from 
the Glacier Bay and Exxon Valdez oil spills.570 Polushkin’s estate brought an action for 
declaratory judgment that Maw was not entitled to the claims arising after the date of the 
sale, and the superior court granted summary judgment in Maw’s favor.571 On appeal, the 
supreme court reasoned that it was unreasonable to assign future claims to the seller when 
they were completely unrelated to him, that ambiguous contractual provisions should be 
read in the most reasonable manner possible, and that there was insufficient extrinsic 
evidence to support Maw’s interpretation.572 The supreme court reversed the superior 
court’s ruling and granted summary judgment to Polushkin’s estate, holding that 
ambiguous contract addendums allowing sellers to retain the right to future claims are not 
enforceable without sufficient extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the addendum.573 
 
Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v. Denison 
 In Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v. Denison,574 the supreme court held that an 
automobile dealership which sold a car to a developmentally disabled person under 
guardianship of his parents was not entitled to restitution after the voiding of the 
automobile purchase agreement.575 After Kenai sold a new car to Denison’s disabled son, 
the Denison’s sought to return the car.576 Kenai refused to void the contract and 
demanded restitution despite the public notice of Denison’s ward status provided by the 
guardianship proceedings.577 The supreme court determined that in order for the 
dealership to obtain restitution, it must have been unaware of Mr. Denison’s status as a 
ward; furthermore, because the guardianship proceedings provided public notice, they 
were not entitled to any restitution.578 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, 
holding that an automobile dealership which sold a car to a developmentally disabled 
person under guardianship of his parents was not entitled to restitution after the voiding 
of the automobile purchase agreement.579 
 
Romero v. Cox 
In Romero v. Cox,580 the supreme court held that in order to pursue a claim for 
specific performance the buyer must be able and willing to perform on the contract.581 
Romero signed a contract to purchase land and a mobile home from Cox and moved onto 
the property though he never paid Cox the full down payment stipulated in the 
contract.582 Cox sued, and the superior court granted summary judgment on Cox’s 
specific performance claim and required Romero to deposit the remainder of the down 
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payment in trust if Romero wanted to bring a claim for specific performance.583 Of the 
issues that were properly briefed, the supreme court held (1) the superior court properly 
construed the agreement between the parties as a voided contract, and because the 
contract was void, Cox was entitled to the fair rental value of the property during the time 
of Romero’s occupation and had the ability to evict Romero; (2) buyers must be willing 
and able to act on a contract in order to bring an action for specific performance; and (3) 
all the factual findings of the court were warranted, but because the superior court’s 
decision did not mention Romero’s claim regarding the disappearance of some of his 
property, the superior court must decide that issue.584 The supreme court affirmed the 
factual findings of the superior court, remanded the case to the superior court for 
determination of an undecided issue raised at trial, and held that in order to pursue a 
claim for specific performance the buyer must be able and willing to perform on the 
contract.585  
 
Uncle Joe’s, Inc. v. L.M. Berry & Co.  
In Uncle Joe’s Inc., v. L.M. Berry & Co.,586 the supreme court held that 
exculpatory clauses in tariffs should be strictly construed against the utility,587 and 
therefore the publishing company that had written it could be found negligent.588 L.M. 
Berry and Company contracted with Alaska Communications Systems (ACS) to publish 
Anchorage telephone directories but omitted information for Uncle Joe’s Pizzeria.589 
Uncle Joe’s brought a negligence suit against Berry, who claimed limited liability under 
the provisions of an exculpatory tariff filed by ACS.590 The tariff explicitly applied only 
to ACS, not to companies that contracted with ACS as well.591 The court reasoned that 
the same justifications for disfavoring and strictly construing contractual exculpatory 
clauses apply to exculpatory clauses in tariffs.592 Therefore, the supreme court reversed 
the superior court’s judgment dismissing Uncle Joe’s claim and vacated the award of 
costs and attorney fees to Berry, holding that exculpatory clauses in tariffs should be 
strictly construed against the utility, and therefore, the publishing company that had 
written it could be found negligent.593 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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United States v. Hicks 
In United States v. Hicks,594 the Ninth Circuit held that, in light of United States v. 
Booker,595 the Sentencing Guidelines are always advisory, including when a defendant is 
resentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).596 Hicks was convicted and sentenced in 
1993 for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, maintaining a place for drug trafficking, 
and using and carrying a firearm during and in relating to a drug trafficking crime.597 
Hicks was sentenced based on the Sentencing Guidelines, which mandated adding 
additional points for his firearm conviction.598 However, Congress subsequently passed § 
3582(c), which stated that sentence enhancements were not to be applied to sentences 
enhanced due to firearm offenses committed in conjunction with the underlying offense 
and explicitly applied retroactively.599 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that Hicks 
was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because, under Booker, the Guidelines were no 
longer mandatory in any context.600 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that policy statements 
did not preclude the application of Booker to § 3582(c)(2).601 The Ninth Circuit vacated 
Hick’s sentence in light of Booker, since Hicks was being resentenced pursuant to § 
3582(c), and remanded to the district court to determine the proper sentence.602  
 
United States v. Sargent  
In United States v. Sargent,603 the Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to 
establish that postal statements had a face value exceeding $1000, which was a necessary 
element of the defendant postal worker’s convictions.604 Sargent, a disgruntled postal 
worker, stole hundreds of postal statements, which did not allow the United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”) to be paid for bulk mailings.605 A Postal Inspector discovered the 
irregularity, and Sargent was arrested.606 Sargent was convicted of one count of theft of 
public property under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and seven counts of theft of postal service 
property under 18 U.S.C. § 1707.607 In determining what “face value” meant in § 641, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the meaning of “value indicated on the face of a financial 
instrument.”608 Because the postal statements were not “financial instruments” and 
because the “thing of value” was the postal statements, and not the USPS’s services, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the government could not prove that the postal statements had a 
value exceeding $1000.609 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the 
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government failed to establish that postal statements had a face value exceeding $1000, 
which was a necessary element of the defendant postal worker’s convictions.610 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Gabrielle v. State, Department of Public Safety 
 In Gabrielle v. State, Department of Public Safety,611 the supreme court adopted 
the superior court’s holding612 that (1) a pardoned felon was neither entitled to receive a 
concealed firearm permit nor have such a permit renewed because pardoned felons are 
not “eligible to own or possess” a firearm under Alaska law,613 and (2) federal law does 
not prevent a pardoned felon from possessing a firearm if the pardon did not include a 
prohibition against firearm possession.614 An Alaska state trooper revoked Gabrielle’s 
concealed firearm permit and did not renew the permit because of Gabrielle’s prior 
felony convictions, even though Gabrielle had been pardoned for the felonies.615 
Gabrielle appealed to the Department of Public Safety, which upheld the trooper’s 
decision.616 Gabrielle then appealed to the superior court.617  The supreme court adopted 
the superior court’s rationale. Under Alaska’s statutory scheme, a pardoned felon would 
only be able to raise an affirmative defense against a third degree charge of firearm 
possession if, at the time of possession, the pardoned felon was on his or her land or was 
lawfully hunting.618 Therefore, issuing a concealed handgun permit to a pardoned felon 
would have no purpose because the pardoned felon could not use the permit as an 
affirmative defense to firearm possession.619 Thus, Gabrielle was not considered “eligible 
to own or possess” a firearm, and his request for a permit was properly denied because 
eligibility is a requirement for the permit.620 The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court and adopted its opinion621 that (1) a pardoned felon was neither entitled to receive a 
concealed firearm permit nor have such a permit renewed because pardoned felons are 
not “eligible to own or possess” a firearm under Alaska law,622 and (2) federal law does 
not prevent a pardoned felon from possessing a firearm if the pardon did not include a 
prohibition against firearm possession.623 
 
Heavyrunner v. State  
In Heavyrunner v. State,624 the supreme court held that a defendant’s challenge to 
a sentence’s excessiveness is ripe as soon as it is imposed and that a mandatory minimum 
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sentence differs from a presumptive sentence.625  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Heavyrunner pled no contest to kidnapping and second-degree assault for enticing a 
woman to get into his vehicle, abducting her, binding her with duct tape, assaulting her, 
and then abandoning her.626  The superior court sentenced Heavyrunner to thirty-five 
years for the kidnapping offense, with twenty-seven years suspended, and a consecutive 
two years served for the second-degree assault.627  As a preliminary matter, the supreme 
court determined that, contrary to the State’s assertion, a defendant’s challenge to a 
suspended prison term was ripe for review when imposed because the court is required to 
consider the sentence in its entirety.628  Additionally, the supreme court concluded that 
the superior court’s wording of the sentence as “presumptive” was confusing and 
erroneous because a presumptive term is one intended for a typical offender; rather, the 
portion of the sentence imposed that had to be served before the consideration of parole 
was a “mandatory minimum term.”629  The supreme court amended the superior court’s 
judgment, holding that a defendant’s challenge to a sentence’s excessiveness is ripe as 
soon as it is imposed and that a mandatory minimum sentence differs from a presumptive 
sentence.630 
 
McGee v. State 
In McGee v. State,631 the supreme court held that in a case for criminal mischief 
the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that McGee lacked any 
reasonable ground to believe that his actions were justifiable self-defense.632 Upon 
returning to his mother’s trailer home, McGee noticed a large gash in his mother’s head 
and found a man, Alexander, asleep in the back of the trailer.633 McGee claims that after 
a scuffle with Alexander, McGee fled from the trailer as Alexander shouted 
“[threateningly].”634 McGee claims to have smashed out the windows so that Alexander 
would not be able to drive the truck into McGee.635 The court noted that an element of the 
statutory definition of criminal mischief requires the defendant to have acted with “no 
reasonable right or [] reasonable ground to believe [he] has such a right.”636 Therefore, 
the court found that it was the State’s burden to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and since McGee made a showing of necessity (e.g. self-defense) that the State had failed 
to rebut, the State did not meet its burden.637 The supreme court reversed the conviction 
and remanded for further proceedings, holding that in a case for criminal mischief the 
State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that McGee lacked any 
reasonable ground to believe that his actions were justifiable self-defense.638   
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Rathke v. Corrections Corp. of Am., Inc.  
In Rathke v. Corrections Corp. of Am., Inc.,639 the supreme court held that a state 
prisoner has the right to enforce the state’s contract with Corrections Corporation 
America (CCA).640 Rathke, an inmate at the Florence Correctional Center (Florence), was 
placed in disciplinary segregation for thirty days based on a false-positive drug test.641 
Rathke was not afforded any administrative hearing before his segregation, despite his 
clean drug record during his seventeen-year tenure in prison.642 The court found that 
Rathke had colorable constitutional claims based on his allegations of violations by CCA 
of his constitutional rights as an inmate.643 Moreover, the court held that Alaska prisoners 
are the intended third-party beneficiaries of the state’s contract with CCA.644 However, 
Rathke did not have a contract claim against individual CCA employees because 
employees are not generally liable for breach of contract by their employer.645 Finally, 
Rathke did not have a claim as a third-party beneficiary against the drug testing firm, as 
this was a separate contract between the state and the firm.646 The supreme court affirmed 
in part, vacated in part and remanded the superior court’s decision, holding that a state 
prisoner has the right to enforce the state’s contract with CCA.647 
 
State v. Garrison 
In State v. Garrison,648 the supreme court held that a person charged with drunk 
driving is not permitted to raise an affirmative defense of necessity without objective 
evidence that the harm prevented outweighed the harm risked.649 A friend was driving 
Garrison car when it broke down on the side of the road, subsequently causing her friend 
to leave the scene.650 Garrison then started and drove the car, when he was arrested for 
drunk driving.651 At trial she asserted the affirmative defense of necessity, and after a 
hung jury the state moved to prevent her from raising the defense.652 The superior court 
issued an order allowing the necessity defense and denied the state’s motion, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.653 The state appealed, arguing that the proportionality prong of 
the necessity defense, that harm prevented is greater than potential harm inflicted, is a 
matter of law for the court to decide.654 The supreme court concluded that Garrison failed 
to present objective evidence that the harm she prevented outweighed the harm she was 
risking, noting that the proportionality prong is determed by an objective standard and 
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passing on the opportunity to rule on whether the proportionality prong of the necessity 
defense is for the court or for the jury.655 The supreme court vacated the order issued by 
the superior court, holding that a person charged with drunk driving is not permitted to 
raise an affirmative defense of necessity without objective evidence that the harm 
prevented outweighed the harm risked.656   
 
State v. Gonzales  
In State v. Gonzales,657 the supreme court held that the State’s ten-year delay in 
bringing an indictment against Gonzales was justified because of his flight from the state 
as well as the child-victim’s mental health needs.658 A vehicle stop of Gonzales’ car for a 
traffic violation by an Alaska state trooper uncovered sexually explicit drawings and led 
to Gonzales being investigated for child molestation.659 Gonzales fled the state at the 
beginning of the investigation and did not return for nearly ten years.660 Additionally, as a 
result of the investigation, the child-victim was treated for sexual abuse, including a six-
month hospitalization.661 The superior court concluded that this delay was unreasonable, 
and, combined with lost recordings of interviews conducted by the authorities, ordered 
dismissal of the State’s case against Gonzales, and the court of appeals affirmed this 
judgment.662 The supreme court held that the superior court improperly shifted the burden 
to the State to proffer reasons for the delay and to justify why the delay was necessary.663 
The supreme court reversed the appellate court decision and remanded to the superior 
court the issue of what sanctions, if any, should be applied to the State’s case against 
Gonzales because of the lost evidence, holding that the State’s ten-year delay in bringing 
an indictment against Gonzales was justified because of his flight from the state as well 
as the child-victim’s mental health needs.664 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage,665 the court of appeals held that it had 
jurisdiction over all sentence appeals from a district court except those challenging as 
excessive a term of imprisonment of 120 days or less.666  Allen pleaded no contest to two 
counts of cruelty to animals for maintaining animals in an inhumane manner and 
received, after suspensions, a thirty day sentence and a ten-year probationary period 
during which the only animal she was allowed to care for was her son’s dog.667 Allen 
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appealed the probation condition.668 Based on the legislative history and the potential 
administrative difficulties, the court of appeals found that its statutory jurisdictional limit 
applied only to appeals challenging as excessive any sentence for 120 days or less.669 
After finding that it had jurisdiction, the court affirmed the probation condition because it 
was reasonably related to Allen’s rehabilitation.670 Overruling Haggren v. State671 by 
finding that the court of appeals does have jurisdiction over appeals to consider penalty 
provisions other than terms of imprisonment, the court of appeals held that it had 
jurisdiction over all sentence appeals from a district court except those challenging as 
excessive a term of imprisonment of 120 days or less.672 
 
Allen v. State  
In Allen v. State,673 the court of appeals held that a prima facie case of attorney 
incompetence for failure to present witnesses must either present statements from those 
witnesses or explain to the court why such statements are unobtainable.674 Allen filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief appealing his conviction of second-degree murder on 
the grounds that his attorneys failed to present the testimonies of two witnesses who 
would have provided important defense testimony.675 The petition included an affidavit 
by an investigator who, after interviewing each witness, affirmed what their testimony 
would have been.676 The superior court dismissed Allen’s petition on the grounds that it 
failed to present a prima facie case.677 Allen appealed this decision, asserting that the 
superior court should have granted him a hearing on the defense claims associated with 
his witnesses before it dismissed his petition.678 The court of appeals noted that there 
were several unpublished Alaska decisions which state that similar petitions must contain 
either statements from the witnesses or a suitable explanation of why such statements 
could not be obtained, and that Allen’s petition contained neither.679 The court of appeals 
affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that a prima facie case of attorney 
incompetence for failure to present witnesses must either present statements from those 
witnesses or explain to the court why such statements are unobtainable.680 
 
Douglas v. State  
In Douglas v. State,681 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s prior sexual 
assaults were relevant, that the judge did not abuse his discretion by barring the defendant 
from the courtroom even during his testimony, and that the defendant’s physical assault 
on his attorney during an attorney-client conference did not require the attorney’s 
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disqualification.682 Douglas was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault 
and two counts of fourth-degree assault for twice brutally beating his girlfriend and for 
having non-consensual sex with her both times.683 While Douglas was in jail awaiting his 
trial for those charges he contacted his girlfriend by phone, despite a no contact order, 
and attempted to persuade her to give exculpatory testimony, which gave rise to this 
appeal.684 The court of appeals found that while defendants normally do have a right to 
testify in person, rather than by telephone, the superior court properly barred Douglas 
from the courtroom because of his intemperate, disruptive, and uncontrolled behavior.685 
Moreover, the appeals court concluded that evidence of Douglas’ prior sexual assaults 
was properly admitted because defense counsel never objected to its admissibility as 
hearsay and because, arguably, the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Douglas from 
claiming that he was innocent of previously convicted conduct.686 Finally, the appeals 
court found that Douglas’ physical assault on his court-appointed defense attorney at an 
attorney-client conference at the jail did not require defense counsel to withdraw from 
further representation of Douglas; the court concluded that it was not the assault itself 
that prevented meaningful communication between Douglas and his attorney, but rather it 
was Douglas’ own litigation agenda that prevented him from effectively communicating 
with any attorney in order to contribute to his defense.687 The court of appeals affirmed 
the superior court’s judgment, holding that a defendant’s prior sexual assaults were 
relevant, that the judge did not abuse his discretion by barring the defendant from the 
courtroom even during his testimony, and that the defendant’s physical assault on his 
attorney during an attorney-client conference did not require the attorney’s 
disqualification.688  
 
Dow v. State 
In Dow v. State,689 the court of appeals held that Cooksey pleas must be presented 
to the court in clear writing that explicitly states the issues preserved for appeal.690 Dow 
was arrested based on evidence found during a warrantless police search of his 
basement.691 The dispositive issue in his case was whether there was adequate consent to 
the search.692 Dow entered a Cooksey plea, a plea of no contest in exchange for the right 
to appeal a dispositive issue, in which the superior court noted that the general issue of 
consent was appealable.  However, neither the lawyers nor the judge clearly articulated 
the specific arguments the plea reserved for appeal.  When Dow appealed his conviction, 
the State contended that the plea agreement did not preserve the issues he raised.693 The 
court of appeals, noting widespread confusion on the issue of Cooksey pleas, held that 
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Cooksey pleas must be entered into in writing and signed by both the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney, and that: (1) both parties must agree on which issues are dispositive; (2) 
the agreement must state the reasons why the issues are dispositive; and (3) the 
agreement must explicitly refer to the facts of the case and state the legal theories relied 
on by the parties.694 The court of appeals remanded the case to the superior court for 
clarification of the scope of the dispositive issue, holding that Cooksey pleas must be 
presented to the court in clear writing that explicitly states the dispositive issues 
preserved for appeal.695 
 
Edwards v. State 
In Edwards v. State,696 the court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence 
to support Edwards’ conviction, that Edwards’ trial was not flawed by procedural and 
evidentiary errors and that Edwards’ sentence was not in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights.697 A child was left in Edwards’ care by the mother when she went to 
work.698 About two hours later, Edwards’ downstairs neighbor heard a loud noise, and 
roughly forty-five minutes after that, Edwards brought the child to the hospital.699 The 
court held that, based on the evidence presented, it was reasonable to find that Edwards 
was the person who injured the child.700 The court also found that, in excluding 
potentially exculpatory evidence, the superior court properly applied Alaska Evidence 
Rule 403, which limits a defendant’s right to present evidence based on considerations of 
relevance.701 Moreover, the court rejected Edwards’ claim of verdict inconsistency 
because (1) Edwards did not object to the jury instructions;702 (2) Edwards’ attorney 
made precisely the opposite argument regarding the inconsistency of other charges 
against Edwards;703 and (3) taken as a whole, the jury instructions did not reveal a bias in 
the jury’s ultimate verdict.704 The court also noted that this possibility of verdict 
inconsistency could have been avoided had the superior court given the standard jury 
instructions.705 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the 
district court, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Edwards’ conviction, 
that Edwards’ trial was not flawed by procedural and evidentiary errors, and that 
Edwards’ sentence was not in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.706 
 
Garland v. State 
In Garland v. State,707 the court of appeals held that in order to secure review of 
the admissibility of portions of a pre-sentence report, an individual charged with a crime 
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must take the stand and dispute the report’s allegations.708 Garland was charged with 
sexual assault of a minor and pled no contest.709 The state prepared a pre-sentence report 
which included information about a prior sexual assault in California for which Garland 
was the suspected perpetrator.710 Garland argued that because he pled no contest, the pre-
sentence report was irrelevant to his sentence.711 The superior court rejected Garland’s 
argument, which he renewed on appeal.712 Relying on Rule 32.1(f)(5) of the Alaska 
Criminal Rules, the court of appeals held that because sentencing courts can only rule on 
the admissibility (and relevance) of elements of presentence reports if they are “disputed 
assertion[s]” and because Garland neither disputed the assertion at trial nor argued that 
the law did not require that he take the stand, there was no need to remove the part of the 
presentence report referring to the previous event.713 Affirming the superior court, the 
court of appeals held that in order to secure review of the admissibility of portions of a 
pre-sentence report, an individual charged with a crime must take the stand and dispute 
the report’s allegations.714   
 
Grandstaff v. State 
In Grandstaff v. State,715 the court of appeals held that inculpatory statements 
made by a defendant during a peer review investigation are not protected by privilege in 
criminal cases and that none of the issues raised by the defendant in his appeal warranted 
reversing his conviction or reducing his sentence.716 Grandstaff was convicted of sexually 
assaulting medical patients, issuing prescriptions to those patients without any medical 
purpose, and stealing Medicaid funds.717 On appeal, Grandstaff challenged many of the 
trial court’s rulings, including its decision to admit statements he made during a peer 
review investigation.718 The court noted that both the legislative history and a consistent 
reading of Section 18.23.030(a) of the Alaska statutes as a whole indicate that statements 
made during peer review investigations are meant to be privileged only in civil cases. The 
court of appeals affirmed, holding that inculpatory statements made by a defendant 
during a peer review investigation are not protected by privilege in criminal cases and 
that none of the issues raised by the defendant in his appeal warranted reversing his 
conviction or reducing his sentence.719 
 
Lampley v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Lampley v. Municipality of Anchorage,720 the court of appeals held that the 
defendant was entitled to a new trial on the charge of driving with a suspended license 
and that sentences for driving under the influence and breath test refusal should have 
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been imposed concurrently.721 The defendant was convicted for driving under the 
influence, breath test refusal, and driving with a suspended license.722 On appeal, 
defendant argued that the culpable mental state for driving with a suspended license was 
negligence, not recklessness as the jury had been instructed.723 Defendant further argued 
that when the court increased his sentence after discovery of his third-offender status, the 
double-jeopardy clause had been violated.724 In ruling for the defendant on the above-
mentioned claims, the court first determined that while the state statute carried a culpable 
mental state of negligence and the local statute required recklessness, the two statutes 
were not fundamentally inconsistent as to render the local statute unlawful.725 As a result, 
the recklessness standard mandated by the local statute under which the defendant was 
charged applied.726 The court further determined that since defendant’s sentences for 
driving under the influence and breath test refusal could have been implemented 
concurrently and that not doing so violated prior precedent by correcting an illegally 
lenient sentence further than the extent necessary to correct the illegality.727 The court of 
appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the defendant was entitled to a 
new trial on the charge of driving with a suspended license and that sentences for driving 
under the influence and breath test refusal should have been imposed concurrently.728 
 
Linscott v. State 
In Linscott v. State,729 the court of appeals held that (1) denial of a jury trial for an 
aggravating factor is harmless where the composite sentence for multiple crimes could 
have been achieved without finding the aggravator730 and (2) an appellant may not raise 
new theories in support of a mitigating factor on appeal.731 Linscott was convicted of 
first-degree burglary, second-degree theft, and contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor.732 The underlying events occurred while Linscott was on probation.733 On appeal, 
Linscott claimed that, under Blakely v. Washington, his right to a jury trial on an 
aggravating factor, his parole status, was improperly denied.734 The court ruled that the 
alleged Blakely error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court 
could have imposed the same composite sentence (for all three crimes) without using the 
aggravating factor to add to the burglary charge’s presumptive sentence.735 Linscott 
further argued that the trial court had improperly failed to find a mitigating factor, 
“conduct among the least serious” of first-degree burglary.736 The court of appeals denied 
                                                
721 Id. at 530. 
722 Id. at 519. 
723 Id. at 523. 
724 Id. at 528. 
725 Id. at 523–26. 
726 Id. at 526. 
727 Id. at 528. 
728 Id. at 530. 
729 157 P.3d 1056 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
730 Id. at 1057–58. 
731 Id. at 1059. 
732 Id. at 1057. 
733 Id. 
734 Id. at 1057. 
735 Id. at 1057–58. 
736 Id. at 1057. 
 55 
this argument, ruling that when an appellant has failed to prove mitigating factors in the 
lower court, the appellant may not present new theories on appeal supporting the 
mitigating factors.737 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court, 
holding that (1) denial of a jury trial for an aggravating factor is harmless where the 
composite sentence for multiple crimes could have been achieved without finding the 
aggravator738 and (2) an appellant may not raise new theories in support of a mitigating 
factor on appeal.739 
 
Lockuk v. State 
In Lockuk v. State,740 the court of appeals held (1) that the sentencing court was 
not required to submit to the jury aggravating factors resting solely on prior criminal 
convictions;741 (2) that the sentencing court’s failure to obtain a felony offender’s express 
concession of prior convictions and waiver of right to a jury trial on aggravating factors 
was not plain error;742 and (3) that plain error analysis was appropriate.743  Lockuk 
appealed his sentence of five years imprisonment with one year suspended for felony 
assault arguing that the State was required to prove aggravating factors, including prior 
convictions, to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.744  The court of appeals held that, under 
Alaska law and consistent with Blakely v. Washington, a judge could find aggravating 
factors based on prior convictions when the state relied simply on the convictions 
themselves and the defendant did not dispute them.745  The court also held that plain error 
analysis was appropriate because Lockuk did not raise his claims during sentencing,746 
and Lockuk’s claims fail under plain error analysis because reasonable judges could 
differ as to what the law required.747  The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding 
(1) that the sentencing court was not required to submit to the jury aggravating factors 
resting solely on prior criminal convictions; (2) that the sentencing court’s failure to 
obtain a felony offender’s express concession of prior convictions and waiver of right to a 
jury trial on aggravating was not plain error; and (3) that plain error analysis was 
appropriate.748 
 
Love v. State 
In Love v. State,749 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant may 
withdraw a guilty plea if he does not receive competent legal advice on an issue when 
that issue is central to his decision to accept the plea bargain.750 While on parole, Love 
was arrested for heroin possession and taken into custody for both violation of parole and 
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heroin possession.751 After serving two years in prison for parole revocation, Love 
reached a plea agreement with the state stipulating that he would serve two years for the 
heroin possession charge.752 Love believed the two years he previously served would be 
credited toward the new sentence and he would be released immediately; for that reason, 
he agreed to the plea bargain.753 The court of appeals found that Love’s attorney erred by 
failing to tell Love that his belief about his previous time served was incorrect because 
the attorney told him that there was a possibility that his belief was correct.754 The court 
found that the attorney’s failure to correct Love’s mistaken assumption constituted 
incompetent legal advice.755 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a 
criminal defendant may withdraw his plea when he does not receive competent legal 
advice on an issue and that issue is central to his decision to accept the plea bargain.756 
 
Matthew v. State 
In Matthew v. State,757 the court of appeals held that a de novo standard of review 
applies when determining whether conditions of release are restrictive enough to count as 
credit toward prison time and that a convicted individual whose prison sentence has been 
delayed may not count electronic monitoring toward time served when the conditions of 
the monitoring do not approximate incarceration.758 Matthew was sentenced to a two-year 
prison term but was granted a delay of confinement subject to electronic monitoring.759 
The superior court ruling permitted him to be either at home or at work and to travel 
between the two.760 Matthew subsequently filed a motion to have the time spent under 
electronic monitoring count toward his prison sentence; this motion was denied.761 On 
appeal, Matthew argued his electronic monitoring was no different from electronic 
monitoring done by the Department of Corrections, which counts toward time served.762 
The court of appeals held (1) this question was one of law, and thus a de novo standard 
was appropriate, and (2) in order for time outside of prison to count toward time served, 
the restrictions on an individual’s actions outside of prison must approximate those of 
actual incarceration.763 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court, 
holding that a de novo standard of review applies when determining whether conditions 
of release are restrictive enough to count as credit toward prison time, and that a 
convicted individual whose prison sentence has been delayed may not count electronic 
monitoring toward time served when the conditions of the monitoring do not approximate 
incarceration.764  
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Moberg v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Moberg v. Municipality of Anchorage,765 the court of appeals held that 
defendants must show prejudice from preaccusation delay to suppress a hospital-
administered blood test766 and that state-mandated testing procedures767 do not apply to 
blood tests conducted by hospitals and clinics for medical purposes.768 Moberg was 
hospitalized after a motorcycle accident.769 A blood test taken during the course of 
treatment revealed that Moberg was intoxicated.770 More than three months later, the 
government obtained Moberg’s hospital records and subsequently charged him with 
driving under the influence.771 In the context of hospital-administered blood tests, the 
court of appeals applied the more general preaccusation delay rule that defendants must 
show that their ability to defend the case was prejudiced on account of delay and not the 
more narrow rule governing mandatory breath tests that failure to preserve evidence 
results in automatic suppression.772 The court also held that both the legislative intent and 
plain language of title 13, section 63.110 of the Alaska Administrative Code, a regulation 
establishing mandatory testing procedures, do not support extension to blood tests 
conducted by a hospital for medical purposes.773 The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the district court, holding that defendants must show prejudice form 
preaccusation delay to suppress a hospital-administered blood test and that state-
mandated testing procedures do not apply to blood tests conducted by hospitals and 
clinics for medical purposes.774 
 
Morgan v. State 
 In Morgan v. State,775 the court of appeals held the stop for failure to signal did 
not sufficiently depart from reasonable police practices, and as a result, Morgan’s Fourth 
Amendment rights had not been violated.776 After failing to signal a turn upon leaving a 
restaurant parking lot, Morgan was pulled over and, after failing field sobriety tests, was 
arrested for driving under the influence.777 The court denied Morgan’s argument that his 
original stop for failure to signal out of the parking lot was contrary to police practice, 
which would have violated Morgan’s Fourth Amendment rights.778 The court, citing prior 
precedent, restated the proposition that in order to challenge a pretext stop, the defendant 
must prove that the officer departed from reasonable police practices.779 The court 
affirmed, holding that the stop for failure to signal did not sufficiently depart from 
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reasonable police practices, and as a result, Morgan’s Fourth Amendment rights had not 
been violated.780 
 
Osborne v. State 
 In Osborne v. State,781 the court of appeals held that Osborne was not entitled to 
further DNA testing on certain physical evidence because he failed to satisfy the court’s 
three-part test: (1) that his conviction rested primarily on eyewitness testimony, (2) that 
there was a demonstrated doubt concerning this identification, and (3) that the scientific 
testing of physical evidence would likely be conclusive of his guilt.782 Plaintiff and an 
accomplice were convicted of kidnapping, first degree assault, and first degree sexual 
assault after attacking a woman in Anchorage.783 The woman identified the two men in 
two separate lineups, and, among other evidence discovered at the scene, the police found 
a used condom with sperm that matched the plaintiff’s DNA type at a level shared by one 
sixth of the African American population.784 In a petition for post-conviction relief 
Osborne claimed that he received inadequate representation because his lawyer did not 
seek further DNA testing and also claimed that he had a right, as a matter of due process, 
to pursue DNA testing of the condom that may rule him out as the source of the sperm.785 
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision holding that Osborne was not 
entitled to further DNA testing certain physical evidence because he failed to satisfy the 
court’s three-part test: (1) that his conviction rested primarily on eyewitness testimony, 
(2) that there was a demonstrated doubt concerning this identification, and (3) that the 
scientific testing of physical evidence would likely be conclusive on the issue of whether 
he perpetrated the crime.786 
 
Pastos v. State 
In Pastos v. State,787 the court of appeals held that the cashing of a check may 
constitute “contact” in violation of a probation order with a no-contact provision.788 
Pastos pleaded no-contest to unlawful contact with his ex-girlfriend.789 The court 
suspended most of Pastos’ sentence, contingent on the condition that Pastos have no 
contact with his ex-girlfriend.790 Hours later, Pastos cashed a check that his ex-girlfriend 
had written him three years earlier.791 The trial court concluded that this was a purposeful 
act by Pastos intended to adversely affect his ex-girlfriend, contravening the court’s 
probation order.792 The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that, here, “contact” 
encompassed both direct and indirect communication.793 Furthermore, the court of 
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appeals held that the trial court’s conclusion was a reasonable one and was not clearly 
erroneous; Pastos knew that his act of cashing the check would instill emotional distress 
and fear in the victim.794 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, 
holding that the cashing of a check may constitute “contact” in violation of probation 
order with a no-contact provision.795 
 
Spencer v. State 
 In Spencer v. State,796 the court of appeals held that (1) the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion to determine whether witnesses are competent to testify despite the 
fact that the witness consumed alcohol prior to testifying; (2) there was sufficient 
evidence to support convictions of kidnapping and first-degree assault under an 
accomplice-liability theory; and (3) the trial judge did not erroneously instruct the jury on 
accomplice liability.797 Spencer and another man, Williams, were convicted of 
kidnapping and first-degree assault for restraining and beating Ahsoak after Ahsoak 
accidentally knocked Spencer’s girlfriend to the floor.798 Before testifying, Ahsoak had 
consumed four beers, and the defense moved to strike Ahsoak’s testimony as 
incompetent.799 The trial judge denied the defense’s request (stating that he did not 
believe Ahsoak was incompetent) but delayed the remainder of Ahsoak’s testimony until 
the following day and permitted defense counsel to cross examine Ahsoak on his 
intoxication.800 On appeal, the court of appeals (1) rejected a per se rule that witnesses 
who have consumed alcohol are incompetent to testify, instead vesting discretion in the 
trial judge to make the decision (and held that the trial judge, here, did not abuse that 
discretion); (2) reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under a standard of plain error in 
the light most favorable to the verdict; and (3) held that because the mental state elements 
of kidnapping and first-degree assault were included in the jury instructions regarding 
those specific crimes, their absence from the jury instruction regarding accomplice 
liability was not plain error.801 Affirming the decision of the superior court, the court of 
appeals held that (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion to determine whether 
witnesses are competent to testify despite the fact that the witness consumed alcohol prior 
to testifying; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support convictions of kidnapping and 
first-degree assault under an accomplice-liability theory; and (3) the trial judge did not 
erroneously instruct the jury on accomplice liability.802 
 
Valentine v. State 
 In Valentine v. State,803 the court of appeals held that changes to section 
28.35.030 of the Alaska Statutes, which prohibits driving under the influence, were not in 
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conflict with the Alaska Constitution.804  Valentine was convicted of driving under the 
influence under AS 28.35.030 after failing three field sobriety tests, and then registering 
over the permissible alcohol level in a police-administered breath test and an independent 
blood test.805 Valentine appealed his conviction, arguing that amendments to the statute 
which allowed conviction based on blood alcohol levels at the time of the test, rather than 
at the time of driving, violated the Alaska Constitution.806 The court dismissed all of 
Valentines claims, holding that: (1) the amended statute was not void for vagueness, 
because the statute gave adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited;807 (2) the 
amended statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad because the legislature intended to 
criminalize driving after ingesting enough alcohol to reach a certain blood alcohol level, 
even if that amount had not yet been absorbed into the bloodstream;808 (3) the amended 
statute did not impose criminal liability absent mens rea, because the State must still 
prove that the defendant knowingly drank and drove;809 (4) the amended statute did not 
deny due process by creating impermissible presumptions because the law does not 
require a presumption that a motorist was intoxicated while driving;810 (5) the amended 
statute does not infringe the rule-making power of the Alaska Supreme Court because the 
legislature may define the parameters of relevant evidence;811 (6) the amended law did 
not violate the constitutional right to an independent test because that right did not 
guarantee an exculpatory test result;812 and (7) the amended statute did not violate equal 
protection because the law rationally relates to a compelling interest of the legislature.813  
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that changes to AS 28.35.030, the 
law prohibiting driving under the influence, were not in conflict with the Alaska 
Constitution.814 
 
Wooley  v. State  
In Wooley v. State,815 the court of appeals held that the date of sentencing alone 
determines the beginning of the five-year time period in which third-degree theft is 
elevated to second-degree theft.816 On February 12, 2002, Wooley stole property worth 
less than $500, which normally constitutes third-degree theft under Alaska law.817 
However, Wooley had pleaded guilty to two prior counts of second-degree theft on 
December 20, 1996 and January 24, 1997 and was sentenced for both crimes on March 
28, 1997.818 Section 11.46.130(a)(6) of the Alaska Statutes elevates third-degree theft to 
second-degree for repeat offenders, specifically those convicted and sentenced for other 
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thefts “within the preceding five years.”819 In accordance with this provision, the State 
charged Wooley with second-degree theft, to which he pled no contest.820 The court of 
appeals identified an ambiguity in the statute concerning whether the five years begins to 
run from sentencing or from the finding of guilt.821 The court of appeals identified a 
longstanding principle in Alaska law that statutes imposing enhanced punishment for 
repeat offenders hinge on the date of sentencing.822 The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s decision, holding that the date of sentencing alone determines the 
beginning of the five-year time period in which third-degree theft is elevated to second-
degree theft.823 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
United States v. Rendon-Duarte 
 In United States v. Rendon-Duarte,824 the Ninth Circuit held that a conviction 
under section 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) of the Alaska Statutes qualified as a crime of violence 
under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1).825 Rendon-Duarte was 
convicted of being a felon in possession of two firearms.826 His sentence took into 
account the fact that he had previously sustained a felony conviction for a crime of 
violence.827 The court disagreed with Rendon-Duarte’s argument that the sentencing 
guidelines require an element of use of force828 and held that Rendon-Duarte’s conviction 
for reckless conduct was enough to find a crime of violence because it presented a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.829 The Ninth circuit affirmed, holding that a 
conviction under AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) qualified as a crime of violence under United 
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1).830 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Baker v. State 
 In Baker v. State,831 the supreme court held that forced savings accounts should 
not be considered when calculating a filing fee for indigent prisoners in lawsuits against 
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the state.832 The case arises from the calculation of the filing fee for Baker’s post-
conviction relief pursued against the state.833 Under section 09.19.010(d) of the Alaska 
Statutes, an indigent prisoner’s filing fee is calculated using a percentage of an average 
month’s deposits made to the prisoner’s account.834 However, since the passage of 
section 09.19.010(d) of the Alaska Statutes, a second, “forced savings” account has been 
created with the primary purpose of providing the prisoner with money upon his 
release.835 The question before the supreme court was whether the forced savings account 
should be included in the calculation of the filing fee.836 The court held that including the 
forced savings account was inconsistent with the purpose of the minimum filing fee, 
which was put in place to prevent frivolous and recreational lawsuits by prisoners.837 
Money from the forced savings account provides little immediate disincentive, as 
prisoners are not immediately able to spend that money.838 Additionally, long-term 
prisoners, who have the most incentive for recreational lawsuits are exempted from 
forced savings.839 The supreme court ordered the filing fee to be calculated without 
consideration of the forced savings account and remanded, holding that forced savings 
accounts should not be considered when calculating a filing fee for indigent prisoners in 
lawsuits against the state.840 
 
 
Bluel v. State 
 In Bluel v. State,841 the supreme court held that a driver’s refusal to take an 
optional drunk driving blood test could not later be used against the driver for 
impeachment purposes under Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 because its prejudicial 
potential could outweigh its probative value.842 A state trooper pulled Bluel over, and 
Bluel failed the mandatory sobriety test and declined to take an independent chemical 
test.843 At trial, Bluel testified that he was surprised that his blood alcohol content was so 
high.844 The prosecution then introduced evidence that Bluel declined to take an optional, 
independent test in order to impeach his claim.845 Bluel appealed his subsequent 
conviction of drunk driving, arguing that the evidence of his refusal to take the optional 
independent test should not have been introduced because it violated constitutional 
rights,846 and the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision.847 The supreme court 
stated that the probative value of introducing Bluel’s refusal to take the independent test 
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was tempered because he was entitled to decline the test,848 and the prejudicial effect was 
potentially high because there was a distinct possibility that the jury could interpret 
Bluel’s refusal to take the independent test as a sign of guilt.849 The supreme court 
reversed the court of appeals, vacated the district court’s conviction, and remanded the 
case to district court for a new trial,850 holding that a driver’s refusal to take an optional 
drunk driving blood test could not later be used against the driver for impeachment 
purposes under Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 because its prejudicial potential could 
outweigh its probative value.851 
 
Cameron v. State 
In Cameron v. State,852 the supreme court held that the Alaska Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require a prosecutor to inform a grand jury of the accused’s request to 
testify.853 Neil Cameron was charged with third degree assault for pointing his shotgun at 
and threatening two tow truck operators who were attempting to repossess his truck.854 
Cameron requested to testify before the grand jury as to his state of mind, but the 
prosecutor declined, and Cameron was indicted.855 The court, reviewing the question de 
novo, emphasized the grand jury’s important role of protecting the accused from unjust 
prosecution and the prosecutor’s vital duty to serve as a non-adversarial legal advisor to 
the grand jury.856 Cameron was clearly and unconditionally willing to testify, and because 
the grand jury’s questions indicated a strong desire to hear Cameron’s testimony, the 
prosecutor should have made this information available to the grand jury.857 The supreme 
court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the Alaska Rules of 
Criminal Procedure require a prosecutor to inform a grand jury of the accused’s request 
to testify.858 
 
Clark v. State, Department of Corrections 
 In Clark v. State, Department of Corrections,859 the supreme court held that the 
public interest exception did not apply to an appeal of a prison transfer because the 
mootness doctrine would not repeatedly circumvent later review of the issue.860 Clark, a 
prisoner, began serving his sentence in Alaska but was later considered for transfer to an 
Arizona facility.861 Clark appealed the transfer because it would interfere with his 
rehabilitation, particularly his ability to visit with his family.862 The appeal was denied by 
the superior court, but the court of appeals ordered that Clark be resentenced, making, in 
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the state’s view, the appeal moot.863 The supreme court agreed with the state regarding 
mootness because the decision on appeal would no longer be the operative decision 
regarding Clark’s transfer.864 The court found that Clark satisfied two of the three 
required prongs of the public interest exception, whether the disputed issue is capable of 
repetition and is a matter of public interest.865 However, the claim failed because the 
mootness doctrine will not repeatedly circumvent review of this issue because all 
prisoners retain their right to appeal a transfer.866 Dismissing the appeal, the supreme 
court held the public interest exception did not apply to an appeal of a prison transfer 
because the application of the mootness doctrine would not repeatedly circumvent later 
review of the issue.867 
 
Hartman v. State, Department of Administration 
 In Hartman v. State, Department of Administration,868 the supreme court held that 
an investigatory stop was legal where the officer reasonably believed that the car 
contained a suspect869 but that a state administrative hearing officer has a duty to inform a 
pro se litigant of the correct procedures for the action he is clearly attempting to 
accomplish.870 After driving into a ditch, Hartman got into a friend’s car that was later 
stopped by a police officer.871 In the course of the subsequent administrative hearing, 
Hartman attempted to gain access to a recording of his arrest (which was never brought 
into evidence), and his license was revoked.872 The supreme court reasoned that Hartman, 
having already crashed one car, had continuing access to another car and therefore 
continued to pose an imminent public danger.873 However, the court also reasoned that as 
a pro se litigant, Hartman “obviously attempted” to obtain the potentially exculpatory 
evidence.874 The court found that the hearing officer erred in neglecting to instruct 
Hartman as to the proper procedure for obtaining the recording and in issuing a decision 
without listening to the recording herself.875 The supreme court reversed the superior 
court, holding that an investigatory stop was legal where the officer reasonably believed 
that the car contained a suspect876 but that a state administrative hearing officer has a duty 
to inform a pro se litigant of the correct procedures for the action he is clearly attempting 
to accomplish.877 
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Jeffries v. State  
In Jeffries v. State,878 the supreme court held that an intoxicated driver may be 
guilty of extreme indifference murder if a reasonable juror could find indifference to the 
value of human life when considering all four Neitzel factors.879 A jury convicted Jeffries 
of second-degree murder after he caused a fatal traffic accident while intoxicated.880 
Jeffries appealed, arguing that second-degree murder should be reserved for intoxicated 
drivers who operate vehicles in a particularly dangerous way.881 Although the supreme 
court agreed that second-degree murder is rarely appropriate in motor vehicle 
homicides,882 it held that intoxication was not necessarily an excuse to extreme 
indifference,883 and that the question of whether a defendant manifested extreme 
indifference is primarily one for the jury.884 Applying the four Neitzel factors, the court 
held that (1) driving while intoxicated creates no social utility, except in rare 
circumstances, which were absent in Jeffries’s case since he was merely driving home;885 
(2) driving while intoxicated creates a very high risk of death, especially here since 
Jeffries’s error in judgment which caused the accident was severe and since he was 
highly intoxicated;886 (3) Jeffries had a heightened awareness of the risk of driving while 
intoxicated since he had been convicted of it before and had been ordered to refrain from 
drinking altogether;887 and (4) Jeffries took no precautions to minimize the risk of driving 
while intoxicated, as evidenced by his failure to participate in substance abuse 
programs.888 Further, the supreme court held that it was not error for the superior court to 
admit evidence of Jeffries’s failure to comply with orders to complete substance abuse 
programs and to refrain from consuming alcohol.889 The supreme court affirmed the 
decision of the superior court, holding that an intoxicated driver may be guilty of extreme 
indifference murder if a reasonable juror could find indifference to the value of human 
life when considering all four Neitzel factors.890 
 
State v. Koen 
In State v. Koen,891 the supreme court held that a search warrant not explicitly 
stating that the listed address is the defendant’s residence will still establish probable 
cause if it can be reasonably inferred that the address is the defendant’s residence.892 The 
police received reports that Koen possessed child pornography on his computer at a 
residence on Greentimbers Drive, and, after obtaining a search warrant, found computer 
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evidence of child pornography.893 The search warrant was accompanied by an affidavit 
that did not indicate that the house to be searched was Koen’s residence.894 The trial court 
found no probable cause because the search warrant, by not explicitly stating the address 
was Koen’s residence, failed to establish a link between the place to be searched and the 
alleged crimes and the decision was affirmed on appeal.895 The court of appeals 
affirmed.896 In reversing, the supreme court reasoned that the affidavit and supporting 
evidence provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that the address listed 
was Koen’s residence.897 Also, probable cause requires only that the outcome offered by 
the state be probable and does not require that the evidence rules out all possible 
explanations.898 Thus, the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that probable 
cause exists if it can be reasonably inferred that the address is the defendant’s residence, 
even if the search warrant does not explicitly state that the listed address is the 
defendant’s residence.899 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Abyo v. State 
In Abyo v. State,900 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on whether an officer had probable cause to arrest, that 
allowing documents verifying calibration of a breath test to be introduced even though 
the author of the documents was not available for cross-examination did not violate the 
confrontation clause, and that the trial court did not err in finding sufficient evidence for a 
jury to convict.901 Abyo was convicted of driving after a trial in which the arresting 
officer testified that Abyo failed multiple field sobriety tests and a breath test.902 The state 
then played a video of the traffic stop, showing that Abyo had failed only one of the field 
sobriety tests.903 The officer then amended her testimony.904 Abyo appealed the court’s 
earlier refusal of his motion for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the officer’s 
testimony and evidence from a breath test should have been excluded and that his motion 
for judgment of acquittal should have been granted due to lack of evidence.905 First, the 
court held that denying Abyo’s motion to hold an evidentiary hearing on the officer’s 
testimony was error since Abyo stated that the video contradicted Officer Anthony’s 
statements supporting probable cause for arrest.906 Second, the court held that reports 
verifying calibration of a breath test machine were non-testimonial since they are 
mandated by administrative rules, are created regardless of whether the machine is used, 
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and are not created in anticipation of a particular case.907 Third, the court held that 
denying Abyo’s motion for judgment of acquittal was proper since aspects of the 
arresting officer’s testimony showing probable cause were still credible since they were 
neither contradicted nor retracted and a valid breath test showed probable cause.908 The 
court remanded to the district court, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on whether an officer had probable cause to arrest, that allowing 
documents verifying calibration of a breath test to be introduced even though the author 
of the documents was not available for cross-examination did not violate the 
confrontation clause, and that it did not err in finding sufficient evidence for a jury to 
convict.909 
 
Active v. State  
In Active v. State,910 the court of appeals held that the superior court did not err in 
(1) admitting evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement, (2) admitting evidence 
of a prior conviction for sexual assault when sexual assault was one of the crimes alleged, 
or (3) applying aggravating factors to increase a sentence when those aggravating factors 
were based on prior convictions.911 Active was charged with burglary, sexual assault, and 
physical assault.912 Although there was evidence to suggest the crimes had occurred, the 
victim later claimed her prior statements about the crimes were lies.913 The superior court 
allowed into evidence Active’s 11-year-old prior conviction for a similar sexual assault 
and also permitted the prosecutor to enter the victim’s prior statement.914 The superior 
court convicted Active and identified several aggravating factors it used to extend 
Active’s sentence.915 Active appealed, claiming the superior court improperly allowed the 
State to introduce evidence of both his prior conviction and the prior inconsistent 
statement of the witness, and that the superior court improperly applied aggravating 
factors to increase his sentence without a jury present.916 The court of appeals held that 
(1) the victim’s prior inconsistent statements were properly admitted because they 
conveyed the victim’s demeanor and because the superior court could reasonably 
conclude that the witness would continue to deny any previous statement upon which the 
charges were based; (2) although evidence of a prior conviction of sexual assault was 
prejudicial against Active, the superior court did not err in admitting the prior conviction 
because the judge had properly applied the Bingaman balancing test917 in light of the fact 
that the defendant has served most of the intervening time in prison; and (3) Active had 
no constitutional right that the aggravating factors playing a role in his increased sentence 
be put to a jury when those aggravating factors were prior convictions.918 The court of 
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appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the superior court did not 
err in (1) admitting evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement, (2) admitting 
evidence of a prior conviction for sexual assault when sexual assault was one of the 
crimes alleged, or (3) applying aggravating factors to increase a sentence when those 
aggravating factors were based on prior convictions.919   
 
Anderson v. State 
 In Anderson v. State,920 the court of appeals held that admission of a witness’s 
hearsay statement to police did not violate a criminal defendant’s right of confrontation 
because the statement was not testimonial in nature.921 When Alaska police officers 
found an injured person in an apartment, one officer asked what had happened and 
whether the injured person was alright.922 The injured person responded that he was hurt 
and that Anderson had hit him with a pipe.923 The officer again asked the victim about his 
condition, the victim replied that he was hurt, and the officer assured the victim that help 
would be coming.924 At Anderson’s trial for assault, the prosecution introduced the 
victim’s statement to police even though the victim did not testify.925 Anderson objected 
to the introduction of that statement as a violation of his right to confrontation, but the 
superior court upheld the admission of the statement.926 The court of appeals relied on 
Crawford v. Washington,927 which held that the Confrontation Clause did not permit 
admission of a witness’s “testimonial” statements if the witness was not going to testify 
at trial.928 The court of appeals also relied on Davis v. Washington,929 which defined 
“testimonial” statements as ones that are made to help explain past events to police, not 
statements made to police to help them assist in emergency situations.930 The court of 
appeals held that here, the victim’s statements were not testimonial because the victim 
was trying to describe his injuries to the officer so the officer could help him.931 
Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that admission of a witness’s 
hearsay statement to police does not violate a criminal defendant’s right of confrontation 
if the statement was not testimonial in nature.932 
 
Artemie v. State 
 In Artemie v. State,933 the court of appeals held that a trial judge acted within his 
discretion in finding manifest necessity for a mistrial because there was no probability 
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that the jury would reach a unanimous verdict.934 Artemie was tried for sexual assault and 
assault.935 During deliberations at trial, the jury returned three times telling the judge that 
it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.936 The trial judge instructed the jury to 
continue deliberating twice, but on the third notice, the judge asked the jury if the 
instructions were understood and whether additional instructions would assist.937 The jury 
said that they would not, and the judge declared a mistrial.938 On appeal, Artemie argued 
that double-jeopardy barred a second trial because the trail judge abused his discretion by 
declaring a mistrial before establishing that there was a manifest necessity.939 However, 
the court of appeals held that the trial court had acted within his discretion and that there 
was no minimum amount of deliberation required to declare a mistrial.940 The court of 
appeals affirmed, holding that a trial judge acted within his discretion in finding manifest 
necessity for a mistrial because there was no probability that the jury would reach a 
unanimous verdict.941 
 
Benson v. State 
 In Benson v. State,942 the court of appeals held that under Rule 39.1(e) of the 
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant who claims to be indigent in 
order to obtain court-appointed counsel is entitled to testify under oath as to his indigence 
or sign a written statement showing indigence.943 Benson was charged with using a gun 
to threaten his girlfriend while he was drunk and subsequently scaring her two 
children.944 Benson was initially appointed counsel, but after $11,500 in bail money was 
returned to Benson from prior plea agreements, the superior court ruled that Benson had 
too much money to be eligible for a court-appointed attorney.945 Later, Benson’s son 
posted $50,000 bail.946 Benson stated that he did not want to represent himself but could 
not afford counsel, and that he wanted a court-appointed attorney.947 The superior court 
denied court-appointed counsel to Benson because of the $11,500 in returned bail money 
and the fact that Benson’s son managed to come up with $50,000 bail.948 Benson was 
convicted of fourth degree assault and two counts of violating his conditions of release, 
and he appealed.949 The court of appeals held that because Rule 39.1(e) of the Alaska 
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to determine a defendant’s financial state, 
the superior court was required to place Benson under oath and question him about his 
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finances.950 The court of appeals remanded the case to the superior court, holding that 
under Rule 39.1(e) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant who 
claims to be indigent in order to obtain court-appointed counsel is entitled to testify under 
oath as to his indigence or sign a written statement showing indigence.951 
 
Bush v. State 
In Bush v. State,952 the court of appeals held that a retrial for a prior offense after 
the conviction had been set aside would not violate a repeat offender’s right to a speedy 
trial, nor the prohibition against double jeopardy.953 Bush sought to have a prior DWI 
conviction set aside, arguing that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right 
to counsel.954 The superior court set aside the conviction without prejudice.955 Bush 
appealed the superior court’s decision that the state was entitled to retry him, arguing that 
a retrial would violate both his right to a speedy trial and the prohibition against double 
jeopardy.956 The court of appeals held that Bush’s right to a speedy trial was not violated 
where Bush changed his plea within the 120-day time for trial mandated by Alaska 
Criminal Rule 45(g)957 and that retrial would not violate the double jeopardy clause 
because jeopardy does not attach to a defendant whose conviction is set aside at the 
defendant’s request due to a procedural error.958  The court of appeals affirmed, holding 
that a retrial for a prior offense after the conviction had been set aside would not violate a 
repeat offender’s right to a speedy trial, nor the prohibition against double jeopardy.959 
 
Charliaga v. State  
In Charliaga v. State,960 the court of appeals held that despite the defendant’s 
assertion that a prior confession was false, a pre-sentence report could still contain the 
testimony obtained in the confession if the judge determines the prior recounting of the 
events to be truthful;961 however, additional hearsay not obtained directly from the 
defendant could not appear in the pre-sentence report.962 Charliaga pleaded no contest to 
sexual abuse.963 In preparation for the sentencing, the Department of Corrections 
submitted a pre-sentence report containing an allegation that Charliaga had committed 
similar sexual abuse seven years before his present offense.964 Charliaga filed an 
objection to this information, claiming that he was innocent of the earlier offense.965 He 
testified that although he had told a State Trooper that he had committed the offense, he 
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had only confessed because the trooper was already convinced of his guilt.966 The 
superior court judge declined to remove the information, having concluded that Charliaga 
was not telling the truth, and Charliaga appealed on the grounds that the information was 
inadmissible hearsay.967 Although under Alaska law the State cannot rely on only hearsay 
allegations of a defendant’s prior misconduct if the defendant takes the stand to deny the 
misconduct and submits to cross-examination, the court of appeals noted that Charliaga 
admitted that he confessed this crime to the trooper.968 The court of appeals thus held that 
certain disputed portions of information were true and that the State need not introduce 
any additional evidence to support them.969 However, the court of appeals further noted 
that there was additional information in the pre-sentence report that came not from 
Charliaga but from information his alleged abuse victim gave to the trooper and to her 
mother.970 Because Charliaga denied this information on the stand and the state made no 
effort to prove that the victim was unavailable as a witness, the court of appeals held that 
this additional information was inadmissible hearsay.971 The court of appeals remanded 
the case to the superior court, holding that despite the defendant’s assertion that a prior 
confession was false, a pre-sentence report could still contain the testimony obtained in 
the confession if the judge determines the prior recounting of the events to be truthful;972 
however, additional hearsay not obtained directly from the defendant could not appear in 
the pre-sentence report.973  
 
Coffman v. State  
In Coffman v. State,974 the court of appeals held that an attorney had the authority 
to decide whether to pursue an excessive sentence claim, regardless of the defendant’s 
desire to do so, and that it had not been proven that such a decision was incompetent.975 
Coffman, who received a combined thirty years for second-degree murder and first-
degree burglary, sought post-conviction relief based on her attorney’s failure to pursue an 
excessive sentence claim.976 The court found that a claim of excessive sentence is simply 
another issue to be raised in a criminal appeal, rather than its own distinct type of 
appeal,977 noting that an appellate attorney has discretion to decide which issues to raise 
on appeal and to abandon issues he or she feels are unlikely to succeed.978 Furthermore, 
the court held that the attorney’s decision to exclude from the appellate brief the claim 
that the sentence was excessive was not incompetent because Coffman failed to make a 
prima facie showing that the excessive sentence claim had a significantly better 
likelihood of success than any other issues pursued on appeal.979 The court of appeals 
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affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that an attorney had the authority to decide 
whether to pursue an excessive sentence claim, regardless of the defendant’s desire to do 
so, and that it had not been proven that such a decision was incompetent.980 
 
Cooper v. State 
In Cooper v. State,981 the court of appeals held that there is no plain error where 
the trial court fails to obtain defendant’s personal waiver of the right to jury trial with 
regards to an aggravating factor where (1) the defense attorney concedes the factor or (2) 
the factor is not in dispute.982 Cooper was convicted of robbery and assault, and the state 
alleged one aggravating factor—that Cooper was on parole when the crimes were 
committed.983 Cooper’s attorney conceded the aggravator in the pre-sentencing brief and 
again at the sentencing hearing, but Cooper himself never affirmatively waived the right 
to jury trial on the aggravator.984 While it is arguable that Blakely v. Washington requires 
courts to directly address defendants in these situations, the trial court took a different, 
equally reasonable position and thus did not commit plain error.985 Furthermore, because 
Cooper’s parole status was not disputed, failure to present the issue to a jury is harmless 
and does not necessitate reversal.986 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
superior court, holding that there is no plain error where the trial court fails to obtain 
defendant’s personal waiver of the right to jury trial with regards to an aggravating factor 
where (1) the defense attorney concedes the factor or (2) the factor is not in dispute.987   
 
Eaklor v. State 
In Eaklor v. State,988 the court of appeals held that jurors may reasonably interpret 
a victim’s general description of pain as encompassing both physical and emotional 
elements989 and that a trial judge may instruct the jury on the meaning of a statutory 
phrase.990  During an argument, Eaklor punched a man in the face, causing a red, swollen 
eye and a bleeding scratch below the eye.991  Eaklor was charged with fourth-degree 
assault.992  The court of appeals held that jurors could reasonably interpret the victim’s 
testimony describing “some sort of pain” as encompassing both physical and emotional 
pain, thus meeting the physical pain element of the assault charge.993  Furthermore, 
because the meaning of a statute is a matter of law, the trial court was within its authority 
when it instructed the jury regarding the meaning of the statutory phrase “impairment of 
physical condition.”994  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, 
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holding that jurors may reasonably interpret a victim’s general description of pain as 
encompassing both physical and emotional elements995 and that a trial judge may instruct 
the jury on the meaning of a statutory phrase.996 
 
Eide v. State 
In Eide v. State,997 the court of appeals held that sufficient evidence supported a 
verdict for first-degree vehicle theft and driving with a revoked driver’s license but not a 
verdict for resisting arrest.998 A jury convicted Eide of vehicle theft, driving with a 
revoked license, and resisting arrest.999  The superior court entered a judgment of 
acquittal on the resisting arrest conviction after determining that it was not supported by 
sufficient evidence.1000 Eide appealed, contending his convictions for vehicle theft and 
driving with a revoked license were not supported by sufficient evidence.1001 The State 
cross-appealed, arguing that the superior court judge improperly set aside the jury verdict 
for resisting arrest.1002 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Eide’s convictions for 
vehicle theft and driving with a revoked license were supported by sufficient 
evidencewhen viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
verdict1003 and that the superior court judge properly set aside the resisting arrest 
conviction because Eide’s conduct was “‘mere non-submission’” and thus did not fall 
within the conduct prohibited by the resisting arrest statute.1004 The court of appeals 
affirmed the superior court, holding that sufficient evidence supported a verdict for first-
degree vehicle theft and driving with a revoked driver’s license, but not a verdict for 
resisting arrest.1005 
 
Friedmann v. State 
In Friedmann v. State,1006 the court of appeals of Alaska held that the dismissal of 
a jury in the middle of a jury trial under Alaska Criminal Rule 27(d)(3) must be treated as 
the equivalent of a declaration of a mistrial for double jeopardy purposes.1007 Friedmann 
was standing trial for several counts of controlled substance misconduct.1008 The superior 
court dismissed the jury in the middle of the trial and the defendant, through his attorney, 
consented to such action.1009 The court of appeals first searched for a clear legislative 
intent behind Rule 27(d)(3), and finding none, interpreted the statute in accordance with 
double jeopardy clause jurisprudence.1010 Despite equating a Rule 27(d)(3) dismissal with 
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a mistrial, the court reasoned that because Friedmann had consented to the dismissal of 
the jury there was no violation of the double jeopardy clause and thus Friedmann could 
be brought back to stand trial.1011 The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, 
holding that the dismissal of a jury in the middle of a jury trial under Alaska Criminal 
Rule 27(d)(3) must be treated as the equivalent of a declaration of a mistrial for double 
jeopardy purposes.1012 
 
Gladden v. State 
In Gladden v. State,1013 the court of appeals held that a man convicted of driving 
with a suspended license had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and 
that the trial court’s failure to obtain a separate waiver of counsel at the sentencing 
hearing did not constitute plain error.1014 Gladden appealed his conviction for driving 
with a suspended license, asserting that his right to counsel had been violated.1015 The 
court of appeals held that Gladden had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel when he insisted on an attorney who would sign his contract even though he 
conceded that he knew no attorney would sign it.1016 The court of appeals also held that 
the trial court’s failure to obtain a separate waiver of counsel at sentencing was not plain 
error since the weight of authority in other jurisdictions is that a valid waiver remains in 
effect, barring a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration, or unless the 
defendant revokes it.1017 The court of appeals affirmed Gladden’s conviction, holding that 
he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and that the trial court’s 
failure to obtain a separate waiver of counsel at the sentencing hearing did not constitute 
plain error.1018 
 
Gomez v. State 
  In Gomez v. State,1019 the court of appeals held that the trial court was required to 
hold a hearing on a bond-insurer’s request for remission of forfeiture after a criminal 
defendant was rearrested with the assistance of the bond insurer.1020 Gomez secured the 
bail bond of Haynes, guaranteeing his appearance in court.1021 When Haynes did not 
appear at sentencing, the bond was forfeited.1022 Haynes was later rearrested with the 
assistance of Gomez, who twice requested a hearing for remission to the trial court and 
was twice denied.1023 The court analyzed Alaska Criminal Rule 41(h)1024 and explained 
that since the bail bond agency assisted in the recapture of the defendant, it was entitled 
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to a hearing regarding remission of the bond forfeiture.1025 The court of appeals reversed 
the superior court, holding that the trial court was required to hold a hearing on a bond-
insurer’s request for remission of forfeiture after a criminal defendant was rearrested with 
the assistance of the bond insurer.1026 
 
Harvey v. Antrim 
 In Harvey v. Antrim,1027 the court of appeals held that the Alaska courts had 
personal jurisdiction over the warden named in a prisoner’s habeas petition even though 
the warden and prisoner were both outside the state at the time of the petition.1028 Harvey 
had a criminal judgment entered against him by the superior court and was serving his 
sentence at a private prison in Arizona.1029 He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
challenging certain procedures in his prosecution and sentencing.1030 The court denied 
Harvey’s argument that the Alaska courts lacked authority to entertain litigation 
regarding his restraint, determining that the court needed jurisdiction over the custodian 
whose actions was being challenged.1031  The court determined that the courts of Alaska, 
via control of the Alaska Commissioner of Corrections, possessed personal jurisdiction 
over the Arizona warden who possessed direct control over Harvey.1032 The court of 
appeals denied Harvey’s application for relief, holding that the Alaska courts had 
personal jurisdiction over the warden named in a prisoner’s habeas petition even though 
the warden and prisoner were both outside the state at the time of the petition.1033 
 
Hodges v. State 
In Hodges v. State,1034 the court of appeals held that assessing the total amount of 
restitution against an offender without regard to his ability to pay did not deprive him of 
due process of law, nor did it defeat the sentencing goal of reformation under the Alaska 
Constitution.1035 Hodges conceded that he should pay restitution for his conviction of 
second-degree theft but challenged the State’s post-sentencing request for restitution on 
the ground that he should be allowed to demonstrate that he lacked the financial ability to 
pay the sum requested.1036 The court of appeals upheld the sentencing court’s assessment 
of the amount of restitution, holding that the defendant’s due process rights and the 
sentencing goal of reformation were both preserved because the sentencing judge had 
considered the defendant’s ability to pay when setting forth the terms of repayment in 
accordance with section 12.55.045(c) of the Alaska Statutes.1037 The court of appeals held 
that assessing the total amount of restitution against an offender without regard to his 
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ability to pay did not deprive him of due process of law, nor did it defeat the sentencing 
goal of reformation under the Alaska Constitution.1038 
 
Huntington v. State 
 In Huntington v. State,1039 the court of appeals held that police did not have an 
affirmative duty to remind a detainee of a previous request to make a phone call.1040 The 
court additionally held that evidence of racist comments is not always sufficient to order 
a mistrial.1041 After being pulled over for driving under the influence, Huntington 
expressed a desire to contact an attorney, which the police informed him he could do this 
upon arrival at the police station.1042 At no point after his arrival did Huntington renew 
his request.1043 At trial, evidence further suggested that Huntington had said on the night 
of his detaining that he was “upset with the white people.”1044 The court determined that 
section 125.25.150(b) of the Alaska statutes does not obligate the police to expressly 
offer a telephone call to an arrestee and that the statute only obliges the police to not 
unreasonably interfere with an arrestee’s efforts to call an attorney.1045 The court also 
determined that the evidence of Huntington’s racially insensitive remarks was probative 
as to his condition on the night of his arrest and that a mistrial was not required.1046 The 
court of appeals affirmed, holding police did not have an affirmative duty to remind a 
detainee of a previous request to make a phone call.1047 
 
Labrake v. State  
In Labrake v. State,1048 the court of appeals held that a convicted sex offender had 
failed to establish a prima facie showing of ineffective counsel, except with respect to 
Labrake’s second appellate attorney who failed to reinstate Labrake’s sentence appeal.1049 
In 1999, Labrake was indicted on two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a 
minor.1050 After receiving a sentence of 5 years, Labrake obtained a new attorney who 
died while Labrake’s appeal was in the briefing stage and who was subsequently replaced 
by a second appellate attorney.1051 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Labrake 
claimed that his original attorney had failed to represent him competently.1052 The court 
found Labrake’s claim to be without merit and asserted that any difference in opinion or 
animosity between Labrake and his trial attorney was not enough to establish ineffective 
counsel.1053 The court dismissed all of Labrake’s other claims based on ineffective 
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counsel, with the exception of his claim against his second appellate attorney, who had 
failed to ask the court to reinstate Labrake’s appeal.1054 The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s dismissal of Labrake’s petition for post-conviction relief because 
Labrake failed to establish a prima facie showing for his claims of ineffective counsel, 
except with respect to his second appellate lawyer’s failure to reinstate Labrake’s 
sentence appeal.1055 
 
Lambert  v. State 
In Lambert v. State,1056 the court of appeals held that the three special conditions 
of probation imposed on a probationer were valid under the test laid out in Roman v. 
State,1057 but that one general condition of probation involving searches for contraband 
was overly broad.1058 Lambert was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment with thirty 
months suspended and probation for his role in a third-degree assault.1059 After 
sentencing, Lambert sought to have the court remove one general and three special 
conditions of probation on the grounds that they violated the requirement from Roman 
that there be a direct relationship between the probation condition and the crime for 
which the probationer was convicted.1060 The superior court denied Lambert’s motion.1061 
Lambert appealed.1062 The court of appeals held that the three special conditions of 
probation imposed on Lambert met the Roman test since they were reasonably related to 
his rehabilitation and were not unduly restrictive insofar as they furthered Lambert’s 
substance abuse treatment.1063 The court of appeals also held that the general condition 
which subjected Lambert to searches for contraband was unsupported by case-specific 
findings.1064 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the 
three special conditions of probation imposed on a probationer were valid under the test 
laid out in Roman v. State, but that one general condition of probation involving searches 
for contraband was overly broad.1065 
 
Latham v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Latham v. Municipality of Anchorage,1066 the court of appeals held that a court 
has the power to appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant when a municipality’s 
usual procedures fail to procure representation.1067 Latham was convicted and sentenced 
to jail for violating two city ordinances, and his appeal to the superior court was 
affirmed.1068 At no time was Latham represented by counsel because none of the 
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attorneys with which the city contracts for indigent defense were willing or able to take 
the case.1069 The court first held that since Latham was sentenced to jail, he was 
convicted of a serious crime and therefore was entitled to counsel.1070 The court then 
determined that, if Latham had been prosecuted by the state, the Office of Public 
Advocacy would have had the power to petition the court to appoint an attorney.1071 The 
court concluded that, since the municipality’s usual method of procurement of attorneys 
was inadequate, the court should have exercised its common law authority to appoint an 
attorney.1072 The court of appeals remanded to the superior court, holding that a court has 
the power to appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant when a municipality’s usual 
procedures fail to procure representation.1073 
 
McLaughlin v. State  
In McLaughlin v. State,1074 the court of appeals held that a defendant who is 
represented by counsel may not file a pro se petition for review.1075  McLaughlin was 
convicted of driving under the influence.1076  After his attorney refused to seek 
interlocutory appellate review of the superior court’s decision denying a new trial, 
McLaughlin attempted to file a pro se petition for review.1077  The court held that the 
final decision of whether to seek interlocutory review of a trial court’s un-appealable 
order is reserved for the attorney, since all tactical decisions are left to the attorney except 
those specifically outlined in the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.1078  Although the 
rules leave the decision of whether to take an appeal up to the client, the rule does not 
include interlocutory appeals, which are more precisely identified as petitions for 
review.1079 The court of appeals rejected McLaughlin’s pro se petition for review, holding 
that a defendant who is represented by counsel may not file a pro se petition for 
review.1080 
 
Middleton II v. State 
In Middleton II v. State,1081 the court of appeals held that the jury’s verdict on a 
kidnapping charge were not inconsistent, and the trial judge was not required to include 
third-degree theft as a lesser-included offense of robbery in his jury instructions.1082 
Middleton was charged with robbery and kidnapping for robbing a pizza deliveryman at 
gunpoint and trying to force him to deliver one more pizza and give him the money.1083 
The judge refused to instruct the jury that third-degree theft was a lesser-included offense 
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of robbery, and while the jury found Middleton guilty of kidnapping and robbery, with no 
jury instruction explaining what “merely incidental” meant in a legal sense, it returned a 
special verdict stating the relationship of the restraint to the robbery was “merely 
incidental.”1084 Middleton appealed, arguing that the jury verdicts pertaining to the 
kidnapping charge were inconsistent and that the judge should have instructed the jury 
that third-degree theft is a lesser included offense to robbery.1085 The court of appeals 
held (1) the jury’s misunderstanding of the legal definition of “merely incidental” was 
consistent with its kidnapping verdict because the jury found the defendant guilty of 
kidnapping pursuant to its instruction and a follow-up question resolved the inconsistency 
in favor of the kidnapping verdict, and (2) the trial judge did not commit harmful error in 
refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense of third-degree theft because the 
two are separate crimes with different elements and, this reasoning aside, the error was 
harmless because the kidnapping verdict clearly indicated the jury did not believe the 
defendant’s third degree theft argument.1086 The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, 
holding that the jury’s verdict on a kidnapping charge was not inconsistent and that the 
trial judge was not required to include third-degree theft as a lesser-included offense of 
robbery in his jury instructions.1087 
 
Mooney v. State 
In Mooney v. State,1088 the court of appeals held that 1) when a prosecutor and 
defense attorney are operating under a mutual mistake regarding the terms of a plea 
agreement that is rejected, there is no right to specific performance on the grounds that 
the defense attorney was mistaken; and 2) when ruling on whether a new trial should be 
granted in light of new evidence, if that evidence bears heavily on the defendant’s case, a 
new trial ought to be granted.1089 Mooney was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced 
as a third-felony offender, having elected to go to trial rather than sign a plea 
agreement.1090 The foregone agreement was premised on the assumption that his 
presumptive sentence would be based on his status as a second-felony offender.1091 On 
appeal, Mooney argued that he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement 
and that he was entitled to a new trial in light of new witness testimony.1092 The court of 
appeals 1) noted that Mooney may have been erroneously sentenced because only one of 
his prior felonies should have counted toward the presumptive sentence; 2) held that, 
even assuming he was properly sentenced as a third-felony offender, the plea agreement 
was illegal and voidable because both parties were operating under a mutual mistake, and 
thus Mooney was not entitled to specific performance; and 3) held that Mooney was 
entitled to a new trial because post-conviction witness testimony goes to the core 
question of the defendant’s guilt.1093 The court of appeals remanded the case to the 
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superior court, holding that 1) when a prosecutor and defense attorney are operating 
under a mutual mistake regarding the terms of a plea agreement that is rejected, there is 
no right to specific performance on the grounds that the defense attorney was mistaken; 
and 2) when ruling on whether a new trial should be granted in light of new evidence, if 
that evidence bears heavily on the defendant’s case, a new trial ought to be granted.1094   
 
Ortiz v. State 
In Ortiz v. State,1095 the court of appeals held that the ex post facto clause is 
violated by retrospective application of a restitution statute which makes restitution 
mandatory and which does not take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.1096 Ortiz 
committed a robbery in 2003, for which he was later convicted and ordered to pay 
restitution.1097 At the restitution hearing, the superior court applied the newer version of a 
sentencing statute amended in 20041098 to find Ortiz liable for a substantial sum of 
money.1099 Whereas the pre-amended version of the statute would have given the superior 
court discretion to grant or withhold restitution, and would have further given discretion 
to account for the defendant’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution, the 
amended version allowed for neither.1100 Ortiz argued that application of the amended 
statute violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution since the statute 
had been amended after his crime was committed.1101 The superior court nonetheless 
found that it was obligated to apply the amended version and Ortiz appealed.1102 The 
court of appeals, noting that it had previously held the ex post facto clause to forbid 
retrospective application of laws that increase the punishment for criminal acts, held that 
some quantum of punishment had been increased by the application of the amended 
statute.1103 The court of appeals vacated the decision of the superior court and directed 
the superior court to reevaluate the restitution using the pre-amended statute, holding that 
the ex post facto clause is violated by retrospective application of a restitution statute 
which makes restitution mandatory and which does not take into account a defendant’s 
ability to pay.1104 
 
Roberts v. State  
In Roberts v. State,1105 the court of appeals held that an appellant who had already 
sought post-conviction relief was barred from pursuing a second application even when a 
flaw in the jury’s deliberative process became known.1106 Six months after the court had 
affirmed Roberts’s convictions, it was reported that two jurors in his case had carried out 
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an impermissible group experiment during their deliberations.1107 Pease, Roberts’ co-
defendant, was allowed to litigate an application for post-conviction relief; however, 
Roberts, who had already litigated a previous application for post-conviction relief, was 
denied the right to pursue a second application.1108 The court found that because it had 
recently held that the jury experiment at issue would not undermine or change the results 
of either Roberts’s or Pease’s trial, the other issues in the case need not have been 
decided.1109 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the 
application for post-conviction relief, holding that an appellant who had already sought 
post-conviction relief was barred from pursuing a second application even when a flaw in 
the jury’s deliberative process became known.1110 
 
Samples v. Municipality of Anchorage 
 In Samples v. Municipality of Anchorage,1111 the court of appeals held that (1) 
defendants are not entitled to a jury trial for speeding tickets if they are not at risk of 
losing their driver’s license, (2) an officer’s testimony is sufficient evidence to prove a 
speeding violation, and (3) a defendant must show plain error for issues that are not 
preserved for appeal.1112 Using a laser speedmeter, an Anchorage police officer measured 
Samples traveling at more than 20 miles an hour over the posted speed limit and charged 
him with speeding.1113 The magistrate judge ruled that Samples was not entitled to a jury 
trial.1114 The court of appeals held that the right to a jury trial does not extend to minor 
infractions like speeding, unless the conviction would result in the defendant losing an 
important license or includes an excessive fine that would imply criminality.1115 The 
court of appeals held that the mere possibility of losing a license does not meet this 
requirement.1116 The court of appeals also held that an officer’s testimony is sufficient for 
a speeding conviction.1117 Finally, the court of appeals held that when a defendant fails to 
preserve issues for appeal, plain error must be shown and that the magistrate judge did 
not commit plain error.1118 The court of appeals affirmed the magistrate judge, holding 
that: (1) defendants are not entitled to a jury trial for speeding tickets if they are not at 
risk of losing their driver’s license, (2) an officer’s testimony is sufficient evidence to 
prove a speeding violation, and (3) a defendant must show plain error for issues that are 
not preserved for appeal.1119 
 
State v. Beltz 
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 In State v. Beltz,1120 the court of appeals held that when individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their garbage, evidence obtained by 
searching their garbage should not be suppressed.1121 Based on a tip that Beltz bought 
many items used to make methamphetamines, two officers drove by Beltz’s home and 
took some trash bags without a warrant.1122 One of the officers later returned to Beltz’s 
residence with a trash collector to take more of Beltz’s garbage.1123 The officers inspected 
the trash on police premises and found many items used to make methamphetamines.1124 
With a warrant, Beltz’s home was searched and he admitted that he knew the items were 
being used to make methamphetamines.1125 Beltz was then indicted on four second-
degree drug charges, and he moved to suppress the evidence that was taken from his 
trash.1126 The superior court granted Beltz’s motion, and the State filed a petition for 
review.1127 The court of appeals reasoned that the United States Constitution does not 
grant a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s garbage because trash is readily 
accessible by third parties.1128 Furthermore, employing the two-part test articulated in 
Smith v. State,1129 (1) whether the individual actually expected to have privacy in the 
trash, and (2) whether society should recognize that expectation as reasonable, the court 
of appeals held that under the Alaska Constitution, Beltz had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his trash because Beltz put the trash at the end of his driveway where it 
could be accessed by anybody.1130 The court of appeals reversed the superior court, 
holding that when individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
their garbage, evidence obtained by searching their garbage should not be suppressed.1131 
 
State v. Kameroff 
In State v. Kameroff,1132 the court of appeals held that double jeopardy does not 
prevent the State from proceeding on felony charges when a criminal defendant pleads no 
contest to lesser-included offenses in order to avoid more serious charges.1133 Kameroff 
pled no contest to two misdemeanor charges related to an incident for which the State had 
filed felony sexual assault charges, charges that were later dismissed.1134 The judge who 
accepted his plea further ruled that double jeopardy barred the State from prosecuting 
Kameroff on felony charges stemming from the same incident with the same victim.1135 
The State petitioned for review.1136 The court of appeals held that under, Kameroff could 
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not use double jeopardy as a sword to prevent the State from proceeding with the more 
serious charges, since Kameroff was aware that the State was actively proceeding on 
felony charges against him at the time he pled no contest to lesser-included offenses, and 
since the State objected to the plea as an attempt to avoid the felony charges.1137 The 
court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that double jeopardy 
does not prevent the State from proceeding on felony charges when a criminal defendant 
pleads no contest to lesser-included offenses in order to avoid more serious charges.1138  
 
State v. Pease 
In State v. Pease,1139 the court of appeals held that a jury may conduct common-
sense experiments to test factual assertions made by experts.1140 Pease and Roberts were 
convicted of robbing and murdering a teenage boy and assaulting an adult.1141 During 
deliberations, the jury left the courthouse and conducted an experiment to test the validity 
of expert testimony.1142 Specifically, the jury tested the distance at which one could 
recognize another person.1143 The court, overruling the rule announced in Gorz v. 
State,1144 allowed the experiment under the principle that juries are permitted to use 
common experiences and illustrations during deliberations.1145 While the court found the 
act of leaving the jury room without court permission was misconduct, this misconduct 
was not serious and did not deprive Pease of a fair trial.1146 The court of appeals reversed 
the superior court’s grant of post-conviction relief,1147 holding that a jury may conduct 
common-sense experiments to test factual assertions made by experts.1148 
 
Sweezey v. State 
 In Sweezey v. State,1149 the court of appeals (1) held that in situations where the 
presumptive range of imprisonment for a criminal convict includes an option for no 
prison time, an appeal for non-consideration of potential mitigating factors is moot and 
(2) upheld the option of a defendant to reject probation.1150 Sweezey pled no contest to 
charges of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance in the superior 
court.1151 At that time, she chose to refuse probation; however, the superior court judge 
rejected this refusal and sentenced Sweezey to three years of probation and required her 
to serve 60 days imprisonment as a condition of her probation.1152  Sweezey appealed her 
sentence, asserting that the superior court’s failure to consider a mitigating factor (the 
                                                
1137 Id. at 1163. 
1138 Id.  
1139 163 P.3d 985 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
1140 Id. at 991–93. 
1141 Id. at 986. 
1142 Id. at 987–88. 
1143 Id. at 988. 
1144 749 P.2d 1349 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
1145 Pease, 163 P.3d at 991–93. 
1146 Id. at 994–95. 
1147 Id. at 995. 
1148 Id. at 991–93. 
1149 167 P.3d 79 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
1150 Id. at 79–80. 
1151 Id. at 79. 
1152 Id. 
 84 
small amount of cocaine she possessed) and failure to honor her refusal of probation was 
improper.1153 The court of appeals determined that the presumptive range of 
imprisonment for Sweezey’s crime was zero to two years, and that since the superior 
court could have imposed no prison time absent proof of the mitigating factor, her 
argument was moot.1154 The court further determined that as the supreme court has 
allowed for the refusal of probation by defendants, it was bound by those decisions and 
must allow for such a refusal here.1155 Therefore, the court of appeals vacated Sweezey’s 
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, (1) holding that, in situations where the 
presumptive range of imprisonment for a criminal convict includes an option for no 
prison time, an appeal for non-consideration of potential mitigating factors is moot and 
(2) upheld the option of a defendant to reject probation.1156 
 
Wacker v. State 
 In Wacker v. State,1157 the court of appeals held that: (1) a prosecutor does not 
improperly shift the burden of proof when rhetorically asking who had access to a 
beneficial witness for the defendant, and (2) evidence of drunk driving propensity is 
character evidence, not evidence of a habit, and is therefore inadmissible.1158 Wacker and 
her sister, Boone, got into a car accident while driving home from a night out 
drinking.1159 Although a witness claimed that Wacker was driving, Wacker claimed that 
Boone was behind the wheel.1160 Wacker tried to get Boone to testify that she was 
driving, but Boone never appeared in court, although the two communicated 
frequently.1161 The superior court refused to allow Wacker to introduce evidence that 
Boone would regularly drive drunk, and the prosecutor made a comment during the 
closing argument that underscored the regular contact between Wacker and Boone.1162 
The court of appeals reasoned that the prosecutor’s comment did not shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant to show why Boone did not testify because the prosecutor was 
merely trying to provide evidence of an alternative explanation of why Boone failed to 
appear.1163 The court of appeals also explained that driving drunk is too volitional an act 
to be considered admissible habit evidence under Alaska Evidence Rule 406, thus 
evidence of Boone’s propensity to drive drunk was barred as character evidence under 
Alaska Evidence Rule 404.1164 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding 
that: (1) a prosecutor does not improperly shift the burden of proof when rhetorically 
asking who had access to a beneficial witness for the defendant, and (2) evidence of 
drunk driving propensity is character evidence, not evidence of a habit, and is therefore 
inadmissible.1165 
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Woodbury v. State 
In Woodbury v. State,1166 the court of appeals held that under Blakely v. 
Washington,1167 in a jury trial, the State is not required to prove an offender’s parole 
status as an aggravating factor where the offender stipulates to such facts during 
sentencing.1168 During a change of plea and sentencing appearance, Woodbury stipulated 
that he was on parole at the time of his DUI arrest, leading to an increased sentence.1169 
Woodbury, although never disputing the fact, subsequently appealed claiming that under 
Blakely he was entitled to a jury trial on any issue of fact that may raise the potential 
maximum sentence.1170 The court of appeals held that there was no plain error for three 
individually sufficient reasons: (1) Blakely is reasonably interpreted as allowing reliance 
upon facts expressly stipulated during sentencing,1171 (2) a Blakely error is harmless if the 
facts are not in dispute,1172 and (3) selective rescission, as opposed to total rescission, of a 
plea bargain would create injustice.1173 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s 
judgment, holding that under Blakely, in a jury trial, the State is not required to prove an 
offender’s parole status as an aggravating factor where the offender stipulates to such 
facts during sentencing.1174 
 
 
 
ELECTION LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Edgmon v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor 
 In Edgmon v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor,1175 the supreme court held that 
section 15.15.360 of the Alaska Statutes should be interpreted to give effect to the voter’s 
intent when deciding whether there is an overvote.1176 Edgmon was involved in a close 
primary election and challenged the results of the runoff on the basis that several ballots 
were wrongly determined to be overvoted and therefore excluded.1177 The supreme court 
reasoned that a bright-line rule should not be applied and that the court should instead 
seek to determine the voter’s intent as mandated by section 15.15.360 of the Alaska 
Statutes and similar precedent.1178 To determine voter’s intent, the court looked at the 
different marks, compared the alleged overvotes to other votes on the ballot, and found 
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that the challenged ballots were not overvotes.1179 The supreme court reversed the 
determination of the State Division of Elections, holding that section 15.15.360 of the 
Alaska Statutes should be interpreted to give effect to the voter’s intent when deciding 
whether there is an overvote.1180 
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop 
In Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop,1181 the supreme court held that a 
helicopter company was liable under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) for 
overtime hours paid to helicopter pilots, but that a contract claim predicated on AWHA 
violations must be pursued within the AWHA statute of limitations, not the statute of 
limitations for contract claims.1182 Throop, a former employee, filed a class action 
complaint against Air Logistics for breach of contract for failing to include any add-ons 
in the regular rate of pay when calculating the overtime wage.1183 The superior court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Throop, and Air Logistics appealed.1184 The 
supreme court held that summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of compensable 
hours since the employees were required to work in isolated and inaccessible locations 
and because their employment agreement was reasonable.1185 The court further held that 
summary judgment should have been granted for Air Logistics on Throop’s contract 
claim since it would be inappropriate and against legislative intent if the AWHA 
overtime provision was governed by the standard contract statute of limitations rather 
than the AWHA’s statute of limitations provision.1186 Finally, the court held that the 
superior court’s decision not to award liquidated damages was supported by persuasive 
evidence showing that Air Logistics acted in good faith.1187 In part affirming and in part 
reversing the decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that a helicopter 
company was liable under AWHA for overtime hours paid to helicopter pilots, but that a 
contract claim predicated on AWHA violations must be pursued within the AWHA 
statute of limitations, not the statute of limitations for contract claims.1188 
 
AT&T Alascom, Inc. v. Orchitt 
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In AT&T Alascom, Inc. v. Orchitt,1189 the supreme court held that (1) substantial 
medical evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination that the 
claimant was entitled to medical and temporary total disability;1190 (2) the employer 
cannot claim that the Workers’ Compensation Board erred in denying its right to cross-
examine experts;1191 and (3) the employer was not entitled to a pre-hearing follow-up 
employer’s medical examination.1192 The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded Orchitt 
temporary total disability and medical benefits for injuries he sustained while working for 
AT&T Alascom.1193 AT&T Alascom appealed to the superior court, alleging that it was 
deprived of due process and that the Board’s decision was not supported by competent 
scientific evidence.1194 The supreme court upheld the lower court, reasoning that an 
opinion by a qualified expert, even if contradicted by other experts, constituted 
substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination;1195 AT&T Alascom cannot 
claim that the Board erred in denying its right to cross-examine experts because AT&T 
Alascom waived without qualification its right to cross-examine the experts;1196 and it 
was within the Board’s discretion not to allow AT&T Alascom a pre-hearing follow-up 
employer’s medical examination so close to the date of the hearing.1197 The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court, holding that (1) substantial medical evidence supported 
the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination that the claimant was entitled to 
medical and temporary total disability;1198 (2) the employer cannot claim that the 
Workers’ Compensation Board erred in denying its right to cross-examine experts;1199 
and (3) the employer was not entitled to a pre-hearing follow-up employer’s medical 
examination.1200 
 
Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore  
In Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore,1201 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Workers’ Compensation Board erred in awarding an employee the statutory minimum 
amount of attorneys’ fees under section 23.30.145(a) of the Alaska Statutes and that the 
proper award was reasonable attorneys’ fees under subsection 145(b).1202 Moore, an 
employee of the NC Machinery Company, had injured his back at work and consequently 
received compensation benefits and participated in a reemployment plan.1203 When this 
reemployment plan did not work out, the employer changed Moore’s benefits to 
permanent total disability (PTD) but subsequently signed a second reemployment 
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plan.1204 Moore’s attorney filed a claim seeking PTD benefits since the date of the injury, 
interest on those benefits, and attorney’s fees and costs.1205 NC Machinery admitted its 
liability for the PTD benefits but argued that it should not have to pay the statutory 
minimum amount of attorney’s fees under subsection 145(a) because it did not controvert 
the claim.1206 The Board awarded Moore the statutory minimum under subsection 145(a) 
and the superior court affirmed.1207 The supreme court found that NC Machinery’s initial 
resistance to paying PTD benefits did not constitute a controversion in fact because 
Moore’s claims had not been filed when the initial resistance occurred.1208 However, the 
court found that Moore was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees under subsection 145(b) 
because the employer had delayed or otherwise resisted a payment of compensation, and 
the employee had retained an attorney in the successful prosecution of the claim.1209 
Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board erred in awarding an employee the statutory minimum amount of 
attorneys’ fees under section 23.30.145(a) of the Alaska Statutes and that the proper 
award was reasonable attorneys’ fees under subsection 145(b).1210 
 
Jurgens v. City of North Pole 
 In Jurgens v. City of North Pole,1211 the supreme court held that preponderance of 
the evidence was the appropriate standard in determining that sexual harassment in the 
workplace had occurred because the possible harm was approximately equal to each 
party.1212 Police Officer Jurgens’s employment was terminated after a review board found 
that he had made sexual advances and explicit comments to a number of police 
dispatchers.1213 The court applied Romulus v. Anchorage School District1214 and found, 
using the preponderance of the evidence standard, that the review board’s findings were 
supported by substantial evidence and that the board did not err in terminating his 
employment.1215 The supreme court affirmed, holding that preponderance of the evidence 
was the appropriate standard in determining that sexual harassment in the workplace had 
occurred because the possible harm was approximately equal to each party.1216 
 
Miller v. Safeway, Inc. 
In Miller v. Safeway, Inc.,1217 the supreme court held that neither a company’s 
grooming policy nor its actions with respect to enforcing that policy breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1218 Miller was an at-will employee of Safeway 
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who was terminated for failing to bring his hairstyle, upon request, into conformance 
with the company’s grooming policy, although his hair—which he kept long for religious 
reasons—had gone unchallenged for his nearly three years at Safeway.1219 Miller filed 
suit against Safeway, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.1220 The superior court granted summary judgment to Safeway and Miller 
appealed.1221 The supreme court first held that Safeway’s grooming policy did not 
objectively violate the implied covenant by violating public policy, reasoning that 
employer grooming policies have generally been upheld as constitutional, and that it 
would not be appropriate to upset such decisions with the much narrower judicially-
created doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1222 The supreme 
court next held that Safeway’s actions in terminating Miller did not objectively breach 
the implied covenant because Safeway followed the same procedures with Miller as they 
did with all other employees and because no unfair religious discrimination occurred 
because Miller never disclosed his religious reasons for keeping his hair long and because 
Safeway was under no obligation to ask.1223 Finally, the supreme court held that Safeway 
did not subjectively violate the implied covenant because there was no evidence to show 
that Miller was terminated for any reason other than failing to comply with the grooming 
policy.1224 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment, 
holding that neither Safeway’s grooming policy nor its actions with respect to enforcing 
that policy breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1225 
 
Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission on Human Rights 
 In Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission on Human Rights,1226 the supreme court 
held that a prima facie case of employment discrimination had not been established 
because the employer had hired an individual in the same protected class as the 
complainant.1227 Villaflores applied for a job with the state government but was not hired 
and subsequently filed a suit with the Alaska State Commission on Human Rights.1228 
The Commission held that no discrimination existed because the employer had hired a 
person of the same protected class (Asian and over-forty) and that Villaflores did not 
meet the minimum qualifications for the job.1229 On appeal, the court affirmed the 
decision because Villaflores had failed to make a prima facie case for employment 
discrimination.1230 The court noted that any argument regarding discrimination based on a 
great difference between qualifications was not applicable because Villaflores had failed 
to make out the prima facie case.1231 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, 
holding that a prima facie case for employment discrimination had not been established 
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because the employer had hired an individual in the same protected class as the 
complainant.1232 
 
Willard v. Khotol Services Corp. 
 In Willard v. Khotol Services Corp.,1233 the supreme court held that: (1) factual 
disputes about an employer’s retaliatory discharge of an employee are sufficient to 
preserve the employee’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim;1234 (2) as 
at-will employees, probationary workers can be fired without cause;1235 (3) an employee 
must justifiably rely on a misrepresentation for a misrepresentation claim to succeed;1236 
and (4) the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preemption does not prevent an 
employee from introducing evidence of union-organizing activities, as long as that 
evidence is used to support a claim that is separate and independent from the employer’s 
alleged anti-union bias.1237 Khotol issued Willard an employee manual which described 
the probationary period, outlined “disciplinary procedures,” and said that employees 
could be terminated at any time for various violations.1238 While at Khotol, Willard tried 
to unionize the employees, complained about safety concerns, and felt that his 
supervisors personally disliked him.1239 Khotol fired Willard for “insubordination” six 
weeks after he started working.1240 Willard raised several claims challenging his 
termination, and the superior court granted summary judgment for Khotol on all of them, 
from which Willard appealed.1241 The supreme court held that a claim of breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be subjective or objective and that if 
an employee can raise factual issues over whether the employer terminated him for 
retaliatory reasons, the claim should survive summary judgment.1242 The supreme court 
also held that a probationary employee cannot bring a wrongful discharge or breach of 
contract claim if the employee manual explicitly states that probationary employment 
was at-will.1243 The supreme court further held that acceptance of the job before the 
employee learned of the misrepresentations makes it impossible for the employee to have 
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation.1244 Finally, the supreme court held that the 
NLRA would not preempt an employee from presenting evidence of an employer’s anti-
union sentiment, as long as the evidence would be used to support a claim that was 
independent from the anti-union allegation and the claim would not be identical to any 
potential federal claim under the NLRA.1245 The supreme court reversed in part and 
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remanded to the superior court regarding the implied covenant claim and the decision to 
admit anti-union bias evidence.1246  
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Hale v. Norton 
 In Hale v. Norton,1247 the Ninth Circuit held that the National Park Service was 
reasonable in requiring an environmental assessment before it would allow bulldozers to 
cross National Park Land.1248 The Hales’ property is surrounded by a national park, and 
they use an abandoned road to gain access to their property.1249 After their property 
burned down in 2003, the Hales used a bulldozer to travel over the abandoned road 
without first getting permission from the Park Service.1250 The Hales asked the Park 
Service for a permanent permit, but the Park Service responded by saying that it would 
need to do a more complete environmental analysis under the National Environmental 
Policy Act before it could properly determine whether to grant the permit.1251 The Park 
Service said it could prepare an environmental assessment and decide the issue in nine 
weeks, but the Hales failed to give the necessary information to the Park Service.1252 
Instead, the Hales filed suit, seeking an injunction that would force the Park Service to 
grant them “adequate and feasible access” to their land.1253 The district court ruled that it 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Hales appealed.1254 The Ninth Circuit held that 
although the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) gives access 
rights to property owners, it also permits the government to curb those rights for 
reasonable regulatory purposes.1255 The Ninth Circuit found that the gathering of 
information from the Hales for the National Environmental Policy Act did not necessarily 
contravene ANILCA’s requirement that landowners be given “adequate and feasible 
access” to their land “subject to reasonable regulations.”1256 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the Hales’ use of the bulldozer could lead to potentially harmful environmental effects, so 
the Park Service was justified in requesting an environmental assessment under the 
National Environmental Policy Act.1257  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, 
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holding that the National Park Service was reasonable in requiring an environmental 
assessment before it would allow bulldozers to cross National Park Land.1258 
 
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of Engineers  
In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers,1259 the Ninth Circuit held that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
performance standard for froth-flotation mill operations, not the regulatory definition of 
“fill material,” controlled the issuance of a permit to discharge wastewater into a lake.1260 
The Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, with the Sierra Club and the Lynn Canal 
Conservation, brought suit against the Army Corps of Engineers and the Forest Service 
challenging the issuance of a permit to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater 
from its gold mining operation into Lower Slate Lake.1261 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the EPA’s performance 
standard prohibiting discharges from froth-flotation mills, promulgated under § 301(e) 
and § 306(e) of the Clean Water Act,1262 did not control since the permit was issued 
under § 404, which permitted the discharge of “fill material.”1263 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the EPA’s performance standard applies, since no exceptions to a performance 
standard are allowed and § 404 only applies to discharge not subject to performance 
standards.1264 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the EPA’s performance standard 
for froth-flotation mill operations, not the regulatory definition of “fill material,” 
controlled the issuance of a permit to discharge wastewater into Lower Slate Lake.1265 
 
 
 
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Compton v. Kittleson 
In Compton v. Kittleson,1266 the supreme court held that a “hybrid” fee agreement 
that uses a client’s decision to settle as a trigger to convert contingent-fee representation 
into an hourly-fee scheme is prohibited by Alaska law because it burdens the client’s 
right to settle a case.1267 Attorney Kittleson entered into a fee agreement with the 
Nelvises for their case against a car dealer that would compensate Kittleson on a 
contingency-fee basis.1268 However, if the Nelvises dropped the case or settled for an 
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amount that would award Kittleson less than $175 per hour, then the Nelvises would have 
to compensate Kittleson for the difference between the contingency rate and the $175 per 
hour amount.1269 The Nelvises lost the case at trial, and because of their prior rejection of 
the settlement offer pursuant to Kittleson’s advice, the trial court ordered the Nelvises to 
pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees.1270 The Nelvises filed bankruptcy, and the 
Bankruptcy Trustee sued Kittleson for malpractice based on the impropriety of the hybrid 
agreement.1271 The supreme court concluded that, while not categorically prohibited, this 
particular hybrid agreement infringed on the client’s exclusive right to accept or reject 
settlement offers, embodied in Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct.1272 The supreme 
court reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that a “hybrid” fee agreement that 
uses a client’s decision to settle as a trigger to convert contingent-fee representation into 
an hourly-fee scheme is prohibited by Alaska law because it burdens the client’s right to 
settle a case.1273  
 
In re Landry 
 In In re Landry,1274 the supreme court accepted a stipulation that a state district 
court judge violated judicial protocol and publicly censured him by requiring the 
publication of its order in the Pacific Reporter.1275 The judge’s violations included the 
issuance of pre-signed bail orders to prosecutors for out-of-custody arraignments, poor 
tracking of timing in criminal cases leading to numerous dismissals, improper ex parte 
communications, hearing a case he should have disqualified himself from, and making 
sexual remarks to female employees.1276 The stipulation was agreed to by the judge and 
the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct,1277 and it recommended, among other 
things, that the judge be publicly censured for his violations and that he not seek further 
judicial office in Alaska.1278 The supreme court accepted the stipulation that a state 
district court judge violated judicial protocol and publicly censured him by requiring the 
publication of its order in the Pacific Reporter.1279 
 
 
 
FAMILY LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Alyssa B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
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 In Alyssa B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1280 the supreme 
court held that under certain circumstances, having a trial to terminate parental rights 
without the parent present does not violate due process.1281 After the Department of 
Health & Social Services petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the court 
had to delay the actual trial sixteen months because the mother kept refusing court-
appointed attorneys.1282 The mother failed to appear at the termination trial and objected 
to the trial proceeding without her there.1283 At trial, two experts testified that her 
daughter would be best served staying with foster parents, and one of them testified that 
the mother had psychological issues.1284 The supreme court found that holding the 
termination trial without the mother there did not violate her due process rights because 
she had ample notice and was purposefully delaying the trial, and that it was in the best 
interests of her daughter to have this trial as soon as possible.1285 The supreme court also 
found that the mother’s parental rights were not terminated due to her mental illness 
because there was adequate evidence to show that her parental rights were terminated due 
to abandonment of her daughter.1286 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
termination of parental rights, holding that under certain circumstances, having a trial to 
terminate parental rights without the parent present does not violate due process.1287 
 
Burke v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Burke v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1288 the supreme 
court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the assertion that Burke’s 
youngest child was a “child in need of aid,” that the Office of Children’s Services’ 
(“OCS”) efforts to reunite Burke and his youngest child were reasonable, and that post-
termination visitation was properly denied.1289 Burke’s youngest child, Jesse, was born in 
October 2002, roughly nine months after his older three siblings were removed from their 
parents’ custody because of abuse by their mother, Sondra, and Burke’s neglect.1290 In 
May 2004, citing Sondra’s substantial improvement in her parenting skills, OCS placed 
the older three children back in their parents’ home.1291 However, in December 2004 
OCS removed all children from their parents’ home after they received reports that 
Sondra was again abusing the children. The supreme court agreed with the superior court 
that Jesse was subject to actual, substantial risk of harm, that Jesse suffered from mental 
injuries, that Jesse had been neglected, and that Sondra suffered from mental illness, 
which placed Jesse at risk of physical harm or mental injury.1292 The supreme court also 
found that the superior court did not err in concluding that OCS’s reunification efforts 
were reasonable because of OCS’s deep involvement with the family for four years, 
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during which time OCS reasonably concluded that Burke’s involvement as a parent was 
lacking.1293 Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court did not err in declining 
to order post-termination visitation because there is no presumption of visitation where 
parental rights are terminated for adequate grounds, which existed here.1294 The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the assertion that Burke’s youngest child was a “child in need of aid,” that OCS’s 
efforts to reunite Burke and his youngest child were reasonable, and that post-termination 
visitation was properly denied.1295 
 
Fowler v. State, Department of Revenue 
In Fowler v. State, Department of Revenue,1296 the supreme court held that a 
father’s due process rights were not violated when an Idaho court entered a default 
paternity judgment against him, and so upheld registration of the judgment for 
enforcement in Alaska.1297  Fowler had a default judgment entered against him for failure 
to pay a filing fee in a paternity suit in an Idaho court.1298  After he relocated to Alaska, 
Fowler challenged registration of the judgment in Alaska on the ground that the Idaho 
court violated his due process rights by entering the judgment, and the superior court 
denied him relief.1299  The supreme court adopted in full the superior court’s reasoning by 
ruling that Fowler’s due process rights were not violated since he was given notice of the 
reason his answer to the paternity suit had not been accepted and he knew the date and 
time of a hearing on his opposition to the default judgment but did not attend.1300  The 
supreme court affirmed, holding that a father’s due process rights were not violated when 
an Idaho court entered a default paternity judgment against him, and so upheld 
registration of the judgment for enforcement in Alaska.1301 
 
Harvey v. Cook 
 In Harvey v. Cook,1302 the supreme court held that (1) a grandparent seeking 
visitation rights had not met the requirements for intervention by right, (2) there was no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court when it denied the grandparent permissive 
intervention, (3) a past child support claim is abandoned if it is not pursued in the 
superior court, and (4) there was insufficient evidence presented to the superior court 
upon which to render a judgment of child support fees.1303 Harvey and Cook had a child 
together before Cook’s military service required him to move to Arizona, where he 
married and had a second child.1304 During custody proceedings, the superior court 
denied the child’s maternal grandmothers attempt to intervene as a matter of right to seek 
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grandparental visitation rights.1305 The superior court awarded custody to Cook and 
ordered Harvey to pay child support.1306 The supreme court held that the superior court 
did not err in declining to allow the grandmother to intervene because the court properly 
weighed the relevant factors and decided intervention would not be appropriate.1307 The 
court found that Harvey’s past child support claims were waived when she failed to offer 
evidence in support of her claim during the trial1308 and ruled that the superior court erred 
by setting Harvey’s child support obligation without sufficient evidence of her 
income.1309 Affirming the denial of the grandmother’s attempt to intervene and 
remanding the child support determination for more evidence, the supreme court held that 
(1) a grandparent seeking visitation rights had not met the requirements for intervention 
by right, (2) there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court when it denied the 
grandparent permissive intervention, (3) a past child support claim is abandoned if it is 
not pursued in the superior court, and (4) there was insufficient evidence presented to the 
superior court upon which to render a judgment of child support fees.1310 
 
Hopper v. Hopper 
 In Hopper v. Hopper,1311 the supreme court held that: (1) rendering a dissolution 
agreement invalid is not an abuse of discretion;1312 (2) real property constitutes marital 
property if a spouse purchases the property from a prior ex-spouse during the marriage to 
a subsequent spouse;1313 (3) pre-marital savings accounts are marital property if marital 
assets are commingled therein;1314 (4) an account with only Social Security deposits is 
not marital property;1315 (5) attorneys’ fees should be awarded during dissolution 
agreement modifications only if a spouse acts improperly during litigation;1316 (6) 
awarding prejudgment interest was not an abuse of discretion;1317 and (7) terminating 
spousal support was not an abuse of discretion.1318 James and Loretta Hopper married in 
1994 and filed for marital dissolution in 2002.1319 In 2004, Loretta moved to set aside the 
dissolution, claiming that she was “cognitively impaired” at the time and that portions of 
the marital property were excluded from the dissolution agreement.1320 The trial court 
ruled for Loretta on all issues except the termination of spousal support, and both James 
and Loretta appealed.1321 The supreme court held that if a dissolution agreement omits 
large portions of marital property, then it is valid to set aside the dissolution 
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agreement.1322 The supreme court also held that as long as a spouse purchases real 
property during the marriage, even if that spouse had previously owned that real property 
before the marriage and was merely repurchasing it from a previous ex-spouse, that real 
property still counts as marital property.1323 The supreme court further held that pre-
marital accounts become marital property if marital assets are integrated into those 
accounts, and the burden of proof rests on the spouse who claims that they are not marital 
property to show the source of the assets in the accounts if that spouse wants to dispute 
the presumption.1324 The supreme court also held that accounts containing only Social 
Security deposits are not marital property because federal law disallows states from 
dividing Social Security benefits, and the spouse who argues that the account contains 
more than just Social Security deposits has the burden of proof.1325 The supreme court 
also held that during a dissolution modification, attorneys’ fees should be awarded only if 
a spouse acts improperly during litigation and that improper behavior during the drafting 
of the dissolution agreement does not merit an award of attorneys’ fees.1326 The supreme 
court further held that if no injustice would be done to the spouse who is paying 
prejudgment interest, then a judge can properly award the prejudgment interest.1327 The 
supreme court finally held that a judge can terminate spousal support if the marital 
property is properly divided and the marital support is no longer necessary.1328 The 
supreme court reversed the trial court on the issues of the Social Security account and the 
award of attorneys’ fees and affirmed the trial court on the other issues.1329 
 
Huestess v. Kelley-Huestess 
In Huestess v. Kelley-Huestess,1330 the supreme court held that (1) an order 
dividing the property of a divorced couple be vacated because only a portion of a marital 
house was transmuted into marital property and because the house was valued at the time 
of separation and not the time of trial and (2) an award of child support for the period 
before the couple was married violated the due process rights of the husband.1331 Bonnie 
Kelley and Allen Huestess were married nearly eight years after they had a child 
together, who Huestess did not financially support when the child was born.1332 Before 
the couple was married, Kelley purchased a house and four years later Huestess began 
living with Kelley and began giving her his paycheck for “general use.”1333 After Kelley 
received a settlement of over $120,000 for an automobile/motorcycle accident, the couple 
refinanced the house and then filed for divorce about a year after the refinancing.1334 The 
superior court determined that the house was two-thirds the property of Kelley and one-
third marital property, valued the house at the time of trial instead of separation, and 
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ordered Huestess to pay child support for the years before he and Kelley were 
married.1335 The supreme court held that the partial transmutation was unjustified, and 
that the value of the house should have been determined at the time of trial, not 
separation; therefore the court held that the property division should be vacated.1336 
Furthermore, because Kelley introduced testimony as to Huestess’ child support late in 
the trial, awarding back child support violated Huestess’ due process rights.1337 The 
supreme court vacated and remanded the decision of the superior court, holding that (1) 
an order dividing the property of a divorced couple be vacated because only a portion of a 
marital house was transmuted into marital property and because the house was valued at 
the time of separation and not the time of trial and (2) an award of child support for the 
period before the couple was married violated the due process rights of the husband.1338  
 
In re Change of Name for A.C.S. 
 In In re Change of Name for A.C.S.,1339 the supreme court held that the superior 
court erred by allocating the burden of proof to the father in an initial naming dispute 
where neither parent should have borne the burden of proof.1340 Gieser sued Starling 
before their child was born requesting the declaration of Alaska’s jurisdiction, the 
addition of Gieser’s name to the child’s name, custody, visitation, and child support.1341 
Starling left the state before giving birth and named the baby without including Gieser’s 
last name.1342 Gieser sued for custody and received sole legal custody and equal physical 
custody.1343 Gieser then filed this petition to change the child’s name to “Gieser-
Starling.”1344 The trial judge denied the petition, holding that Gieser failed to carry his 
burden of proof that the name change was in the best interests of the child.1345 The 
supreme court held that this was an initial naming dispute, in which the parents disagreed 
even before the birth of the child without any acquiescence by Gieser.1346 Thus, the 
burden of proof should not have fallen on Gieser.1347 Moreover, the placement of the 
burden was an important factor in the superior court’s decision.1348 The supreme court 
then laid out the appropriate factors in considering a name dispute without making a 
ruling thereon.1349 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the superior 
court erred by allocating the burden of proof to the father in an initial naming dispute 
where neither parent should have borne the burden of proof.1350 
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Josephine B. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Josephine B. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services,1351 
the supreme court held that it is not necessary to establish gross parental misconduct in 
order to find that a child suffered a mental injury under the Child in Need of Aid (CINA) 
statute.1352 Josephine B. and her husband Jacob were twice accused of physically abusing 
Josephine’s three children, but insufficient evidence was found to indicate such abuse.1353 
In 2006, Josephine’s oldest daughter, Ashley, contacted a social worker and reported that 
her parents were engaging in extreme military disciplinary techniques.1354 As a result, the 
Department of Health and Social Services filed emergency petitions for adjudication of 
the three children as children in need of aid under the CINA statute.1355 The superior 
court issued an order adjudicating Ashley as a child in need of aid because she had 
suffered mental injury.1356 Josephine B. appealed this adjudication, arguing that the 
superior court used an incorrect standard of mental injury for CINA purposes because 
such a standard did not establish gross parental misconduct.1357 The supreme court 
affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that it was not necessary to establish 
gross parental misconduct in order to find that a child suffered a mental injury under the 
CINA statute.1358 
 
Katz v. Murphy 
In Katz v. Murphy,1359 the supreme court held that an ex parte warrant taking a 
child away from a parent without notifying that parent violates Alaska’s Uniform Child 
Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), but consenting to the 
registration of another state’s custody order bars that parent from challenging the custody 
order on jurisdictional or lack of notice grounds.1360 After Katz and Murphy divorced, a 
Georgia court gave Katz, the mother, custody of their son.1361 Later, Katz moved to 
Alaska with their son while Murphy settled in South Carolina.1362 After a South Carolina 
court ordered custody transferred to Murphy, the Alaska  superior court expedited 
registration and enforcement of that custody order because Murphy feared that Katz 
would flee with their son.1363 Katz was not notified until after Murphy had taken custody 
of their son, but at a later superior court hearing, Katz’s attorney consented to registering 
the South Carolina custody order.1364 The supreme court held that under the UCCJEA, 
expedited registration and enforcement of a custody order requires the parent losing 
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custody to be immediately notified to have an opportunity to challenge.1365 The supreme 
court found that Murphy only mailed notice to Katz after already taking their son, and 
that he could not adequately demonstrate that Katz would immediately flee with their 
son, so the superior court erred in expediting registration and enforcement of the South 
Carolina custody order.1366 However, the supreme court further held that Katz ultimately 
waived her right to challenge the South Carolina custody order on lack of notice and 
jurisdictional grounds because her attorney consented to registering the order, and new 
issues cannot be raised on appeal absent plain error.1367 Even though the ex parte removal 
was in error, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s registration of the South 
Carolina custody order,1368 holding that an ex parte warrant taking a child away from a 
parent without notifying that parent violates the UCCJEA, but a parent’s consent to the 
registration of another state’s custody order bars challenging the custody order on 
jurisdictional or lack of notice grounds.1369 
 
McDonald v. Trihub 
In McDonald v. Trihub,1370 the supreme court held that the superior court’s 
determinations of child support obligations were appropriate, even though they 
contradicted the findings of a prior administrative hearing.1371 Yvonne Trihub and Curtis 
McDonald had a child together in 1992 but were never married.1372 Determination of 
McDonald’s child support obligations and arrears went forward in two parallel 
proceedings.1373 First, McDonald requested administrative review of a child support 
order, arguing that the order overestimated his income and failed to base his obligations 
on shared custody.1374 Second, McDonald filed a complaint for joint custody in superior 
court, and Trihub filed a counterclaim on child support arrears.1375 After the 
administrative judge reduced McDonald’s child support obligations in its proceeding, the 
superior court issued a separate order for a larger amount of child support based on a 
different finding of custody.1376 McDonald appealed the superior court’s decision, 
arguing inter alia that the court was bound by the administrative decision and that the 
court’s order was an impermissible retroactive modification.1377 The supreme court held 
that McDonald had both waived his right to assert collateral estoppel and waived his 
statutory right to claim that the administrative tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction.1378 
Further, because neither party had exercised its right to appeal the administrative order 
and because the time for filing an appeal had not yet lapsed, the supreme court held that 
there was no valid support order in effect at the time of the superior court order; 
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therefore, the superior court order was not an impermissible retroactive modification.1379 
Next, the supreme court held that the superior court’s determinations of physical custody 
and income were appropriate, since there was evidence supporting both 
determinations.1380 Finally, the supreme court held that awarding Trihub attorneys’ fees 
was not error, since McDonald conceded that the proceedings were not a divorce and thus 
the prevailing party is entitled to fees.1381 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the 
superior court, holding that its determinations of child support obligations were 
appropriate, even though they contradicted the findings of a prior administrative 
hearing.1382   
 
Mellard v. Mellard 
 In Mellard v. Mellard,1383 the supreme court held that the failure of the superior 
court to account for the value of the wife’s retirement account in dividing up the assets in 
a divorce proceeding constituted reversible error.1384 After trial, the court awarded each 
party its individual retirement accounts and valued the husband’s account at $346,319, 
but failed to place a value on the wife’s account.1385 The wife was awarded her 
survivorship benefit in the husband’s estate, and the husband was ordered to pay an 
additional sum to balance out the larger reward he received.1386 The supreme court 
regarded the missing value of the wife’s retirement account as an “evidentiary void” and 
the assignment of a value of zero constituted reversible error.1387 Therefore, the supreme 
court reversed and remanded the matter for reevaluation of the property division1388, 
holding that the failure of the superior court to account for the value of the wife’s 
retirement account in dividing up the assets in a divorce proceeding constituted reversible 
error.1389 
 
Miller v. Clough 
In Miller v. Clough,1390 the supreme court held that the potential wealth of a 
voluntarily underemployed collector of child support under Civil Rule 90.3(a)(4) need 
not be recalculated merely on account of marriage to a wealthy spouse1391 and also held 
that when the parties to a dispute each win on non-overlapping claims, it is not manifestly 
unreasonable to determine that, for the purposes of Civil Rule 82, neither party was the 
prevailing party.1392 In 2002, the superior court ordered Miller to pay child support to 
Clough, his former wife.1393 In determining the award, the superior court found that 
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Clough was voluntarily underemployed and, under Civil Rule 90.3(a)(4), imputed 
potential annual earnings to her for the purposes of calculation.1394 In 2005, Miller moved 
in the superior court for a modification of his child support obligations on the grounds 
that his daughter with Clough now lived with him and that Clough’s potential earnings 
for child support calculations should be increased because she had since married a 
wealthy man.1395 The superior court ruled that Clough’s remarriage alone was not enough 
to justify reexamining her potential income,1396 and that support calculations should be 
recalculated in light of the parties’ daughter’s move to Miller’s home.1397 After this, 
Clough moved for an award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that Miller had filed at least seven 
motions to reduce his child-support obligation, all of which had been struck or denied, 
and that she was thus the prevailing party.1398 The superior court denied this claim, noting 
that both parties had prevailed in certain aspects of the dispute.1399 Miller appealed the 
court’s refusal to reevaluate Clough’s potential income, arguing that Civil Rule 90.3(a)(4) 
allows for the re-imputation of potential income in the case of a voluntarily 
underemployed collector of child support who has become married.1400 Clough appealed 
the court’s refusal to grant her attorneys’ fees, arguing that she had won on all of the 
substantive issues whereas Miller had only obtained a temporary reduction of his child-
support obligation and that, under Civil Rule 82, she was the prevailing party.1401 
Addressing Miller’s argument, the supreme court noted that, for the purposes of Civil 
Rule 90.3(a)(4), the totality of circumstances should be considered to determine whether 
to calculate potential income but not necessarily in the calculation of the income.1402 The 
supreme court held that Clough’s husband’s wealth alone did not serve as evidence of 
increased earning potential.1403 Addressing Clough’s argument, the supreme court held 
that because Miller’s minimal victory was part of a factually distinct legal motion, it was 
reasonable for the superior court to determine that neither party was the prevailing 
party.1404 The supreme court affirmed the rulings of the superior court, holding that the 
potential wealth of a voluntarily underemployed collector of child support need not be 
recalculated merely on account of marriage to a wealthy spouse; and that when the parties 
to a dispute each win on non-overlapping claims, it is not manifestly unreasonable to 
determine that neither party was the prevailing party.1405 
 
Puddicombe v. Dreka  
In Puddicombe v. Dreka,1406 the supreme court held that the desirability of 
keeping a child with her siblings need not be the decisive factor in a custody suit, and that 
the superior court must specifically consider the relevant domestic violence provisions in 
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section 25.24.150(g)-(i) of the Alaska Statutes and the domestic violence exception in 
section 25.24.150(c)(6) of the Alaska Statutes.1407 Puddicombe, the child’s mother, 
appealed a decision by the superior court that awarded primary and sole legal custody to 
the child’s father following her relocation to Arizona.1408 The superior court considered 
the location of the child’s half-siblings, in Arizona, but concluded that this factor should 
not be decisive because the child’s current stable and satisfactory environment in Alaska 
was in her best interest.1409 The superior court also addressed the alleged domestic 
violence by both parties, but the supreme court concluded that the superior court had 
failed to make specific findings of fact of the relevant child-custody factors, as required 
by section 25.24.150(c), including whether or not there existed a continuing threat to the 
health and safety of either parent or the child.1410 The supreme court vacated the custody 
award by the superior court, holding that the desirability of keeping a child with her 
siblings need not be the decisive factor in a custody suit, and that the superior court must 
specifically consider the relevant domestic violence provisions in section 25.24.150(g)-(i) 
of the Alaska Statutes and the domestic violence exception in section 25.24.150(c)(6) of 
the Alaska Statutes.1411 
 
Rosen v. Rosen 
In Rosen v. Rosen,1412 the supreme court held that (1) upholding child support 
agreements that comport with section 90.3 of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
generally not an abuse of discretion;1413 (2) where clerical error prevents a decree from 
being signed, retroactively enforcing the original agreement is not an impermissible, 
retroactive modification;1414 (3) a lower court may properly deny a motion for 
modification where the current agreement meets the minimum requirements of section 
90.3 at the time such motion is filed;1415 and (4) where an agreement requires consent of 
one party to elective medical procedures, refusal of consent must be reasonable and is 
subject to the duties of good faith and fair dealing.1416 Bettina and Carl Rosen were 
divorced in 1991 and reached a child custody, child support, spousal support, and 
property agreement.1417 Bettina filed susequent motions to modify the agreement and to 
recover medical expenses.1418 The superior court properly found that both the original 
decree and the partial modification met the minimum requirements of section 90.3 and 
were thus valid.1419 When the superior court signed the agreement in March 2005 and 
declared it effective as of January 2001, it was not an improper retroactive modification 
because the court would have originally signed the document were it not for clerical 
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error.1420 The superior court properly determined no modification was required because in 
2004, at the time of Bettina’s motion to modify, the income cap had not yet been raised to 
$100,000 and therefore Carl’s payments met the requirements of section 90.3.1421 Citing 
the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, the supreme court vacated the 
judgment of the lower court and found that if Carl had unreasonably withheld consent for 
their  child’s orthodontic expenses he must reimburse all of Bettina’s costs.1422 The 
supreme court thus affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the superior 
court.1423 
 
Shepherd v. Haralovich 
In Shepherd v. Haralovich,1424 the supreme court held that considering income-
producing capabilities of proceeds from the sale of an asset is appropriate in determining 
child support payments, but that failing to deduct federal income tax liability when 
determining gross income is error.1425 Shepherd appealed an order from the superior court 
denying her motion to reconsider determination of her gross income, which the court had 
readjusted due to rental income.1426 Shepherd claimed that the court had imputed rental 
income to her erroneously, arguing that rental income can only be imputed when a parent 
is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed.1427 The supreme court held that the lower 
courts had not imputed rental income to Shepherd, but rather, reasonable investment 
income from some portion of the net proceeds from the sale of rental property.1428 The 
court further held that this imputation was appropriate, since section 90.3(a)(4) of the 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure and also precedential cases expressly provide that 
income may be imputed for assets, regardless of a parent’s employment status.1429 
Finally, the court held that it was error to assume that Shepherd would have no income 
tax liability in 2004 based on her 2002 tax returns, since Shepherd implicitly argued in 
her brief that her zero tax liability in 2002 was a one-time event and explicitly stated as 
much in her statement of the case.1430 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s 
imputation of income to Shepherd and remanded to the trial court to recalculate 
Shepherd’s gross income to account for federal income tax liability, holding that 
considering income-producing capabilities of proceeds from the sale of an asset is 
appropriate in determining child support payments, but that failing to deduct federal 
income tax liability when determining gross income is error.1431 
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State, Department of Health and Human Services v. Doherty  
In State, Department of Health and Human Services v. Doherty,1432 the supreme 
court held that (1) a superior court must apply the proper two-part federal test for 
qualified immunity to a social worker and (2) a social worker may re-litigate the factual 
issues in a prior child in need of aid case because the social worker was neither a party to, 
nor in privity with a party to, the prior suit.1433 On August 18, 2001, Kelly Sullivan 
Doherty and her daughter, Shannon Doherty, were treated at Fairbanks Memorial 
Hospital for domestic violence injuries.1434 Kelly refused to identify the abuser, and in 
2003, Eldridge, a social worker employed by the Department of Health and Social 
Services, Office of Children’s Services, filed a petition to terminate Kelly’s parental 
rights of Shannon and removed Shannon from Kelly’s care.1435 The supreme court found 
that the superior court erred by applying Alaska’s three-part test to determine if Eldridge 
had qualified immunity, rather than the required federal two-part test for state officers.1436 
Furthermore, the supreme court found that the termination of the parental rights hearing 
was insufficient to estop Eldridge from re-litigating factual issues adjudicated during that 
hearing because government employees, in their individual capacities, are generally not 
in privity with the government nor are they bound by adverse determinations against the 
government.1437 The supreme court vacated and remanded the superior court, holding that 
(1) a superior court must apply the proper two-part federal test for qualified immunity to 
a social worker and (2_ a social worker may re-litigate the factual issues in a prior child 
in need of aid case because the social worker was neither a party to, nor in privity with a 
party to, the prior suit.1438 
 
Terry S. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Terry S. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1439 the supreme 
court held that the superior court did not err in (1) rejecting a father’s peremptory 
disqualification of the superior court judge, (2) deciding by clear and convincing 
evidence that the father’s continued custody of his children would cause them emotional 
or physical damage, (3) requiring the father to undergo sex-offender treatment before 
being allowed to visit his children, or (4) failing to apply a “reasonable doubt” standard to 
its findings.1440  The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) placed Terry’s children with 
their maternal grandmother after the death of their mother and initiated Child in Need of 
Aid (CINA) proceedings.1441 After a number of proceedings in front of the same judge, 
the court determined by clear and convincing evidence that Terry had sexually abused 
one of his daughters and that his children faced harm in his custody, so the judge placed 
the children in the custody of their maternal grandmother, conditioning Terry’s visitation 
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rights upon his successful participation in sex offender treatment.1442 Terry appealed.1443 
The supreme court held that (1) the subsequent guardianship proceeding did not 
“reinvigorate” Terry’s right to peremptorily disqualify the judge, since it did not “give 
rise to a separate and distinct guardianship case,”1444 (2) the superior court’s finding that 
Terry’s continued custody would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
children was supported by sufficient evidence,1445 (3) conditioning Terry’s visitation 
rights upon successful participation in sex offender treatment was justified because of the 
strong interest in protecting the children,1446 and (4) the limitations on visitation were not 
a termination of visitation rights and thus did not require evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt.1447  Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the superior court did 
not err in (1) rejecting a father’s peremptory disqualification of the superior court judge, 
(2) deciding by clear and convincing evidence that the father’s continued custody of his 
children would cause them emotional or physical damage, (3) requiring the father to 
undergo sex-offender treatment before being allowed to visit his children, or (4) failing to 
apply a “reasonable doubt” standard to its findings.1448 
 
Thomas v. Thomas 
In Thomas v. Thomas, 1449 the supreme court held that (1) gold coins belonging to 
a wife in a divorce proceeding had not been transmuted into marital property because the 
wife had not shown any intention to do so, and (2) that the failure of the superior court to 
indicate which factors guided its custody disposition made the issue unreviewable.1450 
Gail, the wife, had purchased $50,000 worth of gold coins prior to the divorce and had 
taken no steps to indicate an intention to convert the coins to marital property.1451 In a 
separate issue, the superior court had awarded Kevin primary physical custody and sole 
legal custody of the children, but the court failed to indicate which factors it had used in 
making this determination.1452 On appeal, Gail challenged the court’s custody decision, 
and Kevin challenged the determination that the gold coins were separate property and 
that Gail was not required to pay child support.1453 Noting that the superior court was 
required to consider the nine factors articulated in section 25.24150(c) of the Alaska 
Statutes, the supreme court concluded that the superior court erred in not considering 
some of them.1454  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the gold coins had not been 
transmuted into marital property because there was no affirmative action by Gail 
suggesting an intent to transmute the coins.1455 The supreme court remanded the case to 
the superior court, holding that (1) gold coins belonging to a wife in a divorce proceeding 
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had not been transmuted into marital property because the wife had not shown any 
intention to do so, and (2) that the failure of the superior court to indicate which factors 
guided its custody disposition made the issue unreviewable.1456 
 
Ward v. Urling 
In Ward v. Urling,1457 the supreme court held that Urling was not unreasonably 
underemployed, that it was appropriate not to impute income to her in a child support 
calculation, and that Urling’s tax return was unnecessary to determine the calculation.1458 
Ward petitioned the court to reconsider a child-support calculation nine years after a 
support order, claiming that his wife’s changed financial and marital status amounted to a 
material change in circumstance.1459 The supreme court noted that Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1) 
allowed a child support award to be modified only upon a showing of a material change 
in circumstance, which is presumed where there is a fifteen percent difference between 
support calculated under the rule and the outstanding support order.1460 However, Ward 
was unable to produce a preponderance of evidence showing either a legal or factual 
change that amounted to such a material change in circumstances.1461 The supreme court 
also affirmed the superior court’s awarding of attorney’s fees, concluding that the amount 
of fees awarded was not manifestly unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion because 
Urling’s attorney provided representation at two separate evidentiary hearings with seven 
total witnesses.1462 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling, holding that 
that Urling was not unreasonably underemployed, that it was appropriate not to impute 
income to her in a child support calculation, and that Urling’s tax return was unnecessary 
to determine the calculation.1463 
 
 
 
HEALTH LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst. 
 In Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,1464 the supreme court held that the 
appellant was not entitled to attorneys’ fees in her civil commitment proceeding despite 
its dismissal without prejudice.1465 Alaska Psychiatric Institute had petitioned for the 
continued commitment of Wetherhorn but chose to file a dismissal of its petition without 
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prejudice.1466 After this was granted, Wetherhorn moved for attorneys’ fees under Civil 
Rule 82.1467 The supreme court agreed with the superior court in ruling that Civil Rule 82 
did not apply in civil commitment hearings since the parties were not truly adverse and 
that if attorneys’ fees were at risk, the state may be reluctant in performing “protective 
litigation” for those in need of commitment.1468 The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s decision, holding that e appellant was not entitled to attorneys’ fees in her civil 
commitment proceeding despite its dismissal without prejudice.1469 
 
 
 
INSURANCE LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Falgoust 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Falgoust,1470 the supreme court held that a household 
exclusion clause in an insurance policy extends to the foster children of the named 
insured.1471 The Falgousts’ foster children brought tort claims against the Falgousts.1472 In 
a hearing before the superior court, the Falgousts’ insurance provider asked for a 
declaratory judgment that the household exclusion clause, which excludes from liability 
coverage claims brought against a named insured by any “insured person,” applied to the 
claims of the Falgousts’ foster children.1473 The superior court refused to grant the 
declaratory judgment action.1474 Interpreting the policy such that ambiguities are resolved 
favorably for the insured, the supreme court held that (1) the terms “dependant in your 
care” and “resident” in the insurance policy were unambiguous; (2) foster children are 
“dependent persons;” (3) and the foster children here were residents.1475 For these 
reasons, the household exclusion in the insurance policy blocked the insurance provider 
from having any obligation to the insured.1476  The supreme court reversed the superior 
court, holding that a household exclusion clause in an insurance policy extends to the 
foster children of the named insured.1477 
 
Ayres v. United Services Automobile Ass’n 
In Ayers v. United Services Automobile Ass’n,1478 the supreme court held that 
written waiver of uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage is not required 
                                                
1466 Id. at 702. 
1467 Id. 
1468 Id. at 703. 
1469 Id. at 704. 
1470 160 P.3d 134 (Alaska 2007) 
1471 Id. at 140–41.   
1472 Id. at 135. 
1473 Id. at 136 
1474 Id at 137. 
1475 Id. at 138–41. 
1476 Id.  
1477 Id. at 140–42.   
1478 No. S-12018, 2007 Alas. LEXIS 59 (Alaska May 25, 2007). 
 109 
unless the insured opts for no UIM coverage or UIM coverage below statutory 
minimums.1479  Ayers’ insurance company refused to pay her above the amount of her 
UIM coverage after she had extinguished the liability coverage of the driver at fault in a 
car accident.1480  Her UIM coverage was less than her liability coverage.1481  Ayers 
argued that under section 21.89.020 of the Alaska statutes, written waiver was required 
before her insurance company could issue a policy in which the UIM coverage was less 
than the liability coverage.1482  The supreme court held that so long as UIM coverage is 
above the statutory minimum established in sections 28.20.440 and 28.22.101of the 
Alaska statutes, written waiver is not required, and noted that in previous cases it held 
that waiver was necessary only when the insured opts for no UIM coverage.1483 The 
supreme court held written waiver of UIM coverage is not required unless the insured 
opts for no UIM coverage or UIM coverage below statutory minimums.1484 
 
Gibson v. Geico General Insurance Co. 
In Gibson v. Geico General Insurance Co.,1485 the supreme court held that in a 
trial where the sole issue was the insured’s damages, the insured was not entitled to 
depose insurance adjustors or to advise the jury that she was insured against underinsured 
drivers.1486 Gibson brought suit against Geico, her insurance carrier, to recover 
underinsured motorist benefits after being struck by another driver whose policy limit 
was $50,000.1487 The jury awarded Gibson a $68,611 judgment and the superior court 
offset the $50,000 insurance award.1488 Gibson appealed, raising a number of procedural 
issues.1489 The supreme court held that Gibson was not entitled to depose Geico claim 
adjusters because the probative value of information they could offer as to Gibson’s 
injuries was small, given the availability of medical records and other testimony.1490 Nor 
was Gibson entitled to introduce evidence that she carried an underinsured motorist 
policy with Geico, since referring to Geico as Gibson’s insurance company was sufficient 
to alert the jury of the parties’ positions.1491 The supreme court further held that damages 
were proper since it was appropriate to deduct the $50,000 Gibson had already received 
from her total damages, interest was calculated only on the amount for which Geico was 
liable,1492 and Gibson failed to produce receipts that supported her claim for damages.1493 
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that in a trial 
where the sole issue was the insured’s damages, the insured was not entitled to depose 
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insurance adjustors or to advise the jury that she was insured against underinsured 
drivers.1494 
 
Nelson v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. 
 In Nelson v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,1495 the supreme court held that 
named driver exclusions apply in negligent entrustment cases and that such exclusions 
are a valid exception to mandatory minimum liability protection.1496 Nelson, while 
walking a crosswalk, was struck by a car driven by Ulisese, an uninsured and unlicensed 
driver using his parents’ car.1497 Nelson filed a claim against Progressive, the Uliseses’ 
insurance company, which Progressive denied because the Uliseses had excluded their 
son from their coverage through the policy’s “Named Driver Exclusion.”1498 Nelson then 
filed suit against Progressive.1499 In finding for Progressive, the court explained that 
Nelson could not proceed against Progressive under a negligent entrustment claim 
because negligent entrustment requires the younger Ulisese to be negligent, and his 
negligence was explicitly excluded from coverage.1500 In addressing Nelson’s challenge 
to the validity of the exclusion, the court reasoned that the exclusion was consistent with 
the general policy of insuring every driver because it allows policyholders to avoid 
excessive premiums and encourages the excluded driver to obtain his own insurance.1501 
Therefore, the supreme court affirmed, holding that named driver exclusions apply in 
negligent entrustment cases and that such exclusions are a valid exception to mandatory 
minimum liability protection.1502 
 
Premera Blue Cross v. State  
In Premera Blue Cross v. State,1503 the supreme court held that a retaliatory tax 
imposed on out-of-state insurers in Alaska pursuant to section 21.09.270(a) of the Alaska 
Statutes did not violate Alaska’s equal protection and substantive due process clauses 
because the purposes of retaliatory tax statutes in general, and of section 21.09.270 in 
particular, were furthered by such an application.1504 Section 21.09.270(a) of the Alaska 
Statutes imposes a retaliatory tax on out-of-state insurers in Alaska to the extent that the 
taxes, licenses, and fees imposed on Alaska insurers by other states exceeded those under 
the statute.1505 Blue Cross, a Washington-based insurance company, refused to pay a 
portion of the retaliatory tax required under section 21.09.270(a) in 1997 and requested a 
refund for the excess retaliatory taxes it paid in 1995 and 1996.1506 Blue Cross argued that 
the tax violated both the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the 
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Alaska Constitution.1507 The supreme court held that this particular application of the tax 
was in line with the constitutionally sound purpose of retaliatory tax statutes, which is to 
deter other states from enacting discriminatory taxes of their own.1508 Additionally, the 
general purpose of section 21.09.270, to equalize taxes across states, was fairly and 
substantially furthered.1509 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s judgment 
holding that a retaliatory tax imposed on out-of-state insurers in Alaska pursuant to 
section 21.09.270(a) of the Alaska Statutes did not violate Alaska’s equal protection and 
substantive due process clauses because the purposes of retaliatory tax statutes in general, 
and of section 21.09.270 in particular, were furthered by such an application.1510 
 
State, Department of Commerce v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. 
In State, Department of Commerce v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,1511 the 
supreme court held that section 21.36.460(d)(1) of the Alaska statutes prevents using 
credit scores “frozen” at the beginning of a policy as the basis for underwriting at the 
policy’s renewal,1512 and, furthermore, that section 21.36.460 of the Alaska Statutes is not 
preempted by the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).1513 Progressive Casualty 
Insurance Company and two other Progressive companies (collectively “Progressive”) 
petitioned the Alaska Division of Insurance to allow them to use  policyholders’ credit 
scores as they existed at policy initiation to make underwriting risk determinations at 
policy renewal.1514 The Division rejected Progressive’s request on the grounds that this 
would violate section 21.36.460(d)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, which prohibits 
underwriting based in whole or in part on a consumer’s credit history.1515 Progressive 
appealed to the superior court, which overturned the Division’s decision, and the Division 
appealed to the supreme court.1516 Progressive argued that its plan fell outside the range 
of what is covered by section 21.36.460(d)(1) of the Alaska Statutes and that the 
encompassing statute is preempted by the FCRA.1517 The supreme court held that the plan 
fell under the plain-language meaning of the provision and that the legislative history of 
the statute supported the Division’s interpretation.1518 The supreme court further held that 
the FCRA did not preempt section 21.36.460 of the Alaska Statutes because they had the 
common objective of consumer protection.1519 The supreme court reversed the order of 
the superior court, holding that section 21.36.460(d)(1) of the Alaska Statutes prevents 
using credit scores “frozen” at the beginning of a policy as the basis for underwriting at 
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the policy’s renewal,1520 and, furthermore, that section 21.36.460 of the Alaska Statutes is 
not preempted by the FCRA.1521 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof 
 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof,1522 the supreme 
court held that when an automobile insurance policyholder is not underinsured with 
respect to court-awarded attorneys’ fees, the insurer does not have to pay additional 
attorneys fees pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82.1523 Lestenkof sued Odden for wrongful 
death after her husband died of injuries sustained from a car accident, where he was a 
passenger in Odden’s car.1524 Odden’s insurance policy, issued by State Farm, included 
liability coverage of up to $50,000 of bodily injury per person and $100,000 per accident, 
with equivalent uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (UIM).1525 The policy did not 
have a valid limitation on Alaska Civil Rule 82 attorneys’ fees.1526 Lestenkof and State 
Farm settled the case, but State Farm appealed the superior court’s award of unlimited 
attorneys’ fees, as part of the UIM coverage, to Lestenkof.1527 The supreme court 
reversed, holding that when an automobile insurance policyholder is not underinsured 
with respect to court-awarded attorneys’ fees, the insurer does not have to pay additional 
attorneys fees pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82.1528 
 
 
 
PROPERTY LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
United States v. 191.07 Acres of Land 
In United States v. 191.07 Acres of Land,1529 the Ninth Circuit held that the owner 
of gold mining claims acquired by the government through inverse condemnation was not 
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of just compensation.1530 When Congress expanded the 
boundaries of Denali Park in 1980, the National Park Service acquired surface 
jurisdiction over Martinek’s eleven gold mining claims comprising 191.07 acres.1531 
Though all mining operations in the park were halted from 1985 to 1991, restricting 
Martinek’s ability to mine his claims, the United States did not initiate condemnation 
proceedings of the claims until 1998.1532 Martinek requested a jury trial, but the district 
                                                
1520 Id. at 628–31. 
1521 Id. at 633. 
1522 155 P.3d 313 (Alaska 2007). 
1523 Id. at 314.  
1524 Id. at 314–15. 
1525 Id. at 314. 
1526 Id. 
1527 Id. at 316. 
1528 Id. at 318. 
1529 482 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2007). 
1530 Id. at 1136–37. 
1531 Id. at 1134. 
1532 Id. 
 113 
court held that, because both parties had stipulated to a taking date earlier than the 
declaration of taking, the mining claims were acquired through inverse condemnation and 
Martinek was not entitled to a jury trial.1533 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
owner of gold mining claims acquired by the government through inverse condemnation 
was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of just compensation.1534 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Allen v. Vaughn 
In Allen v. Vaughn,1535 the supreme court held that inexplicit language of a 
property settlement agreement would not be interpreted as a forfeiture provision because 
equity does not favor forfeiture.1536 Following a divorce settlement, Allen and Vaughn 
entered a new property agreement wherein each would receive one parcel of land and buy 
out the other’s interest in that parcel.1537 As their hand-written agreement provided, “[i]f 
the note is not satisfied, . . . Vaughn will maintain an interest of 50% in [Allen’s] . . . 
property.”1538 After Allen failed to pay what he owed, the two disputed the meaning of 
the contract provision; Vaughn asserted that Allen had forfeited 50% of his interest in the 
property, while Allen asserted that Vaughn retained an interest in the property until he 
paid her in full.1539 The court analyzed the agreement under general contract principles 
and stated that forfeiture is a disfavored remedy.1540 The supreme court reversed and 
remanded, holding that inexplicit language of a property settlement agreement would not 
be interpreted as a forfeiture provision because equity does not favor forfeiture.1541 
 
Denardo v. Corneloup 
 In Denardo v. Corneloup,1542 the supreme court held that a landlord is not liable 
to one tenant for the second-hand smoke of another tenant under battery, trespass, or 
nuisance theories.1543 Denardo and Corneloup rented adjacent apartments in a building 
owned by Foreman Properties.1544 Denardo began complaining to Corneloup that he 
could smell Corneloup’s cigarette smoke and soon filed suit against Corneloup under 
theories of battery, trespass, and nuisance.1545 Denardo amended his complaint to add 
Foreman as a defendant after Denardo evicted him.1546 The superior court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.1547 On appeal, the court reasoned 
that, though blowing smoke in someone’s face could be considered battery, neither 
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defendant acted with the requisite level of intent.1548 The court rejected the trespass claim 
against Foreman because a landlord does not control a tenant and rejected the nuisance 
claim against Corneloup because smoking is not considered a private nuisance.1549 Also, 
smoking is not an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability since the dangers of 
second-hand smoke can be avoided with due care.1550 The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court, holding that a landlord is not liable to one tenant for the second-hand 
smoke of another tenant under battery, trespass, or nuisance theories.1551 
 
Vezey v. Green 
In Vezey v. Green,1552 the supreme court held that there was insufficient evidence 
to support a finding of adverse possession for all 300 feet to the west of Green’s cabin, 
since Green only produced evidence of her exercise of dominion and control over the 
land forty feet west of her cabin.1553 Green’s grandmother gave a piece of the family’s 
land to Green in 1982, and sometime between 1982 and the mid-1990’s Green built a 
cabin on the property, clearing the area around the cabin.1554 Vezey purchased a two-
thirds interest in a parcel of land that included Green’s property, and after Vezey’s 
purchase, Green brought suit to establish her right to a portion of the land by several 
means, including adverse possession.1555 The superior court determined that Green had 
acquired the entire 300 feet to the west of her property by adverse possession and Vezey 
challenged this finding.1556 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of 
Vezey’s Rule 60(b) motion, found that the motion was barred by the statute of 
limitations,1557 and concluded that a longstanding public trail created an easement on both 
Green and Vezey’s properties.1558 Finally, the court affirmed that Green had a fee simple 
title to the land forty fee to the west of her property.1559 The supreme court affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding 
of adverse possession for all 300 feet to the west of Green’s cabin, since Green only 
produced evidence of her exercise of dominion and control over the land forty feet west 
of her cabin.1560 
 
Walker v. Walker 
In Walker v. Walker,1561 the supreme court held that the superior court’s failure to 
make findings to justify the inequitable distribution of property between a husband and 
wife or to reallocate the property equally amounted to an abuse of discretion.1562 John 
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Walker filed for divorce from Susan Walker in 2002.1563 The superior court initially 
divided the marital property so that the parties received approximately $140,000 each.1564 
However, during a status hearing, the superior court discovered that it had incorrectly 
valued an asset it allotted to John, and that the correct figure reduced the value of John’s 
share by $46,396.86.1565 In spite of the error, the superior court did not change the 
distribution to correct the inequality.1566 John appealed, arguing that the superior court 
erred in awarding more than fifty percent of the martial estate to Susan without making 
findings to support the award.1567 The supreme court vacated the property division and 
remanded, holding that the superior court’s failure to make findings to justify the 
inequitable distribution of property between a husband and wife or to reallocate the 
property equally amounted to an abuse of discretion.1568 
 
Ware v. Ware 
In Ware v. Ware,1569 the supreme court held that when property is transferred 
inter vivos from parent to child, there is a presumption that the transfer was a gift and that 
elderly people are not presumptively incompetent.1570 A mother and sole trustee of the 
family homestead conveyed the homestead to one of her sons.1571 A daughter brought suit 
against her brother, arguing the homestead had been conveyed under circumstances of 
undue influence and that her brother had been unjustly enriched.1572 The superior court 
granted summary judgment to the son, dismissed the daughter’s claims with prejudice 
and ordered the daughter to pay her brother’s attorneys’ fees in excess of the statutory 
minimum.1573 The supreme court concluded that the transfer was properly a gift from 
parent to child, because there was no evidence of undue influence (either premised on 
coercion or the existence of a confidential relationship between mother and son), and the 
mother had the mental capacity to make the gift.1574 The unjust enrichment claim was 
improper because no benefit was alleged to have accrued from the daughter to the 
brother.1575 Finally, the superior court’s reasons for awarding attorneys’ fees above the 
statutory minimum were legitimate.1576 The supreme court affirmed, holding that when 
property is transferred inter vivos from parent to child, there is a presumption that the 
transfer was a gift and that elderly people are not presumptively incompetent.1577 
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TORT LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Bolt v. United States  
In Bolt v. United States,1578 the Ninth Circuit held that clearing snow and ice from 
parking lots constituted a matter of routine maintenance, with no discretionary 
component, and therefore the discretionary function exception of the Federal Torts Claim 
Act (“FTCA”) did not apply.1579 Bolt suffered permanent injuries as a result of her slip 
and fall on snow and ice in a parking lot of the U.S. Army apartment complex where she 
lived.1580 Bolt brought a negligence claim against the United States under the FTCA.1581 
In determining whether the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that it was immaterial whether the Army’s “Snow Removal 
Policy” is more specific than the analogous state law duty.1582 Rather, using the two-part 
Gaubert test,1583 the court concluded, first, that the Army failed its burden of proving an 
issue of discretion because its Snow Removal Policy expressly imposes a specific and 
mandatory annual duty to clear snow and ice from Family Housing Parking Areas.1584 
Second, the Ninth Circuit found that even if the Army had some discretion in deciding 
when to clear the snow, this was not the type of decision-making that the discretionary 
function exception was meant to protect.1585 Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
summary judgment was not appropriate because, regardless of the local municipality’s 
similar duty, the FTCA creates no exceptions for government conduct similar to that 
undertaken by municipalities.1586  The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, holding that clearing snow and ice from parking lots constituted a 
matter of routine maintenance, with no discretionary component, and therefore the 
discretionary function exception of the FTCA did not apply.1587   
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Brandner v. Hudson 
In Brandner v. Hudson,1588  the supreme court held that (1) the superior court’s 
admission of evidence of domestic violence at a bench trial was, if anything, harmless 
error; and (2) the superior court’s ruling regarding compensatory and punitive damages 
was warranted.1589 At the hospital where they both worked, Brandner pulled Hudson by 
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the arm and thrust her into her chair, twisting her knee in the process.1590 Hudson brought 
suit for negligence and assault, and the trial judge awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages.1591 Brandner appealed, arguing that evidence of his record of domestic violence 
was improperly admitted and challenged the court’s assessment of damages.1592   First, 
the supreme court held that admission of Brandner’s record of domestic violence was, if 
anything, harmless error because it was not abuse of discretion for the trial judge to rule 
that the probative value of the evidence as to determining Hudson’s state of mind 
outwieghed the possible prejudice to Brandney where a judge was the trier of fact.1593 
Second, the damage award for emotional distress was warranted because whether a 
victim’s reaction to an incident is unusual is not relevant to damages.1594 Third, punitive 
damages were appropriate because there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Brandner’s conduct was sufficiently outrageous and reckless.1595 Affirming the superior 
court, the supreme court held that (1) the superior court’s admission of evidence of 
domestic violence at a bench trial was, if anything, harmless error; and (2) the superior 
court’s ruling regarding compensatory and punitive damages was warranted.1596 
 
Christiansen v. Christiansen 
In Christiansen v. Christiansen,1597 the supreme court held that admiralty 
jurisdiction did not displace Alaska’s social-host immunity provision where a vessel 
owner acted merely as an unlicensed social-host.1598  Almeria Christiansen brought a 
wrongful death action against Kenny Christiansen when her husband fell off a dock and 
drowned after drinking on Kenny’s boat.1599 Almeria appealed the superior court’s 
decision to apply Alaska’s social-host immunity provision and grant Kenny partial 
summary judgment, arguing that federal maritime law imposed a duty on Kenny to 
supervise and control drinking on the boat that should not be limited by state law.1600 The 
supreme court held that admiralty jurisdiction did not displace the state law because (1) 
no controlling federal rule existed imposing liability on unlicensed social-hosts or 
abrogating common law social-host immunity, therefore applying the social-host 
immunity provision did not materially prejudice a characteristic feature of maritime 
law;1601 and because (2) there was no strong federal interest in dictating the availability of 
actionable wrongful death claims, therefore applying social-host immunity did not impair 
the essential uniformity and harmony of maritime law.1602 The supreme court affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment, holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not displace 
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Alaska’s social-host immunity provision where a vessel owner acted merely as an 
unlicensed social-host.1603 
 
Deptula v. Simpson  
In Deptula v. Simpson,1604 the supreme court held that sellers of a home and their 
listing agent who failed to disclose that the previous homeowner had died and 
decomposed in the house did not breach any duty to homebuyers who waived their 
statutory right to disclosure.1605 The Deptulas sold their mother’s home to the Williams 
through a realtor and executed a waiver agreement that released them from making 
statutorily mandated disclosures about the house.1606 The Williams brought suit against 
the sellers and their listing agent after discovering that decomposition of the previous 
owner’s body had caused structural damage to the kitchen subfloor.1607 The supreme 
court held that the Williams’ claims against the agent were not properly before the court, 
since the Williams had voluntarily dismissed the claims by asking for a final judgment 
against her under Rule 54(b) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.1608 The supreme 
court further held that the sellers owed no statutory duty of disclosure to the Williams, 
since the Williams had voluntarily and knowingly waived their statutory right to 
disclosure, under section 34.70.110 of the Alaska statutes.1609 Finally, the supreme court 
held that the Deptulas did not owe the Williams any common law duty of disclosure 
because the sellers did not give partial or misleading statements to the Williams when 
they honestly stated that they were not familiar with the condition of the house, and the 
sellers had no special relationship with the buyers since they were involved in an arms-
length commercial transaction and signed a contract containing an “as-is” clause.1610 The 
supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that sellers of a home 
and their listing agent who failed to disclose that the previous homeowner had died and 
decomposed in the house did not breach any duty to homebuyers who waived their 
statutory right to disclosure.1611 
 
Diblik v. Marcy 
In Diblik v. Marcy,1612 the supreme court held that a seller is not liable for 
misstatements made in a disclosure statement related to the sale of a home when the 
seller did not know or have reason to know his statements were false and that even if a 
seller makes misstatements in an addendum to a disclosure statement, the seller is not 
liable for those misstatements unless they are material.1613 Prior to the sale of his house to 
Diblik, Marcy had some work done on the septic system and an engineer concluded the 
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system was functioning properly.1614 Diblik was provided with copies of the engineer’s 
report and informed of some of the work done, however holes in the tank were 
discovered after he moved in.1615 The superior court found that Marcy was not liable to 
Diblik on grounds of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.1616 Reviewing the 
superior court’s decision for clear error, the supreme court held that (1) because Marcy 
relied on the report produced by the engineer, his belief that the problems were fixed 
nullified any argument that the disclosure statement had been fraudulently or negligently 
completed;1617 (2) for these same reasons and because Diblik both received the engineer’s 
report and discussed the repairs with the engineer, there was sufficient disclosure to 
satisfy the statutory requirement;1618 and (3) while Marcy admitted the statements made 
in the addendum were false, the statements were immaterial because a reasonable seller 
would have attached no significance to the repairs once the septic tank was certified by 
the engineer.1619 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a seller is not 
liable for misstatements made in a disclosure statement related to the sale of a home 
when the seller did not know his statements were false and that even if a seller makes 
misstatements in an addendum to a disclosure statement, the seller is not liable for those 
misstatements unless they are material.1620   
 
Diggins v. Jackson 
 In Diggins v. Jackson,1621 the supreme court held that a non-settling defendant 
may offset his liability with the plaintiff’s settlement award only in proportion to settling 
defendant’s comparative fault, even where proportional offset will result in the plaintiff’s 
double recovery.1622 After flipping his bike and fracturing his neck while riding on a 
bicycle path that was undergoing repairs, Jackson sued three contractors involved in 
repairing the path and settled with two of them for a total of $106,190.60.1623 In Jackson’s 
suit against Diggins Concrete, the third contractor, the jury found that Jackson’s damages 
totaled $94,943.40 and allocated ten percent of the fault to Diggins and seventy percent 
of the fault to Jackson.1624 Denying Diggins’ request to offset Jackson’s damages by the 
full amount of the pre-trial settlement, the superior court entered a judgment requiring 
Diggins to pay Jackson $9,494.34.1625 Following Petrolane Inc. v. Robles,1626 the 
supreme court held that a non-settling defendant may offset against his liability the 
plaintiff’s settlement award only in proportion to setting defendant’s comparative fault, 
even where proportional offset results in the plaintiff’s double recovery.1627 
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Groom v. State, Department of Transportation  
In Groom v. State, Department of Transportation,1628 the supreme court held that 
the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board violated due process when it failed to give 
adequate notice that it would reconsider a prior factual finding and that the board applied 
the incorrect legal standard in determining whether the state had rebutted a presumption 
of compensability.1629 Groom worked for the Department of Transportation and was 
injured when he allegedly fell on ice while inspecting a truck.1630 The board determined 
the injury was compensable.1631 Groom filed additional workers’ compensation claims 
following the hearing, culminating in a claim that the slip-and-fall caused either total or 
partial compensable disability.1632 Following a later hearing addressing this claim, the 
board overturned its decision that the injury was compensable.1633 Groom appealed, 
arguing that the board failed to give adequate notice that the finding of injury might be 
modified in the later hearing, and that the state failed to rebut the presumption of 
compensability.1634 The court held that notice to Groom was defective since (1) the board 
failed to identify the injury’s compensability as an issue for the later hearing, (2) the 
board never clarified whether subsequent workers’ compensation claims were distinct 
from the original slip-and-fall claim, and (3) the state affirmatively represented that it 
would not argue the issue.1635 This defective notice violated due process since Groom 
showed that he did not prepare specific evidence because he was unaware that the slip-
and-fall was at issue.1636 The court further held that the board should have considered 
whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Groom suffered no compensable, 
work-related partial disability in order to determine whether the state had overcome the 
presumption of compensability.1637 Since the board only considered whether the state had 
presented evidence to refute the existence of a permanent total disability, and since the 
state did not present evidence that Groom’s accident was not work-related, the state did 
not rebut the presumption.1638 The supreme court reversed the decision of the superior 
court, holding that the board violated due process when it failed to give adequate notice 
that it would reconsider a prior factual finding and that it applied the incorrect legal 
standard in determining whether the state had rebutted a presumption of 
compensability.1639   
 
Olivit v. City and Borough of Juneau 
In Olivit v. City and Borough of Juneau,1640 the supreme court held that summary 
judgment dismissal was proper because the underlying newspaper story about Olivit did 
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not amount to defamation.1641 In 2004, the Juneau Empire published an article with a 
headline stating, “City faces fifth lawsuit by man who claims harassment” in response to 
a lawsuit by Olivit against the city for harassment.1642 Six months later Olivit sued the 
newspaper, the reporter, and Juneau claiming that the defendants were retaliating against 
him by publishing the story.1643 The court found insufficient evidence of defamation 
because Olivit’s repeated lawsuits adversely affected the city, Olivit’s criminal charges 
and guilty pleas were matters of public interest, and none of the allegedly false 
information, even if false, was sufficient to establish defamation in any case.1644 The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment dismissal, 
holding that the underlying newspaper story about Olivit did not amount to 
defamation.1645 
 
Parnell v. Peak Oilfield Service Co. 
 In Parnell v. Peak Oilfield Service Co.,1646 the supreme court held that when 
multiple persons together create a hazard, each actor’s conduct substantially contributed 
to the hazard, and each actor realized the resulting danger of serious harm to others, then 
each person involved has created a hazard.1647 Early one morning, one of Peak Oilfield’s 
employees struck a moose at almost the exact same time that an unknown driver struck 
the same moose.1648 The employee continued on his way, and the moose’s carcass 
remained lying in the road.1649 Shortly after the collision, a car in which Parnell was the 
passenger struck the moose and flipped over, resulting in serious injuries to Parnell.1650 
The jury was confused about duty and breach, but the trial court refused to grant Parnell’s 
request for an instruction to clarify that more than one person could have created the 
hazard.1651 The jury then found for Peak Oilfield.1652 The supreme court reversed the trial 
court’s decision and held that the trial court should have given Parnell’s proffered 
instruction.1653 The court noted that but-for causation is not a strict prerequisite to 
imposing a duty.1654 Thus, the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that when 
multiple persons together create a hazard, each actor’s conduct substantially contributed 
to the hazard, and each actor realized the resulting danger of serious harm to others, then 
each person involved has created a hazard.1655 
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Petrolane Inc. v. Robles 
In Petrolane Inc. v. Robles,1656 the supreme court held that (1) the proportionate 
share rule applies to offsetting damage amounts owed by non-settling defendants; (2) 
failure to make an offer of proof does not amount to waiver of legal arguments; and (3) 
when a prior jury has determined that two defendants are liable, the jury in the 
adjudication of a third defendant’s liability may properly be instructed to assume the first 
two defendants are liable for at least a portion of the damages when assigning 
comparative liability among the three.1657 Robles, the operator of a gas station, and a 
customer were injured when a propane tank Robles was filling for the customer 
exploded.1658 The customer brought suit against Robles; Shoreside, the propane supplier; 
and Petrolane, the wholesaler.1659 Shoreside and Petrolane settled with the customer prior 
to the first trial, at which Petrolane and Robles were found liable for the customer’s 
damages.1660 Robles, who was also injured, brought suit against Shoreside and Petrolane, 
and Petrolane was found liable for Robles’s damages.1661 The amount of the settlement 
exceeded the total damages awarded to the customer.1662 A second trial was held to 
determine the liability of Shoreside, at which the jury found only Robles and Petrolane 
liable for the customer’s damages, and the court determined that because the settlement 
amount was greater than the customer’s total award, Robles owed nothing to the 
customer.1663 On appeal, Petrolane argued that (1) Robles was only entitled to an offset 
proportional to Petrolane’s share of the damages, and (2) a jury instruction in the second 
trial, asserting that Petrolane and Robles were liable, was prejudicial.1664 In responding to 
the first argument, Robles argued that Petrolane waived its right to make this argument 
for failing to make an offer of proof.1665 The supreme court held: (1) pursuant to the 
proportionate share rule, non-settling defendants may only offset what they owe an 
injured party by the proportionate share owed by the settling defendant(s); (2) while 
offers of proof are required to challenge rulings on the admission of evidence, they are 
not required to preserve legal arguments on appeal; and, (3) because the liability of 
Robles and Petrolane had been established by a jury and affirmed by the supreme court, 
and the second jury had been instructed not to infer anything from pre-established 
liability of two of the defendants, Petrolane had not been prejudiced by the jury 
instruction.1666 The supreme court affirmed in part reversed in part and remanded the case 
on the issue of offset, holding that (1) the proportionate share rule applies to offsetting 
damage amounts owed by non-settling defendants; (2) failure to make an offer of proof 
does not amount to waiver of legal arguments; and (3) when a prior jury has determined 
that two defendants are liable, the jury in the adjudication of a third defendant’s liability 
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may properly be instructed to assume the first two defendants are liable for at least a 
portion of the damages when assigning comparative liability among the three.1667 
 
Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety 
 In Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety,1668 the supreme court held that 
(1) arresting and supervising officers are entitled to qualified immunity to state tort and 
federal section 1983 claims,1669 (2) the superior court properly denied leave to amend on 
the eve of trial and other motions,1670 and (3) a court may only grant either Rule 68 or 
Rule 82 fees.1671 Prentzel was arrested for allegedly violating the conditions of his release 
on a DWI charge.1672 However, Prentzel was not subject to those conditions because he 
had earlier pleaded no contest to the charges, a change that was not yet recognized by the 
state’s records.1673 Prentzel then filed suit against the State, alleging false 
arrest/imprisonment, trespass to chattels, conversion, negligence, and section 1983 civil 
rights violations.1674 The supreme court began by holding that the arresting officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity to the false imprisonment claim because arrest is within 
their authority and the arrest here, though wrong, lacked malice.1675 The officers were 
also entitled to qualified immunity to the section 1983 claim because they had reasonable 
grounds to believe that Prentzel was engaged in unlawful conduct that was punishable by 
arrest.1676 Next, the court held that the supervising officers were also entitled to qualified 
immunity to the section 1983 claims because no evidence was presented of their personal 
involvement in the arrest, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity for the state 
negligence claims because no evidence was presented that there was a systemic problem 
with delayed record-keeping resulting in wrongful arrests.1677 The court then upheld the 
superior court’s decision to disallow Prentzel any more amendments or motions because 
no injustice appeared to have been committed, and Prentzel was given notice of all 
deadlines.1678 The court, though, vacated the decision to award post-offer judgment of 
attorneys’ fees to the State because the court incorrectly awarded both Rule 68 and Rule 
82 fees when it should have only awarded the greater fee.1679 The supreme court affirmed 
the decision of the superior court regarding everything but attorneys’ fees, holding that 
(1) the arresting and supervising officers were entitled to qualified immunity to state tort 
and federal section 1983 civil rights claims,1680 (2) the superior court properly denied 
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leave to amend on the eve of trial and other motions,1681 and (3) a court may only grant 
either Rule 68 or Rule 82 fees.1682 
 
Winschel v. Brown 
 In Winschel v. Brown,1683 the supreme court held that where there is sufficient 
evidence to raise issues of material fact regarding duty and injury, granting summary 
judgment is improper.1684 Winschel injured his head after he collided with a pole that 
Brown struck down earlier that day when Brown lost control of his vehicle.1685 The 
superior court granted summary judgment to Brown on the grounds that Brown owed no 
duty to Winschel, that Winschel’s conduct was a superseding cause for the accident, and 
that Winschel could not recover because it would be against public policy, as he was 
illegally using a motorized vehicle on a bike path.1686 Winschel appealed, and the 
supreme court held that Winschel was reasonable in asserting that Brown had a duty to 
use reasonable care when driving,1687 that the superior court applied a standard that was 
too narrow to assess foreseeability,1688 that the involvement of the police and the Alaska 
Department of Transportation did not sever a causal connection between Brown and 
Winschel’s injury,1689 and that Winschel’s conduct did not per se bar him from 
recovery.1690  The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that where there is 
sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact regarding duty and injury, granting 
summary judgment is improper.1691 
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